

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

*Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188*

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
	7 June 1996	Master's Thesis, 2 Aug 95-7 Jun 96
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE		5. FUNDING NUMBERS
TITLE: The <u>Small Wars Manual</u> and Military Operations Other Than War		
6. AUTHOR(S)		
Major RICHARD C. MCMONAGLE, U.S. Marine Corps		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-1352		
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 4		
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT		12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.		
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)		
<p>This study examines the applicability of the United States Marine Corps' small wars doctrine in current Military Operations Other Than War. Between 1898 and 1934, the Marine Corps was employed extensively in fighting the nation's small wars. These small wars included long-term occupations in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua and interventions in a number of other countries. From these experiences, the Marine Corps developed, during the 1920s and 1930s, a small wars doctrine, which was published in 1940 in its final form as the <u>Small Wars Manual</u>.</p> <p>This study examines the conditions under which the Marine Corps was employed in small wars, and how from this experience developed a doctrine for fighting small wars. The study then develops three thematic criteria for the examination of a small war, and, then, applies these criteria to a case study of Operation Uphold Democracy, the 1994 intervention in Haiti.</p> <p>The principle conclusion of this study is that the <u>Small Wars Manual</u> defines a time-proven formula for the conduct of small wars or Military Operations Other Than War. When read within the context of the small wars era, the <u>Small Wars Manual</u> provides valuable insights into these types of operations.</p>		
14. SUBJECT TERMS		15. NUMBER OF PAGES
SMALL WARS, SMALL WARS MANUAL, MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR, OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY		151
16. PRICE CODE		
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT
Unclassified	Unclassified	Unclassified
20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT		

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING SF 298

The Report Documentation Page (RDP) is used in announcing and cataloging reports. It is important that this information be consistent with the rest of the report, particularly the cover and title page. Instructions for filling in each block of the form follow. It is important to *stay within the lines* to meet optical scanning requirements.

Block 1. Agency Use Only (Leave blank).

Block 2. Report Date. Full publication date including day, month, and year, if available (e.g. 1 Jan 88). Must cite at least the year.

Block 3. Type of Report and Dates Covered.

State whether report is interim, final, etc. If applicable, enter inclusive report dates (e.g. 10 Jun 87 - 30 Jun 88).

Block 4. Title and Subtitle. A title is taken from the part of the report that provides the most meaningful and complete information. When a report is prepared in more than one volume, repeat the primary title, add volume number, and include subtitle for the specific volume. On classified documents enter the title classification in parentheses.

Block 5. Funding Numbers. To include contract and grant numbers; may include program element number(s), project number(s), task number(s), and work unit number(s). Use the following labels:

C - Contract	PR - Project
G - Grant	TA - Task
PE - Program Element	WU - Work Unit Accession No.

Block 6. Author(s). Name(s) of person(s) responsible for writing the report, performing the research, or credited with the content of the report. If editor or compiler, this should follow the name(s).

Block 7. Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es). Self-explanatory.

Block 8. Performing Organization Report Number. Enter the unique alphanumeric report number(s) assigned by the organization performing the report.

Block 9. Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Name(s) and Address(es). Self-explanatory.

Block 10. Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Report Number. (If known)

Block 11. Supplementary Notes. Enter information not included elsewhere such as: Prepared in cooperation with...; Trans. of...; To be published in.... When a report is revised, include a statement whether the new report supersedes or supplements the older report.

Block 12a. Distribution/Availability Statement.

Denotes public availability or limitations. Cite any availability to the public. Enter additional limitations or special markings in all capitals (e.g. NOFORN, REL, ITAR).

DOD - See DoDD 5230.24, "Distribution Statements on Technical Documents."

DOE - See authorities.

NASA - See Handbook NHB 2200.2.

NTIS - Leave blank.

Block 12b. Distribution Code.

DOD - Leave blank.

DOE - Enter DOE distribution categories from the Standard Distribution for Unclassified Scientific and Technical Reports.

NASA - Leave blank.

NTIS - Leave blank.

Block 13. Abstract. Include a brief (*Maximum 200 words*) factual summary of the most significant information contained in the report.

Block 14. Subject Terms. Keywords or phrases identifying major subjects in the report.

Block 15. Number of Pages. Enter the total number of pages.

Block 16. Price Code. Enter appropriate price code (*NTIS only*).

Blocks 17. - 19. Security Classifications. Self-explanatory. Enter U.S. Security Classification in accordance with U.S. Security Regulations (i.e., UNCLASSIFIED). If form contains classified information, stamp classification on the top and bottom of the page.

Block 20. Limitation of Abstract. This block must be completed to assign a limitation to the abstract. Enter either UL (unlimited) or SAR (same as report). An entry in this block is necessary if the abstract is to be limited. If blank, the abstract is assumed to be unlimited.

THE SMALL WARS MANUAL AND MILITARY
OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

RICHARD C. MCMONAGLE, MAJ., USMC
B.S., University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1983

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1996

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

19960821 017

THE SMALL WARS MANUAL AND MILITARY
OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

RICHARD C. MCMONAGLE, MAJ., USMC
B.S., University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1983

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1996

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Maj. Richard C. McMonagle

Thesis Title: The Small Wars Manual and Military Operations Other Than War

Approved by:

Jerold E. Brown, Thesis Committee Chairman
Jerold E. Brown, Ph.D.

LtCol. Ron R. McFarland, Member
LtCol. Ron R. McFarland, M.S.A.

John T. Fishel, Member
John T. Fishel, Ph.D.

Accepted this 7th day of June 1996 by:

Philip J. Brookes, Director, Graduate Degree
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D. Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

THE SMALL WARS MANUAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR by Maj.
Richard C. McMonagle, USMC, 151 pages.

This study examines the applicability of the United States Marine Corps' small wars doctrine in current Military Operations Other Than War. Between 1898 and 1934, the Marine Corps was employed extensively in fighting the nation's small wars. These small wars included long-term occupations in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua and interventions in a number of other countries. From these experiences, the Marine Corps developed, during the 1920s and 1930s, a small wars doctrine, which was published in 1940 in its final form as the Small Wars Manual.

This study examines the conditions under which the Marine Corps was employed in small wars, and how from this experience developed a doctrine for fighting small wars. The study then develops three thematic criteria for the examination of a small war, and, then, applies these criteria to a case study of Operation Uphold Democracy, the 1994 intervention in Haiti.

The principle conclusion of this study is that the Small Wars Manual defines a time-proven formula for the conduct of small wars or Military Operations Other Than War. When read within the context of the small wars era, the Small Wars Manual provides valuable insights into these types of operations.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank a number of people who assisted me in this study. First, is Lieutenant Colonel Walter Kretchik, who conceived the original idea for this study and provided guidance along the way. He, however, could not see the project through, being called away to Bosnia. I hope I have done his idea justice.

Second, I would like to thank those I interviewed, General Merrill B. Twining, USMC (Retired), Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, USMC (Retired), Brigadier General James D. Hittle, USMC (Retired), Colonel Thomas S. Jones, USMC, and Colonel John Langdon, USMC. Each provided valuable insight into different aspects of this study. I will also include in this group Jon Hoffman, who provided me the results of his research of General Edson and his contributions to the Small Wars Manual, as well as a copy of his own thesis.

I was greatly assisted in my research by the staffs of the History and Museum Division, Marine Corps Historical Center, at the Washington Navy Yard; the Marine Corps Research Center, Marine Corps University, at Quantico, Virginia; and the Automated Historical Archives System at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. I thank each of those organizations, especially Eva Englander at the Marine Corps Historical Center.

Finally, I would like to thank my family. My father opened the door to interviews with Generals Twining and Krulak, and my wife kept closed the door to the study for the past year.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
APPROVAL PAGE	ii
ABSTRACT	iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	iv
Chapter	
1. INTRODUCTION	1
2. MARINE CORPS SMALL WARS, 1898-1934	7
3. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SMALL WARS DOCTRINE	45
4. AN ANALYSIS OF THE <u>SMALL WARS MANUAL</u>	67
5. OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY	79
6. AN ANALYSIS OF OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY	103
7. CONCLUSION	113
Appendix	
A. <u>SMALL WARS OPERATIONS</u> , 1935 REVISION	120
B. <u>SMALL WARS MANUAL</u>	123
C. BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY	135
D. GLOSSARY	141
SOURCES CONSULTED	144
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	151

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

With the 1990s, the world entered a new era in world politics. The decline of the Soviet Union ushered in, as President George Bush proclaimed, a new world order. Less than seven months later, the success of the United States-led coalition in the Gulf War led to the belief that no conventional military force would challenge the United States for at least a decade, maybe a generation.

Instead of peace, however, the new world order has brought a time of uncertainty. Since 1989, the United States has experienced more crises of a wide variance. As the then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, wrote, "We can see more clearly today that danger has not disappeared from the world." The dangers showed themselves quickly as regional and internal conflicts, which the old bipolar world had kept in check, erupted.¹

The United States, as the lone superpower, has hesitatingly become involved in some of these crises. As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili, wrote in his introduction to the 1995 National Military Strategy: "The challenge of the new strategic era is to selectively use the vast and unique capabilities of the Armed Forces to advance national interests in peacetime while maintaining readiness to fight and win when called upon." The military has termed such use of the armed forces in peacetime as Military Operations Other Than War.²

Military Operations Other Than War appear new to a United States military that was occupied by the Cold War for the previous fifty years. The activities of Military Operations Other Than War, however, are not new. The United States military has had previous experience in all the activities now defined as Military Operations Other Than War. During this century, the United States experienced a short-lived colonial period, when the United States intervened in the internal affairs of a number of Caribbean and Latin American nations. The Marine Corps called these interventions small wars, and their conduct included many of the same activities that are now part of Military Operations Other Than War. In 1940, the United States Marine Corps published the Small Wars Manual. It was a compilation of the experiences and lessons learned by the Marines who had spent the previous four decades fighting the nation's small wars.

Knowledge of how the Marine Corps fought these small wars could be of value today as the United States military attempts to cope with a similar form of employment. The experiences and lessons captured in the Small Wars Manual may still be pertinent.

It is generally agreed that the most likely form of employment of the United States military for the future will be in Military Operations Other Than War. This study will look at the small wars conducted by the Marine Corps from 1898 to 1934, trace the development of the Marine Corps small wars doctrine, analyze that doctrine, and then apply that analysis to a current Military Operation Other Than War.

The Small Wars Manual was the end product of a twenty-year development of small wars doctrine, based upon four decades of Marine experience in small wars. Although written over fifty years ago, the Small Wars Manual may be of value when examining present day operations. By answering the primary research question, Is the Marine Corps Small

Wars Manual applicable to Military Operations Other Than War?, this study will determine if any of the Small Wars Manual is relevant to Military Operations Other Than War and, if so, if it can contribute to the development of doctrine in Military Operations Other Than War.

To answer the primary research question, the study will answer the following subordinate questions: (1) What is the historical background of the Marine Corps in small wars? (2) How was small war doctrine developed into the Small Wars Manual? (3) What are the themes presented in the Small Wars Manual? and (4) Did these themes apply during a recent Military Operation Other Than War?

Military Operations Other Than War is a new term that "encompasses the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war."³ It used to define activities that both the United States Army and United States Marine Corps have conducted throughout their histories. As Military Operations Other Than War become the most likely form of employment of U.S. forces, there is a need for doctrine in Military Operations Other Than War. One source of this doctrine may be lessons from the past.

For the Marine Corps, the years between 1898 and 1934 saw extensive involvement in small wars. Marines were involved in numerous interventions, including occupations in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua. In the 1920s and 1930s, the Marine Corps began to develop doctrine for the conduct of these small wars. The end product of this development process was the Small Wars Manual, published in 1940. This manual was a compilation of the experiences of 36 years of fighting small wars.

As a Military Operation Other Than War, Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti offers a pertinent case study. Besides being a recent Military Operation Other Than War, it also has a historical tie.

Sixty years prior, the Marine Corps landed in Haiti and occupied the country for 19 years. This experience in Haiti contributed to the writing of the Small Wars Manual.

With the new concept of Military Operations Other Than War, new doctrine is needed. Although the title is new, many of the activities of Military Operations Other Than War previously fit within the areas of small wars or low-intensity conflict. As the military develops this doctrine, it should not only look to recent experiences, but also to those of the past.

The primary limitation on this study has been the limited amount written on the history of the development of small wars doctrine. During the 1920s and 1930s, the Marine Corps developed doctrine for both amphibious operations and small wars. While amphibious operations continue to be the Marine Corps' primary mission, the conduct of small wars ended in the 1930s. The result is that the development of the doctrine for amphibious operations has become part of the lore of the Marine Corps, while that of small wars has been mostly forgotten.

This study is further limited by the amount of material that is unpublished, and nearly all of it is in the Washington, DC area. Although the author has conducted research in Quantico and Washington, there was only enough time to scratch the surface of the material that is available on the subject. A final limitation involves the use of Operation Uphold Democracy as a case study. Since the operation is relatively recent, much of the material on the operation is still being gathered.

The study of small wars is restricted to the operations of the United States Marine Corps during the period 1898 to 1934. This period included the development of small wars doctrine that led directly to the Small Wars Manual. Within this period, this study is further restricted

to interventions, a term which does not include the numerous operations where the Marine Corps was used solely to protect the lives and property of United States citizens abroad.

The study of Military Operations Other Than War is restricted to the unclassified information available about Operation Uphold Democracy.

The result of the research is that much of the Small Wars Manual applies to Military Operations Other Than War. The study found many lessons that were learned by Marines in small wars, that should be considered in the doctrine being written today for Military Operations Other Than War. Thus, the Marine Corps experience in fighting small wars provides insight into Military Operations Other Than War.

ENDNOTES

¹John W. Jandora, "Threat Parameters for Operations Other Than War," Parameters XXV, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 55; Colin L. Powell, "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead" Foreign Affairs 71, no. 5 (Winter 1992/93): 35.

²Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), introduction.

³U.S. Joint Staff, Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1995), GL-3.

CHAPTER 2
MARINE CORPS SMALL WARS, 1898-1934

The United States victory in the Spanish-American War resulted in a significant change in how the United States saw itself and the world around it. With the victory over Spain, the United States gained possessions in the Caribbean and Pacific, as well as the prestige of defeating a European power. The possessions brought the United States colonies and fueled a short lived period of American imperialism.

The greatest security concern of the United States was foreign encroachment in the western hemisphere. The political and economic instability of the nations of the region made them ripe for foreign, especially European, intervention. These factors led the United States to intervene in the affairs of these republics to preclude the intervention of European powers.

The colonial aspirations of the United States, in the form of manifest destiny, although much different from those of the Europeans, still required the employment of the military instrument of power to maintain its empire and protect its interests. The United States Marine Corps, in its traditional mission of service with the fleet, became the landing force of an interventionist Navy and evolved into colonial infantry.

The United States has always placed great importance on the Caribbean Region. The trans-isthmian railroad, followed by a trans-isthmian canal, made the region vital to the security and economy of the United States. The greatest concern for the United States was

that the nations that guarded the approaches to this vital trade route were politically unstable and economically backward.

The colonial past created problems that have plagued the region to this day. The colonial powers had not prepared the peoples for self-rule. Political immaturity resulted in political systems that were constitutional in appearance only.¹

Normally, power and force determined political outcomes. The electoral process offered few surprises. The party in power controlled the election and, through intimidation or outright fraud, seldom lost.²

The use of force was the primary way a party gained power. Since the opposition parties only came to power through a coup and not the ballot box, the opposition party usually was outlawed and its leaders imprisoned, exiled, or assassinated. Once the opposition did come into power, they continued the same practices as their predecessors, through retributions and reprisals.³

The army, although usually weak, was the source of power for the ruling party. Tasked with maintaining the ruling party in power, the army consumed the largest portion of the economy. Not only was equipping the army expensive, but corruption, as it did throughout the government, drained efficiency. The army, therefore, was usually of very poor quality. The soldiers were recruited from the lowest class and poorly trained, if trained at all. The officer corps was rife with incompetence and corruption.⁴

Although it was expensive to maintain a standing army, a rebel mercenary army was quite cheap. A few hundred men with rifles usually were enough to overwhelm the weak, incompetent army. After the revolution, the mercenary rebels would disperse, and await the next rebellion. Since it was relatively inexpensive to mount a coup, rebellions were frequent.

Despite the constant overthrows of government, the real power in the republics rested in a few families. The very rich and very small aristocracy consisted of a few wealthy land-owning families who dominated and controlled the nation. It was they, or foreign interests, that usually financed the revolutions.

In contrast to the wealthy upper class, the peasant class made up the majority of society. The peasants--of Indian, African, or mixed descent--were illiterate and poverty-struck. There was also a middle class, but it was very small and inconsequential. The ignorance in which the peasants were kept, ensured no reforms in the system or the government.⁵

For all of their political and social ills, the republics' economic instability is what caused outside interest. The inefficiencies of the government and the large expenditure on the military made the economies of the republics extremely fragile. To keep itself in power, the ruling party often took loans from European bankers. The bankers, in turn, would sell bonds in European markets. The money borrowed quickly evaporated in graft and mismanagement, leaving the government with little except a repayment schedule. Often the governments could never pay off the loans. When the Caribbean republics defaulted on the loans, the European investors turned to their government to help them collect.⁶

Although the continual default on loans tended to get the United States and European governments involved in a republic, more likely it was the wrongs done to one of their citizens. These republics were dangerous places, even when the country was not experiencing open rebellion. When a foreigner suffered damages, he turned to his government, who, in turn, demanded punitive damages from the offending government. In both types of cases, the collection of debt or claims by

a citizen, the European and United States governments often resorted to force to collect. Using force to collect on a defaulted loan, however, was less frequent, since the international community frowned upon this bullying.⁷

The European nations, traditionally, had been more aggressive than the United States in protecting their citizens abroad. President Theodore Roosevelt was the first to start a trend to greater protection of United States citizens. The United States believed that making the Caribbean safe for its citizens would encourage trade and investment in the region.⁸

The result of the Spanish-American War was to increase United States interests in the Caribbean. The greatest concern for the United States, as it had been for almost one hundred years, was European encroachment in the region. To counter the threat of European intervention, while fueling its own imperialistic desire, the United States began a program of interventions in the region.

The Caribbean possessed both security and economic interests for the United States. The security interest, dominated by concerns about the European powers, was to maintain stability in the region. The Panama Canal was vital to the security of the United States and its two-ocean empire since it represented the capability to transfer naval power from one ocean to the other. Economic interests were primarily to keep open the trade route across the Panamanian isthmus, and, of secondary interest, to increase trade and investment in the Caribbean region itself.

The biggest threat to United States interests in the Caribbean was intervention by a European power. To counter this threat the United States pursued generally three objectives within the region; discourage

revolution, improve economic conditions, and increase trade and investment opportunities.⁹

By discouraging revolutions, the United States hoped to end the turmoil that created the conditions for European intervention. Foreign nations naturally had concern when open conflict endangered the lives and property of their citizens. They also had concern about the economic effects of internal strife. Often political instability resulted in the resources of the nation being squandered in attempts by rulers to keep themselves in power, rather than being used to cover the nation's obligations.¹⁰

The second United States objective, to improve the economic conditions within the area, supported the first objective. Poverty and illiteracy resulted in conditions that promoted political instability. Disparate wealth distribution made nations ripe for revolution.¹¹

Although not always pursued, the third objective was to increase trade and American investment opportunities in the area. Often, however, corruption, injustice, and revolution threatened business ventures. The nations of the Caribbean were so small and poor that few economic opportunities existed. The pursuit of this objective appears to have had little impact on United States policy in the region, with the possible exception of policy toward Cuba.¹²

The Monroe Doctrine of 1823 was the primary policy used to attain United States objectives in the Caribbean. Concerned about the interference of European powers in the affairs of the nations of the western hemisphere, President Monroe, speaking before the United States Congress, declared "that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portions of this Hemisphere, as dangerous to our peace and safety."¹³ Although there was some doubt as to the

ability of the United States to enforce the doctrine, no European nation had challenged it.

In 1905, President Theodore Roosevelt further refined the Monroe Doctrine through his "Roosevelt Corollary." Presented, along with the Dominican-American treaty, to the United States Senate, the corollary stated that to prevent European intervention in this hemisphere, particularly in the Caribbean, the United States must help nations eliminate the disorder and economic mismanagement that invited such intervention.¹⁴

President Roosevelt had addressed the corollary to both European and Caribbean nations. It did not deny Europeans the right to punish or seek retribution for wrongs done, but that they could not use it as a pretext for acquiring territory in the western hemisphere. At the same time, there was an explanation that the United States did not wish to acquire territory, but it would take action to protect its national interest and settle the claims of creditors.¹⁵

This corollary drove United States policy in the Caribbean for the next 25 years, until, in 1930, the United States publicly removed it from the Monroe Doctrine. The "Clark Memorandum on Monroe Doctrine" of December 17, 1928, stated that the corollary had been an improper interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. The Doctrine concerned encroachment of the European powers, and the corollary had wrongly given the United States the right to interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign nations.¹⁶

During the first term of the Roosevelt administration, the president himself personally set foreign policy. The Roosevelt Corollary represented his philosophy in dealing with the republics of the western hemisphere. Threatening the republics of this hemisphere

with the "big stick," Roosevelt stated that they must act responsibly toward foreign powers.¹⁷

Although general policy did not change during Roosevelt's second term, his Secretary of State, Elihu Root, led United States policy. One of the most gifted statesmen of the era, he wrote in 1905 that "the inevitable effect of our building the Canal must be to require us to police the surrounding premises."¹⁸ Although written six months before assuming his post as the Secretary of State, his emphasis and his devotion to President Roosevelt's principles set the tone for United States policy for the remainder of the Roosevelt administration.

William Howard Taft assumed the presidency from his fellow Republican Roosevelt in 1909. President Taft's objectives in the Caribbean were the same as his predecessor's, to end the political instability and economic troubles that invited European intervention. Likewise, his foreign policy in the Caribbean differed little from that of Roosevelt. Two methods he used for economic reform were the establishing of United States customs receiverships, where the United States controlled the troubled republic's customs houses, and the providing of loans to the republics from American banks to pay off their European loan debts.¹⁹

Woodrow Wilson's inauguration in 1913 brought the anti-imperialist Democrat Party into power. President Wilson despised United States imperialism, criticizing the previous Republican administrations for their Caribbean policy of interventions. Events in Mexico, however, would temper his anti-imperialism, resulting in Wilson committing the United States to three interventions, including the two longest in United States history.²⁰

President Wilson spent his first term absorbed by problems created by the Civil War in Mexico, and the complicity of Germany in

that civil war. The tensions between the United States and Mexico during this civil war resulted in a United States intervention in Mexico from 1914 to 1917. President Wilson believed that German agents had a hand in the confrontations with the United States in an attempt to keep the United States occupied with this hemisphere and out of the war in Europe.²¹

The belief that German agents were active in a number of Caribbean republics influenced President Wilson's policy in the region. As with the previous administrations, the threat of European encroachment in the Caribbean was of considerable concern. The war in Europe only increased these concerns. Nowhere was the concern greater than on the island of Hispaniola.

President Wilson believed that the foreign powers exploited the instability of the Caribbean republics for their selfish gain. He believed the United States, therefore, had a moral obligation to promote democracy in the region. The United States would therefore help these republics by eliminating the causes of the instability. The fact that he would have to violate their sovereignty and that their political immaturity precluded the ability to function as a democracy did not figure into Wilson's policy.²²

Before President Wilson's inauguration, it had become obvious that the customs receiverships were not working. President Wilson realized that he not only needed control over income, but also control over expenditures. Additionally, the armies of these troubled republics needed to be a stabilizing force, rather than a threat to their peace. President Wilson demanded that troubled republics agree to United States financial advisors and a reorganization of the national army with United States control. When republics refused these conditions, the United States intervened.²³

The Wilson presidency was the greatest of the interventionist administrations, and the last. By the mid-1920s, American enthusiasm for imperialism was waning. The Coolidge administration did commit the United States to the long-term intervention in Nicaragua, but it also repudiated the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. The succeeding presidents, Hoover and Roosevelt, stripped intervention from United States policy and ended the last of the long-term interventions.

As the United States State Department entered the twentieth century, it had not caught up with the nation's status as an emerging world power. The secretary and his assistant secretaries personally handled all matters of policy. The small staff consisted of 63 clerks.²⁴

Although some talented men led the small State Department, many of those representing Washington in the world's capitols were incompetent. Recent reforms in the civil service had made the foreign service one of the few places where congressmen, who controlled the appointment process, could reward their supporters. Often these appointees had little knowledge of diplomacy and even less of the country in which posted. The result was that the men who represented the United States were untrained, unqualified, and usually lacking in judgment. The situation was even worse in the nations of the Caribbean, since these posts were not sought after and were often used as punishment.²⁵

During the Wilson administration, the diplomatic spoil system reached its low point. President Wilson, greatly concerned about the competency of those representing the United States, appointed competent men to the major posts. His Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, concerned himself with rewarding loyal Democrats. For the minor posts that he assigned, he rewarded political allies. The result was that

those appointed in the Caribbean and Latin America had little or no expertise in diplomacy or their region.²⁶

The United States victory in the Spanish-American War and the ensuing rise of United States imperialism had a tremendous effect upon the sea services. The expansion of the United States into the far-east and the Caribbean created a United States empire, and, for the Navy Department, the need for overseas bases and a larger fleet.²⁷

For the Marine Corps, the period between the Spanish-American War and the Second World War was one of great activity, as well as great transition. As the Marine Corps entered the twentieth century, its mission was service with the fleet and the security of naval stations. In the new steel Navy, however, this mission had become obsolete. During the next four decades, the Marine Corps would pursue two new missions, use as an advanced base force and use as colonial infantry. The two missions occupied the Marine Corps; while the former dominated the thoughts of Marines, the latter dominated their resources.

Before the Spanish-American War, the Marine Corps had been a small service that provided guards to the ships of the fleet. The function of this guard, which had remained relatively unchanged for a century, was threefold; to provide discipline within the ship by enforcing regulations and preventing mutinies; to provide sharpshooters in the ship's riggings; and to provide the expertise and bodies for landing parties.

The industrial revolution had changed naval warfare and the tradition-bound United States Navy. By the 1890s, a reform was underway within the Navy. As the steam battleships replaced the old ships of sail, the Navy also replaced its sailors. The new technical Navy required a sailor of higher quality to man the new battleships. The Navy envisioned an all-purpose crew of intelligent, educated and

self-motivated sailors. This crew, however, did not need Marines since the threat of mutiny was virtually nonexistent, sharpshooters would play no role in future Naval battles, and sailors could completely man the landing party. The reformers believed that the "penal colony" atmosphere that Marines brought to the ship was insulting to the new high-quality sailor, and was retarding the growth and professionalism of the petty officer corps.²⁸

In 1906, the Navy Department again raised the issue of eliminating the ship's guards from Navy ships. Not only was President Roosevelt sympathetic to the cause, but the Army saw an opportunity to absorb the Marine Corps. The Navy, however, did not wish to go that far, wanting to retain Marine Corps to form advanced base force battalions.²⁹

President Roosevelt, on November 12, 1908, signed Executive Order 969 listing the duties of the Marine Corps. It did not include ship's guards. The Navy immediately began sending Marines ashore. The Congress, however, did not agree with the President. The House Naval Affairs Committee set up an investigating committee chaired by Congressman Thomas Butler, father of Marine Captain Smedley Darlington Butler. During hearings, the Marine Corps made its weak case based on economic factors. For the Navy to replace the 2,000 Marines with sailors would result in increased cost in pay and recruiting. The Congress added the Butler rider, which required reinstatement of ship's guards, to the Naval Appropriations Act. The President signed the bill, and, by July 1909, all ship's guards were back aboard.³⁰

Although the Marine Corps had won this battle, it had done so without proving the value of Marine guards. Although some traditionalists fought to stay on the ships, other Marines were more visionary.

The mission to prepare forces to seize and defend advanced naval bases grew out of experience in the Spanish-American War. To become a global navy, the United States Navy needed advanced bases for coaling and other logistics support. The Marine Corps appeared to be the logical choice for the seizure and defense of these bases. As early as 1900, the Navy Department requested that the Marine Corps establish permanent expeditionary battalions as an advanced base defense force.³¹

The Marine Corps, however, was not eager for such a mission. To most Marines, advanced base operations was a defensive mission in support of the fleet. Progress, therefore, was slow for the first decade. Momentum began to pick up in 1910 with the establishment of the Marine Corps Advanced Base School. Development remained slow, however, as the fighting of small wars occupied the majority of the resources of the Marine Corps. During the 1920's, the 4th Marine Brigade at Quantico trained in expeditionary operations, with the Marines participating in the yearly Fleet Exercises.³²

The concept eventually evolved from a Base Defense Force to an Expeditionary Force to the Fleet Marine Force and the conduct of amphibious operations. The advanced base force captured the imagination and intellectual capability of the Marine Corps, but the colonial duty captured the manpower, assets, and money.

The Marine Corps' role as colonial infantry had its beginnings in the traditional function of manning the ship's landing party. The Marine Corps had a long history of landings on foreign soil other than in time of war. From the Marine Corps' first landing on May 12, 1800, at Puerto Plata in what is now the Dominican Republic, to the Spanish-American War, the Marine Corps had conducted more than 50 landings. In the Caribbean, Marines had landed in Nicaragua (1852,

1853, 1854, 1894, 1896, and 1898), Haiti (1888), and Puerto Rico (1824).³³

Originally the landing parties went ashore for the temporary protection of United States citizens during crises--known legally as interposition. Although interposition continued, increasingly the United States landed forces to alter the political behavior of another country--known as intervention. Although not necessarily an act of war, intervention is a serious international action.³⁴

Interventions became more common with the rise of United States imperialism. The Navy possessed a strong interventionist tradition, dating back to the previous century when its ships had roamed the high seas keeping open the sea trade routes. Often, Naval officers had acted as diplomats in representing United States interests to foreign governments, while Marines and sailors participated in landing parties to protect lives and property.³⁵

The War Department and the Army were not as enthusiastic as the Navy about intervention. The Army's first occupation in the Philippines resulted in a bitter counterinsurgency struggle that lasted over 14 years. The next, a three-year struggle in Cuba, was not much better. The result of these experiences made the Army hesitant to participate in interventions.³⁶

Marines soon became the force of choice for interventions. Naval forces were normally the first at the scene of crises. After the ships' landing parties were ashore, it caused less confusion to reinforce them with Marines. The Marines gained a reputation for their ability to arrive quickly at the scene of crises.³⁷

Force of habit led to the belief that the commitment of the Marines was more palatable to world opinion. Although there is no basis in international law, the opinion grew within the United States that the

landing of Marines on foreign soil was a short-term colonial action, whereas commitment of the United States Army was an act of war. Based upon its employment in the Philippines, Cuba, and Hawaii, the Army was seen as a long-term occupation force.³⁸

While colonial duty, or expeditionary duty as it was known at the time, dominated the period, the two other missions had their own adherents. Some traditionalists wished to return to the days of ship's guards; however, these advocates were quite small in number. The real competition was between the advocates of expeditionary warfare and those of advanced base operations. The former group believed that the Marine Corps' future did not lie with the Navy. Instead, they saw a Marine Corps, independent of the Navy, with the mission to conduct expeditionary operations. In contrast, the latter group, dominated by Naval Academy graduates, saw the Marine Corps' future tied to the Navy, conducting a naval mission. This competition included a clash of sub-cultures within the Marine Corps.³⁹

Even before the colonial period ended, the advanced base operations had won out. The Marine Corps' emphasis became preparation for big wars, while it toiled in small wars.⁴⁰ Some Marines made the transition, while others did not.

The United States fought small wars in eight nations between 1898 and 1934.⁴¹ The first two interventions occurred in Asia, with the first a counterinsurgency in the Philippines and the other a protective expedition in China. The remaining interventions occurred in the Caribbean and Latin America, with five of the six being classified as peacemaking, although three later deteriorated into counterinsurgencies or counter-banditry wars. What follows is a brief synopsis of each, including the United States interests and objectives, the conditions

that required the political decision to intervene and the resulting military actions.

Philippines (1899-1902)

The first intervention by the United States occurred in the United States Army's occupation and bitter counterinsurgency in the Philippines. With the end of the Spanish-American War, President McKinley ordered the United States Army to occupy the Philippines and install a military government. During the occupation, United States interests were strategic and commercial, while the objectives were to annex the Philippines and pacify its occupants.⁴²

Marine landing parties had been ashore guarding the naval station at Cavite, since Admiral Dewey's victory at Manila Bay. When the United States attempted to install a United States military government, Philippine nationalists resisted American rule. After defeating the rebels in conventional operations in 1899, the rebels turned to an insurgency.

Admiral Dewey, worried about the security of Cavite, requested more Marines. The Marine Corps formed a two battalion regiment, the largest Marine formation up to that time, and sailed to reinforce the Marines at Cavite. For the next year and a half, the Marines came under the Army command. Marines chased and ambushed small bands of guerrillas, controlled the flow of rice and supplies, supervised public works projects, held elections, and guarded Navy facilities and lighthouses. The Marines saw little actual combat, but they contributed to the Army's successful campaign against the insurrection on Luzon.⁴³

With President Roosevelt's announcement in 1902 that the Philippines was secure, the Marines withdrew. Moslem insurgents continued their rebellion, which the United States Army fought until 1913.⁴⁴

China (1900)

The United States intervention in China in the summer of 1900 was an expedition to protect United States lives and property and restore stability within China. United States interest was commercial; maintaining the "Open Door" policy within China.⁴⁵

The cause of the intervention was the Boxer Uprising of 1900, which was a war to rid China of foreign missionaries and Christian Chinese. The Boxers laid siege to the Legation Quarter, whose defense consisted of less than 500 legation guards, including a detachment of fifty Marines. After the foreign legations declined an offer of safe passage by the Chinese government, the Chinese army joined in the siege.⁴⁶

On June 20, a battalion of Marines, commanded by Major Littleton Waller Tazewell Waller, landed. The battalion attempted to march to the relief of the legations, but was beaten back. Eventually a multi-national relief force of over 14,000 troops lifted the siege. The United States contingent for this force sailed from the Philippines and consisted of a United States Army force of two infantry regiments, a cavalry regiment, and a field artillery battery and a regiment of Marines.⁴⁷

The Marines had played a minor role in the operation, performing no better than anyone else. The early defense of the legations and Waller's battalion's early landing, however, did help the Marine Corps' image as colonial infantry.

Panama (1903-1914)

The 1903 United States intervention in Panama was to keep the peace in the region. The United States had both commercial and economic interests in Panama. The main objective of the intervention, the protection of the Panama Canal Zone, reflected these interests. The

other United States objective was to ensure the internal stability of Panama.⁴⁸

Marine landings in the Isthmus, then part of Colombia, were not new. Open hostilities due to revolutions had resulted in Marines going ashore in 1860, 1873, 1885, 1895, 1901 and 1902 to protect United States interests, especially the American-owned railroad. Before the building of the Panama Canal, this trans-isthmian railroad was an important United States trade route. The United States had great interest in keeping open the railroad, as well as keeping open the possibilities of a canal.⁴⁹

The United States and Colombia had signed the Hay-Herran Treaty, giving the United States the rights to a canal. In 1903, despite the treaty, talks broke down when Colombia attempted to hold out for more money. The Panamanians, enraged by the possible loss of revenue the proposed canal would bring, and not discouraged by the United States, declared their independence on November 3, 1903. As was becoming habit, a Marine landing party went ashore the following day to protect the railroad and other United States interests. The next day the transport Dixie, with an embarked Marine battalion, commanded by Major John A. Lejeune, anchored off the Caribbean coastline. One day later, the sixth, the United States recognized Panama and the Colombians capitulated.⁵⁰

With Panamanian independence attained, the Navy Department ordered in the Marines. Major Lejeune landed his battalion to protect Panama from Colombia. By January 3, 1904, the Marine force had become a two-regiment brigade under the command of the Marine Commandant Major General George F. Elliot. Although by the next month the Marines had drawn down the size of the force, a Marine battalion remained in Panama through the completion of the Panama Canal in 1914. During those years,

Marines supervised elections in 1908 and 1912, as well as patrolling the Canal Zone.⁵¹

Cuba (1906-1909)

The United States intervention in Cuba beginning in 1906 was a peacemaking operation by the United States. President Roosevelt hesitantly ordered a United States intervention after rebellion broke out. The United States objectives were to prevent disorder and to install a new Cuban government; objectives based on the United States interest of maintaining stability in the Caribbean.⁵²

The United States had gained possession of Cuba as a result of the Spanish-American War, but made a pledge to grant Cuba independence. The United States had fought the war partly out of American sympathy for Cuba in its struggle for independence from Spain. President McKinley, shortly after the war, had made a promise of Cuban independence, although the United States had concerns about Cuba's ability to rule itself.

The United States Congress, concerned also about Cuban stability, passed the Platt Amendment to the Army Appropriation Act of 1901. This amendment stated the United States' right to intervene in Cuba to protect American lives and property. The Platt Amendment specified that Cuba could not enter any treaty with a foreign power that could compromise its independence nor accrue foreign debts that it could not repay. The United States reserved the right to intervene if Cuban independence was in jeopardy. The teeth of the Platt Amendment was that the United States would not withdraw and grant Cuban independence until the Cubans included the provisions of the amendment in the Cuban constitution and the future treaties with the United States. In May 1902, Cuba met these conditions, and the United States withdrew, leaving Cuba an independent republic.⁵³

The cause of the rebellion that preceded the 1906 intervention was fraudulent elections, which caused both the Cuban government and the rebels to request United States intervention based on the Platt Amendment. Eventually, but hesitantly, President Roosevelt ordered a landing by the Marine First Provisional Brigade, consisting of five battalions formed from stations in the United States and ship guard detachments. The brigade of 97 officers and 2,795 men was under the command of Colonel L. W. T. Waller, who had led the relief battalion during the Boxer Rebellion. The United States Army followed the Marines with a force of 5,600 soldiers. Although the Marines saw little action--their primary duty had been disarming the populace--the real value of the operation was the praise the Marine Corps received from the President and the press for their quick response to the crises.⁵⁴

On November 1, 1906, the Marines reorganized the First Provisional Brigade as the First Provisional Regiment. For the remaining two years and three months of the United States occupation of Cuba, the Marine regiment served under the Army of Cuban Pacification, departing in January 1909.⁵⁵

Twice more during the next decade Marines landed in Cuba. The first landing in 1912, came during a rebellion by black peasants, fueled by black political leaders. The Marines formed a two regiment Provisional Brigade, which landed at the new naval base at Guantanamo Bay on May 28. Up to this time, the Cuban Army had been protecting American-owned interests. In what amounted to little more than guard duty, the Marines replaced the Cuban units, freeing them to concentrate on fighting the rebellion. By August, the regiment withdrew, with the exception of one battalion that remained at Guantanamo Bay.⁵⁶

The third intervention in Cuba occurred five years later, when civil war broke out between the Liberal Party and the ruling

Conservative Party. On March 1, 1917, a company stationed at Guantanamo Bay moved into the island's interior, while the landing parties of eight United States warships landed at various landing points. In August, the 7th Marine Regiment landed at Guantanamo Bay, and, on October 24, it too moved into the interior. Again, the Marines protected American lives and property, freeing the Cuban Army to fight. This time, however, the stay was much longer, with the regiment remaining until August 1919, and two companies remaining in western Cuba until February 15, 1922.⁵⁷

Nicaragua (1910 and 1912)

The United States conducted two short-term interventions in Nicaragua in 1910 and 1912. The United States interests were to maintain the stability of Central America, with the objectives of supporting a rebellion in 1910 and supporting the government in 1912.

Nicaragua had been an early candidate for the trans-isthmian canal. The United States, therefore, had maintained great interests in its affairs, landing Marines there seven times between 1852 and 1899.⁵⁸

The 1910 intervention resulted from events that occurred the previous year. The dictator José Santos Zelaya was anti-American and accused of encouraging revolts and uprisings in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. In 1909, the governor in the Caribbean city of Bluefields rebelled against Zelaya. In November, two Americans, captured while serving with the rebel army, were executed by Zelaya. This was too much for the United States, which forced Zelaya's resignation in December. Zelaya's successor was no better, and, so, the rebellion continued.⁵⁹

The United States warships stationed in the Caribbean off of the Nicaraguan coast landed their landing parties in Bluefields in April 1910. The rebels still held the town, and the landing parties were to protect the numerous United States citizens and businesses. The Navy, realizing these parties were too weak, sent ships to Panama to embark a

battalion of Marines under the command of Major Smedley D. Butler. When Major Butler's battalion landed and occupied Bluefields in May 1910, it prevented the Nicaraguan army from crushing the rebellion. The United States intervention encouraged other rebels to rise up, and, by August, the rebels had defeated the Nicaraguan army. The Marines departed Nicaragua on September 4, 1910, and returned to Panama.⁶⁰

Less than two years later, rebellion in Nicaragua again required United States intervention. This time the rebellion, led by the Zelaya Party, threatened the pro-United States government. The United States again positioned warships off the Nicaraguan coast to protect American lives and interests. In early August, these ships sent their landing parties ashore. On August 14, Major Butler's battalion from Panama landed, this time at Carinto. The battalion moved by train to the capital, Managua, to relieve the sailors guarding the United States Legation. On September 4, the 1st Provisional Regiment, commanded by Colonel Joseph H. Pendleton, was formed from two battalions from the United States. The Marines possessed overwhelming power and had to use it. The Marines crushed the rebels, setting the precedent for the use of force to keep a pro-United States government in power in Central America.⁶¹

Mexico (1914)

The United States intervention in Mexico from 1914 to 1917 was a punitive expedition by President Wilson with the objectives to command respect from Mexico and, in a separate action, punish Pancho Villa for his raid into the United States. The United States interests in the intervention were United States prestige and the security of its borders.⁶²

From 1910-1914, the United States patrolled the border with Mexico, as well as Mexican territorial waters, while revolution raged

the country. After rebels killed the first revolutionary president in a coup, and several other incidents, President Wilson, with the approval of Congress, ordered the Navy to use force to punish the new Mexican government. Rear Admiral Badger, the fleet commander, ordered Rear Admiral Fletcher to seize the port city of Veracruz.

On the morning of April 21, ships' landing parties totaling 700 Marines and 5,000 sailors went ashore. The landing of Marines and sailors quickly overwhelmed the Mexican soldiers, most of whom fled. The landing parties, however, did receive sniper fire, and used naval gunfire to support the routing out of the snipers. The landing parties quickly occupied the city, and the resistance was broken by the third day.⁶³

Three regiments and an artillery battalion arrived from the United States to form the First Brigade of Marines, under the command of Colonel L. W. T. Waller. These reinforcements freed the original landing parties to re-embark on their ships. On May 1, United States Army units arrived, with Major General Frederick Funston taking command of all land forces. The Marine brigade remained under Army command until withdrawn on November 23, 1914.⁶⁴

For the Marine Corps, the value of the intervention was the demonstration of its usefulness in colonial operations. The Marines were able to arrive sooner than the United States Army and fight well once ashore.⁶⁵

By this time, a pattern emerged from the five interventions in the Caribbean. Ships' landing parties, consisting of Marines and sailors from the ships' companies, made the initial landings. Larger Marine formations of regiments and brigades, formed specifically for the operation, quickly followed the initial landings. Opposition to the United States presence was minimal with the Marines seeing little

combat, except in Nicaragua. The resulting interventions were relatively short term, although Marines did remain in the Panama Canal Zone during the canal's construction.

The final three interventions would be quite different. The interventions in Haiti in 1915, the Dominican Republic in 1916, and Nicaragua in 1926 would begin similarly to the earlier interventions. Each, however, would require a long term commitment from the United States and turn into a bitter counterinsurgency or counter-banditry war.

Haiti (1915-1934)

President Wilson ordered the United States intervention in Haiti in 1915 to prevent foreign intervention and to restore stability in the nation. The United States interest was stability in the Caribbean.⁶⁶ The Marine intervention in Haiti was to be the longest and most extensive of the small wars.

Haiti was the most volatile and the most unstable of the Caribbean republics, while at the same time being the one of the most strategically positioned. Hispaniola, of which Haiti occupies the eastern third, guards the Caribbean approaches to the Panama Canal. The numerous coups and revolutions since Haiti's independence drew little interest from the United States. By 1900, both France and Germany had tremendous influence in Haiti. French bankers granted Haiti loans in 1875 and 1896, and French investors controlled the National Bank, which was formed in 1881 to pay the foreign debts. The United States had concerns about such heavy involvement by the European powers on the island of Hispaniola.⁶⁷

In 1914, while the country was again in open rebellion, Marines landed to protect lives and property. Likewise, Great Britain, France, and Germany had done the same. While United States Marines were only ashore from January 29 to February 9, their presence, along with that of

British, French, and German marines, had a calming effect upon the country. The incident continued to raise American concerns over European ambitions in Haiti.⁶⁸

The calm, however, did not last long, and the next year the country was again in political turmoil. In March, a coup overthrew the government of President Joseph Théodore, replacing him with Vilbrun Guillaume Sam. Four months into Guillaume Sam's rule, the country again broke out in revolution. To counter the rebellion, Guillaume Sam imprisoned and then executed prominent Haitian citizens. This action so enraged the population that a mob dragged him from the French legation, where he had sought refuge, and literally pulled him apart.⁶⁹

The day of Guillaume Sam's death, July 28, 1915, Rear Admiral William B. Caperton had arrived with his flagship Washington off the coast of Port-au-Prince. Admiral Caperton ordered ashore a landing party to protect the lives and property of foreigners. The landing party of two battalions of Marines and sailors landed at Bizoton, a naval station a mile from the center of Port-au-Prince. At dusk, the landing party marched on Port-au-Prince, searching buildings and confiscating weapons. The Americans told the Haitians the purpose of the landing and the landing force would deal with any threat to Americans. The Haitians put up no resistance.⁷⁰

Admiral Caperton, realizing the magnitude of the problem, requested more Marines. The next day, July 29, a company from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba landed. On July 31, five companies of the Second Regiment sailed for Haiti. These forces later were followed by the Headquarters of the 1st Brigade, commanded by Colonel L. W. T. Waller; the First Regiment, commanded by Colonel Eli Kelley Cole; and an artillery battalion. By August 15, the 1st Marine Brigade had occupied strategic points in Port-au-Prince and disarmed the Haitian military.⁷¹

As well in August, a new president was elected on the 12th, and a new treaty with the United States signed on the 16th. The treaty gave the United States control of the Haitian finances and public works, and created a United States officered national constabulary.⁷²

In 1916, the United States and Haiti signed a protocol that established the constabulary the Gendarmerie d'Haiti. The Marine brigade, charged with the formation of this constabulary, dissolved the Haitian army, and consolidated the nation's five police forces into the Gendarmerie d'Haiti. The Marines, with no experience in this type of mission, drew on the Army experiences in the Philippines, Cuba and Puerto Rico.⁷³

Although the Gendarmerie d'Haiti drew its recruits from the lower class of Haitian society, it drew its officers from the officers and noncommissioned officers of the Marine brigade. As a special incentive, Marines serving with the Gendarmerie d'Haiti received both Haitian pay and their regular Marine pay. This double pay tended to make duty with the Gendarmerie d'Haiti highly sought after and competitive, drawing the best of the Marines.⁷⁴

With the formation of the Gendarmerie d'Haiti, the Marines spent the remainder of the United States occupation of Haiti in rebuilding the country and fighting banditry. The Marines finally withdrew on August 15, 1934.⁷⁵

Dominican Republic (1916-1924)

The intervention in the Dominican Republic occurred less than one year after the one in Haiti. As in Haiti, the United States interest was the stability in the Caribbean, and the objectives were to prevent foreign intervention and to restore stability in the nation.⁷⁶

The Dominican Republic occupies the remaining two-thirds of the island of Hispaniola and, like its neighbor Haiti, has had a long

history of political and economic instability. The first landing of Marines on foreign soil other than in time of war had occurred in the Dominican Republic in 1800, and, despite frequent revolutions and disturbances, the Marine Corps did not return for over 100 years. In April 1903, during unrest, a Marine landing party protected the United States Consulate and the lives of foreigners. The Marines remained ashore for 19 days and then reembarked aboard ship. The following February, the landing parties of two United States warships landed as part of a punitive action against insurgents who had fired upon United States ships and killed a sailor. The ships bombarded rebel positions after the rebels had fired on the boats carrying the landing parties. The landing parties reembarked the same evening that they had landed.⁷⁷

The Dominican Republic's economic conditions made its repayment of several foreign loans doubtful. In 1905, with European creditors threatening to occupy the customs houses, the United States took over control of the Dominican finances. The United States, realizing that only through responsible fiscal management could the debts be repaid, established a receivership. President Theodore Roosevelt believed that if the United States ran the customs houses, the Dominican government would use the little money available to pay off claims and not to finance revolutions.⁷⁸ The Dominican-American Treaty, ratified by the United States Senate in 1907, stated that until the Dominicans paid their debts, the receivership would remain.

Political instability continued to plague the Dominican Republic. From 1911 to 1916, the government changed six times. In 1916, rebellion broke out again, when General Desiderio Arias, the Dominican Secretary of War, attempted to unseat the government of Juan Isidro Jiminez. Fighting broke out in the capital, Santo Domingo City, which resulted in the United States Legation being struck. The United

States quickly sent a naval force, including two companies of Marines embarked from Haiti, to protect American citizens. The Marines landed on May 5, and seven more companies soon followed. The Marines occupied the capital, and General Arias fled to the interior town of Santiago.⁷⁹

To put down the rebellion of General Arias would take more Marines. On June 21, the 4th Marine Regiment, commanded by Colonel Joseph Pendleton, landed on the north coast of the Dominican Republic. Colonel Pendleton took charge of all Marines ashore, forming the 2d Brigade. Five days after landing, the Marines moved into the interior to break up General Arias' army. Colonel Pendleton sent one battalion from Monte Cristi to Santiago, while another battalion marched across the mountains from Puerto Plata to Santiago. Along the march, Marine firepower overwhelmed the rebels, and, on July 6, General Arias surrendered as the Marines approached Santiago.⁸⁰

When peaceful negotiations failed to produce a new treaty, the United States proclaimed a military occupation and installed a military government on November 29. Rear Admiral Harry S. Knapp became the military governor, with a cabinet made up of Navy and Marine officers, since no Dominicans wished to serve. The military government established six departments: Foreign Relations, Finance, Public Works and Communications, Justice and Public Instruction, Agriculture and Immigration, and Interior; with a Department of Sanitation added later.⁸¹

The United States wished to impose the same reforms they had made in Haiti, the creation of a constabulary and control of the finances. The difference was that the United States already had close supervision of Dominican finances, with the legal basis in the 1907 treaty.⁸²

The 2d Brigade was the strength behind the military government. For the first 18 months of the occupation, the brigade disarmed the country. The Marines were out-posted throughout the country, and conducted searches to confiscate the weapons of rebels and bandits alike. Marines saw action in the disarming of some private armies and bandit groups, but Marine casualties were minimal, with four dead and 15 wounded.⁸³

In April 1917, the Marines organized the new constabulary, the Guardia Nacional Dominicana. Although patterned after the Gendarmerie d'Haiti, the Guardia Nacional Dominicana did not have the same talent from which to draw. As in Haiti, the constabulary drew men from the lower class to fill the enlisted ranks. The officer ranks of the Guardia Nacional Dominicana, however, did not attract the same quality as the Gendarmerie d'Haiti. Only one Marine officer and 12 noncommissioned officers initially served. These Marines did not receive double pay as those in Haiti. This lack of monetary incentive, plus the need for Marines to serve in France in the First World War, resulted in a lack of Marine participation in the Guardia Nacional Dominicana.⁸⁴

Too small and poorly trained, the Guardia Nacional Dominicana was not capable of fighting the banditry. The bulk of the fighting and the patrolling of the interior, therefore, fell to the brigade of Marines. The Marines continued to fight banditry for the remainder of the eight and a half year intervention. The Marines did not meet much resistance, but the Guardia Nacional Dominicana did not get much opportunity to improve.⁸⁵

On October 21, 1922, a provisional Dominican government took charge of the country. After elections, a new government took office on

July 12, 1924. With the Marine departure on September 17, 1924, the Guardia Nacional Dominicana took over the policing of the country.⁸⁶

Nicaragua (1926-1933)

The third United States intervention in Nicaragua occurred in 1926 and was the last of the Marine small wars. The United States interest was the stability in Central America, with the objectives being the ending of the insurrection and strengthening of the government.⁸⁷

After the intervention in 1912, the United States had remained involved in Nicaraguan politics. It had arranged a \$12 million loan from two American banks. The United States also maintained a one hundred Marine legation guard in Managua, which ensured that the United States remained visible in Nicaragua, especially to any possible rebels.⁸⁸

By the early 1920's the Marine legation guard was doing more harm than good. In itself, the presence raised anti-American sentiment. When combined with their poor off-duty discipline--cantina brawls were common--the situation became worse. The United States decided to remove the legation guard.⁸⁹

The Nicaraguan government became greatly concerned when informed of the removing of the legation guard. Since there was no constabulary to fill the void left by the departure of the Marines, the United States delayed the withdrawal and formed a constabulary modeled after the Gendarmerie de Haiti and the Guardia Nacional Dominicana. There was, however, no Marine involvement, as three Americans under Calvin B. Carter formed the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua. Carter, a retired United States Army major, had served in the Philippines constabulary. The Nicaragua army, however, did not disband with the forming of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua.⁹⁰

The Marine Legation's departure on August 1, 1925, proved to be premature, as the Nicaraguan government was incapable of protecting foreigners or foreign interests. By May 1926, Nicaragua was again in open revolution, and Marines landed. Throughout the rest of the year, the landing parties of four United States warships were ashore to protect lives and property.⁹¹

The political instability continued. General Chamorro, through political maneuvering, had assumed executive power. In November, after negotiations between the two parties, Liberal and Conservative, failed to resolve the rebellion, the Nicaraguan congress designated Adolfo Diaz the president. General Chamorro resigned and turned the army over to the new president.⁹²

Although the landing parties had established several safe zones, the Marines needed reinforcement due to the continuing revolution. The 2nd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel James J. Meade, sailed from Guantanamo Bay, landing at Bluefields on January 10, 1927. Observation Squadron-1 and a rifle company soon followed the battalion. On March 7, the Headquarters for 2nd Brigade, commanded by Brigadier General Logan Feland, and the remainder of the 5th Marine Regiment landed.⁹³

On May 7, the United States arranged a temporary settlement, which called for United States-supervised elections the following year. This settlement required the landing of more Marines to assist in disarming the armed forces. Later that month, the 11th Marine Regiment and Observation Squadron-4 landed. By June, Marine forces began their withdrawal, and, by September, there remained just the headquarters and two battalions from the 5th Marine Regiment, along with one aviation squadron.⁹⁴

The peace did not last long. General Augusto Sandino led a new rebellion, which would result in a five year counterinsurgency campaign by the Marines and the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua. In January 1928, the 11th Marine Regiment, with two of its battalions, and an aviation squadron arrived in Nicaragua to fight the increasing banditry. Marines manned strategic points throughout the country, remaining there until the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua was capable of relieving them. This time, Marine officers and noncommissioned officers joined the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua to instruct and lead.⁹⁵

General Sandino was very popular both in Nicaragua and throughout Latin America for his anti-American stance, receiving outside assistance from many of Nicaragua's neighbors. Government forces, though, began to get the upper hand in 1932, after Sandino lost his sanctuary in Honduras. Sandino agreed to negotiations after a United States withdrawal, which occurred on January 3, 1933.⁹⁶

Although the intervention in Nicaragua had similarities to those in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, there were also differences. The Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, although modeled after the other constabularies, did not have the early leadership of Marine officers and noncommissioned officers. In political approach, the United States did not form a United States military government in Nicaragua, but left the indigenous governments intact and in control.⁹⁷

Although the Marines departed Nicaragua and Haiti in 1933 and 1934, respectively, the United States policy of intervention ended earlier. By 1928, the Coolidge Administration removed the Roosevelt Corollary from the Monroe Doctrine and United States foreign policy. For the next two administrations, those of Herbert Hoover (1929-33) and Franklin Roosevelt (1933-45), intervention was no longer a part of United States policy.⁹⁸

The end of American imperialism had come with the realization that holding an empire together required the willing use of force. The United States had been idealistic in its imperialism. To support its interest, the United States intervened in troubled republics, but its intentions were to make the republics more stable by improving the government and the lives of the people. The good intentions, however, were not enough.

The United States saw the uglier side of the interventions as they became protracted. During the 1920s, the long occupations in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua had mired the Marines in vicious counterinsurgent and counter-bandit wars. The intensity, bitterness and savagery of the fighting led to atrocities, usually in the killing of prisoners, by both Marines and the native constabularies.⁹⁹

As rumors of atrocities spread, fueled by the anti-interventionists in the United States and the Caribbean, investigations followed. The resulting Senate hearings in 1921 and 1922, went deeper than just Marine performance, including all aspects of the occupation policies. The conclusions drawn from the hearings were that the administration of the occupations had been faulty, although the original and present need for the occupations was justified. The Senate wanted reform in the occupations, but not an end to them. The stories of atrocities, and the investigations that followed, changed the occupations and damaged the Marine Corps' image.¹⁰⁰

Before the last of the occupations had ended, the United States response to a coup in Cuba signaled the beginning of a new policy toward the republics of the Caribbean. The 1933 revolt overthrew the dictator, Gerardo Machado. The United States surrounded Cuba with warships, and Cuba braced for another landing by the United States. President

Franklin Roosevelt sent a diplomat, Sumner Welles, instead. Through diplomatic action, rather than military action, the United States was able to make peace and assist in establishing a new government.¹⁰¹

The results of the occupations appear to be minimal. Where the United States had sincerely intervened to help the people of impoverished, unstable republics, there was little difference after the United States left. United States occupations were followed by dictators, who usually were a product of and received their strength from the constabulary. In Nicaragua, it was General Somoza and his family who assumed power, while on the Dominican Republic, it was Rafael Leonidas Trujillo. In Haiti, the constabulary was the strength behind the regime, and it grew one of its own, Paul Magloire, to assume power.¹⁰²

The small wars left a mixed legacy for the Marine Corps. The occupations in many ways had stunted the Marine Corps' growth. Development of individual Marines and the Marine Corps lost out to the urgent needs of the occupations. Due to the constant drain on manpower, officers had been unable to attend schools, and units had not been available for fleet exercises. Many Marines had recognized the importance of advanced base operations, but had lacked the resources to develop the concept. The Marine Corps spent most of the period unable to form the units needed to support war plans.¹⁰³

The small wars era, however, had given many Marines combat experience. The Marine Corps had gained expertise in counterinsurgency operations and in organizing a native constabulary. Most importantly, it had earned a reputation as a force in readiness for use in times of peace.

ENDNOTES

¹Dana G. Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900-1921 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964; reprint, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980), 8 (page references are to reprint edition).

²Ibid., 10.

³Ibid., 10-11.

⁴Ibid., 10.

⁵Ibid., 9.

⁶Ibid., 14.

⁷Ibid., 12-15.

⁸Ibid., 15.

⁹Ibid., 531.

¹⁰Ibid., 534.

¹¹Ibid., 535.

¹²Ibid., 16, 535.

¹³Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States, 4th ed. (New York: Holt, 1955), 210-11.

¹⁴Munro, 65.

¹⁵Bemis, 523-28.

¹⁶Ibid., 762.

¹⁷Ibid., 538.

¹⁸Philip C. Jessup, Elihu Root (New York: Dodd, Mead, & Company, 1938), Vol. I, 471, quoted in Munro, 113.

¹⁹Ibid., 161-62,

²⁰Lester D. Langley, The Banana Wars: United States Intervention in the Caribbean, 1898-1934 (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1985; reprint, Chicago, IL: The Dorsey Press, 1988), 77 (page references are to reprint edition).

²¹Ibid., 270.

²²Munro, 271-72.

²³Ibid., 273.

²⁴Ibid., 20.

²⁵Ibid., 21-23.

²⁶Ibid., 274.

²⁷Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps, rev. and exp. ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 134.

²⁸Ibid., 123.

²⁹Ibid., 138-39.

³⁰Ibid., 139-41.

³¹Ibid., 267-73.

³²Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr., Soldiers of the Sea: The United States Marine Corps, 1775-1962, 2d ed., with a Foreword by B. H. Liddell Hart, with a Foreword to Second Edition by General Alfred M. Gray, USMC Commandant (Baltimore, MD: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1991), 161; Victor H. Krulak, First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984), 78.

³³Captain Harry Allanson Ellsworth, One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines, 1800-1934 (Washington, DC: U.S. Marine Corps, Historical Section, 1974), II-III, 65.

³⁴Millett, 148.

³⁵Langley, 7.

³⁶Millett, 164.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Ellsworth, vi; Hans Schmidt, Maverick Marine: General Smedley D. Butler and the Contradictions of American Military History (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1987), 44-45, 126.

³⁹General Merrill B. Twining, USMC (Retired), interview by author, tape recording, Rancho Santa Fe, California, 27 December 1995; Krulak, 79; Schmidt, 110-11. Schmidt describes the rivalry as a "schism" between the intellectuals who excelled at state-side service and the warriors who had toiled in foreign lands; between combat experience and education; between staff duty and line duty; between Naval Academy graduates and those who rose through the ranks. General Twining, however, states that this is an oversimplification. Some advocates of small wars were intellectuals with no combat experience and some with combat experience saw no future for the Marine Corps in small wars.

⁴⁰Ibid., 126.

⁴¹John M. Collins, America's Small Wars: Lessons for the Future (Washington, DC: Brassey's (US), Inc., 1991), 90-109; Langley, 8. Collins presentation of case studies in small wars includes two others that are not presented here, the attempted 1904 Marine rescue mission in Morocco of the kidnapped Ion Perdicaris and his stepson, and the 30 year

(1912-1941) protective expedition by the Navy and Marine Corps in China in support of the Open Door policy. Langley includes four Banana Wars, Cuba, Mexico, Hispaniola (Haiti and the Dominican Republic), and Nicaragua. Included in this study also are the 1910 and 1912 interventions in Nicaragua, since they fit the definition of intervention, rather than just interposition. In both interventions, the United States supported a side in an ongoing rebellion within Nicaragua.

⁴²Ibid., 91.

⁴³Millett, 152.

⁴⁴Collins, 91.

⁴⁵Ibid., 93.

⁴⁶Millett, 155-58.

⁴⁷Ibid., 160-63.

⁴⁸Collins, 95.

⁴⁹Ellsworth, 46-56; Millett, 164.

⁵⁰Ibid., 165-66.

⁵¹Collins, 95; Millett, 166.

⁵²Collins, 99.

⁵³Langley, 19; Munro, 24-25.

⁵⁴Collins, 99; Ellsworth, 62; Millett, 166-68.

⁵⁵Ibid.

⁵⁶Ellsworth, 62-63.

⁵⁷Ibid., 63-64; Millett, 168.

⁵⁸Ellsworth, 120-23; Collins, 109.

⁵⁹Ellsworth, 124; Millett, 168-69.

⁶⁰Ellsworth, 125; Millett, 169.

⁶¹Ellsworth, 126; Millett, 170-71.

⁶²Collins, 103.

⁶³Ellsworth, 116-17.

⁶⁴Ibid.

⁶⁵Millett, 173-74.

⁶⁶Collins, 105.

- ⁶⁷Munro, 246.
- ⁶⁸Ellsworth, 88.
- ⁶⁹Ibid., 89.
- ⁷⁰Langley, 129.
- ⁷¹Ellsworth, 89-90; Millett, 185.
- ⁷²Ibid.
- ⁷³Ibid., 188.
- ⁷⁴Ibid.
- ⁷⁵Ellsworth, 90.
- ⁷⁶Collins, 107.
- ⁷⁷Ellsworth, 66.
- ⁷⁸Langley, 32.
- ⁷⁹Ellsworth, 69.
- ⁸⁰Ibid., 65-71; Millett, 192.
- ⁸¹Ellsworth, 69-71; Millett, 193.
- ⁸²Langley, 141.
- ⁸³Millett, 194-95.
- ⁸⁴Ibid., 195.
- ⁸⁵Ibid.
- ⁸⁶Ellsworth, 70-71.
- ⁸⁷Collins, 109.
- ⁸⁸Millett, 239-41.
- ⁸⁹Ibid., 239-40.
- ⁹⁰Ibid., 239-41.
- ⁹¹Ellsworth, 128-29.
- ⁹²Ibid., 129-30.
- ⁹³Ibid., 131-33.
- ⁹⁴Ibid.; Collins, 109.
- ⁹⁵Ellsworth, 131-33.
- ⁹⁶Ibid., 133.

⁹⁷Collins, 109.

⁹⁸Millett, 262; Bemis, 762.

⁹⁹Millett, 199-200.

¹⁰⁰Langley, 170; Millett, 202-3

¹⁰¹Langley, 220.

¹⁰²Millett, 260-61; 211.

¹⁰³Ibid., 261.

CHAPTER 3

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SMALL WARS DOCTRINE

During the first four decades of this century, the United States Marine Corps was the nation's military instrument for the conduct of interventions. These interventions, or small wars, were a new mission for the Marine Corps. Marines learned many lessons and began to adapt to the conduct of their small wars based upon these lessons. While the majority of Marines were in foreign service, the Marine Corps began to instruct and develop doctrine back in the United States for the conduct of small wars. The process of the development of this doctrine occurred over a twenty year period, with the final result being the Small Wars Manual.

This chapter will discuss how the Marine Corps, from its small wars experience, developed doctrine for small wars. It will trace the development of small wars doctrine from the early instruction at the Marine Corps Schools and early articles in the Marine Corps Gazette, through the writing of instructional texts for use in the Marine Corps Schools, to the publication of the finished doctrine, the Small Wars Manual. It will also show how the ongoing internal conflict between the advocates of small wars and those of advance base operations influenced the small wars instruction at Marine Corps Schools and the development of small wars doctrine.

In the first part of the twentieth century, the development of doctrine in the Marine Corps took place at the Marine Corps Schools in Quantico. The doctrine process began with lectures given at the Marine

Corps Schools. The staff of the Marine Corps Schools then refined these lectures into the chapters of a school text. The chapters were broad and not always consistent in style or content. Some chapters contained great detail; others were brief. At the same time, the Marine Corps Gazette published articles on the topics of the time. These articles further refined the subject and kept Marines informed on the doctrinal developments. Over a period of years, the contributions of countless individuals refined the text at the Marine Corps Schools. From the original broad text, after wide spread contributions, the writing was eventually narrowed into a concise, fully developed doctrine.¹

The Marine Corps Schools was the center of advanced officer education. Before World War I, the schools within the Marine Corps provided little formal training in small wars. Learning was by practice and word of mouth. After the World War, the Marine Corps attempted to be more systematic in the teaching of small wars and the development of small wars doctrine. In 1920, the old Marine Infantry School and the Training School were combined into the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico. The Marine Corps Schools, thus formed, consisted of a Company Officers School and a Field Grade Officers School. The importance placed on small wars, however, tended to vacillate. Training often swung between Naval and Army thought, since "a Marine was still half soldier, half sailor and his training had to be presented accordingly." Instruction in land warfare used Army texts from Fort Leavenworth and Fort Benning. After the experience of the World War, Army teachings so dominated tactics that problems and exercises at the Marine Corps Schools used Army units and equipment.²

The Marine Corps Gazette was, and still is, the professional journal of the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps Association had begun publishing the Marine Corps Gazette in 1916, as a forum to debate the

issues of the day, including policy, training, technology, and equipment. Besides stimulating thought in the Marine Corps, the Marine Corps Gazette was the only way that Marines in foreign service could keep up with current issues.³

The competition between the advocates of small wars and those of advanced base operations influenced all aspects of the Marine Corps during the first four decades of this century, to include the development of doctrine. The advocates of small wars included several general officers, the two most prominent being Smedley D. Butler and James C. Breckinridge. General Breckinridge, who twice served as the Commandant of the Marine Corps Schools, was the intellectual leader. General Breckinridge had great influence over the curriculum and had used that influence to sidetrack work on advanced base operations. When John H. Russell became the Major General Commandant in 1934, he had the Marine Corps reopen the subject of advance base operations and had the Marine Corps Schools go to work on the subject as well. Generals Russell and Breckinridge had conflicting views of the future of the Marine Corps.⁴

By the mid-1930s, advanced base operations, then termed landing operations, was the premier mission of the Marine Corps. Small wars instruction decreased during the latter part of the decade, eventually being dropped completely from the curriculum. The development of small wars doctrine continued, however, possibly as an appeasement to the many influential Marines who still advocated small wars.⁵

The development of small wars doctrine began with an early Marine Corps Gazette article, continued through two studies and the texts used at the Marine Corps Schools, to the final publication, the Small Wars Manual. The first important Marine Corps Gazette article on small wars was Major Earl H. Ellis' "Bush Brigades" published in 1921.

Also in that year, Major Samuel M. Harrington wrote a treatise entitled "The Strategy and Tactics of Small Wars." A decade later, Major Harold H. Utley conducted his own study that resulted in the manuscript "The Tactics and Techniques of Small Wars." The closing of the Marine Corps Schools, in 1933 and 1934, to develop doctrine for landing operations, lead also to the publication of Small Wars Operations. With revisions in 1935 and 1938, Small Wars Operations was a text for use within the Marine Corps Schools. The final revision of Small Wars Operations became the Small Wars Manual, which was published in 1940.

Major Earl Hancock Ellis is considered to be one of the greatest thinkers the Marine Corps has produced, and probably one of its most interesting characters. Enlisting in 1900, Ellis earned a commission within the year. In 1902, during the Philippine Insurrection, Ellis served with the Marines at Cavite. As a major, he served in France on the staff of Major General Lejeune and received the Navy Cross and Croix de Guerre for his planning and execution of the assault on Blanc Mont. In July 1920, the new Major General Commandant, Lejeune, ordered Ellis to Headquarters, Marine Corps. For the next seven months, Ellis studied the possibility of war with Japan, a subject that had attracted his interest as early as 1912. The result of his work was "Advanced Based Operations in Micronesia," a 30,000 word document that became the top secret "Operation Plan 712-H." In it, Ellis outlined prophetically both the Japanese strategy and the United States offensive through the central Pacific in a war that was 20 years away.⁶

In "Bush Brigades," Ellis provides a summary of the conduct of small wars, and answers about atrocities. In a small war, he wrote, the enemy will first attempt to prevent landings by the United States force, and then he will resist in the cities. When these fail, the enemy will

move into the interior to fight in armed bands, eventually in guerrilla warfare. To counter this, the steps in fighting a small war are: the landing and takeover of the important seaports, securing the doors to country; the establishment of a line of fortified posts in the interior to cover agriculture production areas and to steady the population; and then the drive with "flying columns" into the isolated districts to mop up the outlaw bands. These flying columns are of company strength to wear down the enemy. Then, platoons and squads patrol for the enemy. Of note, these flying columns need to carry cash to buy food and information on the terrain and enemy.⁷

Ellis also attempts to answer questions amidst the Congressional investigations into misconduct in the occupations of Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Ellis wrote that Marines believe that in every case where the United States has taken over a small state, it has done so for purely altruistic reasons. As to atrocities, he denies them, making the questionable claim that "none of these bandits . . . have ever been executed." He further responds, "yes, the Marines are down in jungleland, and they did kill a man in a war, . . . but--the Marines are only doing their job as ordered by the people of the United States."⁸

Major Samuel Harrington conducted the first Marine study on the subject of small wars. While a student at the Field Officers Course, in 1921, he wrote a treatise "The Strategy and Tactics of Small Wars." Harrington had extensive foreign service including Cuba, the Philippines, China, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. Harrington's work so impressed the Commandant of the Marine Corps Schools, Colonel Ben H. Fuller, that he incorporated it into the curriculum.⁹

The Marine Corps Gazette published a condensed version of the work as a two-part article. Also titled "The Strategy and Tactics of

Small Wars," the article appeared in the December 1921 and March 1922 editions of the Marine Corps Gazette. The article, as the title suggests, describes the strategy and tactics used in small wars. Politics appear to be unimportant, as "the reasons for this occupation are unimportant to this discussion." Harrington used extensive examples from the United States Army Indian Campaigns, the British experience in India, and Marine operations in Haiti, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and China. For much of the theory on small wars and the British experience, he cited Colonel C. E. Callwell's Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice. This turn of the century British work was, at the time, the definitive work on the subject. Another source for Harrington was Ellis' "Bush Brigades."¹⁰

Harrington wrote that there are three purposes of small wars. The first is conquest, as in the Indian Campaigns. The second is the suppression of revolution, as in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua. The third is to avenge a national insult, as at Veracruz in 1914. Marine operations dealt almost entirely with the suppression of revolution. Originally, the United States may limit the fighting to the "infected districts." If, however, the government is weak, the United States may need to take it over. This is what happened in Nicaragua in 1912, Haiti in 1915, and the Dominican Republic in 1916.¹¹

Harrington divided the fighting of a small war into six steps. These were the seizure of ports or border towns commanding the routes of trade into and the entrance to the country; the seizure of the interior cities commanding the resources of the territory and the establishment of a base of supply; the division of the theater of operations into military districts; operations from the captured cities and fortified bases of supply; the seizure of livestock and supplies; and finally the seizure of all arms. The seizing of live stock, supplies, and all

weapons in the country is necessary to suppress the possible opposition.¹²

An important consideration in small wars is psychology. The enemy's psychology affects his tactics and morale, and Harrington gives a patronizing description of how "among semi-civilized and savage peoples, this is a matter of emotion."¹³

Harrington's treatise laid the groundwork for the instruction at the Marine Corps Schools and the further research into the subject of small wars. From his work, and the experience of veterans of small wars who joined the staff of the Marine Corps Schools, small wars instruction increased. For the 1924-25 school year, small wars instruction consisted of nine 50-minute lessons, led by Lieutenant Colonel William P. Upshur, a veteran of Haiti.¹⁴

By the 1930-31 academic year, Harrington's article had fallen out of use. Despite the ongoing interventions in Haiti and Nicaragua, small wars instruction in the Field Officers Course accounted for just ten of the 1,016 hours of instruction. The story was the same at the Basic Course in Philadelphia, where "Bush Warfare" accounted for just four of the 130 hours of instruction in tactics. This out of a total of 1,250 hours of instruction.¹⁵

In June 1931, a committee was "appointed to develop and write the text for Landing Operations and Small Wars." The committee of Majors C. D. Barrett, L. H. Miller, and Pedro A. del Valle, had one year to complete the task. The progress on the development of the text was rather slow. The overworked instructors, who were also to assist other instructors in the preparation of problems during the coming school year, had little time for work on the project.¹⁶

Major Harold Utley, in the early 1930s, conducted the next Marine study of small wars. Utley, an instructor at the Field Officers

Course, possessed extensive small wars experience, having participated in the Cuban Pacification, and served two-year tours in Nicaragua, in the Dominican Republic, and in Haiti twice. He reported to the Marine Corps Schools in March 1930 from Nicaragua where he had served for two years as the eastern area commander.¹⁷

Utley received assistance from Captain Merritt Edson, one of his officers from Nicaragua. Edson had also left Nicaragua in 1930 and become an instructor at the Basic Course in Philadelphia. For conducting a patrol against the Sandinistas up the Coco River, Edson had earned fame, a Navy Cross, and personal letters commending his actions from Major General Commandant Lejeune and Secretary of the Navy Adams.¹⁸

The poor condition of small wars instruction dismayed both Edson and Utley. Each set about trying to correct the deficiencies they found at their respective schools. They also pooled their talents through correspondence and visits, as they attempted to improve not only the instruction, but the study of the subject of small wars.¹⁹

Utley conducted an in-depth study of small wars. His research into the subject was based upon the previous Marine Corps Gazette articles of Ellis and Harrington of ten years previous, the lectures of Upshur, United States Army texts on the Indian Campaigns, Callwell's Small Wars and the work of another British officer, Lieutenant Colonel W. C. G. Heneker's Bush Warfare. Utley also sent letters to veterans of Marine interventions, soliciting their observations. Just as a similar attempt by the 2nd Brigade staff to solicit the Marines in Nicaragua, his request drew little response. Utley also relied on Edson for comments and critiques, as Edson's reputation as an expert in the tactics of jungle fighting and counterinsurgency continued to grow.²⁰

The result of Utley research was a five-part manuscript entitled "The Tactics and Techniques of Small Wars." The Marine Corps

Gazette published the first three parts as "An Introduction to the Tactics of Small Wars." The first part appeared in 1931, and the last two parts in 1933.²¹

In his article, Utley offered little new material. He quoted and paraphrased extensively from Harrington, Ellis, Upshur, Callwell and Heneker. Although he had done extensive historical research, he added little to theory on the subject. His work, however, did consolidate the information that was available.²²

Utley's article concentrated on the conduct of a small war. He wrote that the Marine Corps is often "called upon to undertake warlike operations when a state of war does not exist." The difference between a small and major war is that in a small war "a trained regular force is opposed by an irregular and comparatively untrained enemy." Small wars are conducted in four phases: preparations before entering the country, the capture or occupation of one or more ports or border towns, the destruction of hostile forces and the occupation of vital areas, and then the running down of guerrilla bands and the complete occupation of the country.²³

Utley accomplished much at Quantico. He remained at the Marine Corps Schools until June 1933, serving as an instructor in and the Director of the Field Officers Course. By 1932, he was able to increase the course of instruction in small wars to 19 hours. The Marine Corps Schools formally adopted his research project, but the staff accomplished little. The staff continued to be overworked and was often drained of manpower due to current operations.²⁴

As the Marine Corps entered the 1930s, the search for a mission and the perceived impending war with the Japanese had raised landing operations to the forefront. The Marine Corps had often felt the threat of extinction unless it could justify its existence, and it was again

feeling political pressure. It had become obvious to the leadership of the Marine Corps, for political as well as strategic reasons, that the Marine Corps mission was in landing operations. In 1933, the Marine Corps took two major steps in preparing itself to conduct the mission of landing operations, the development of the Fleet Marine Force and the writing of a manual for landing operations.

The Fleet Marine Force was the project of Major General John H. Russell, then the assistant to the Major General Commandant. With Navy Department Order 241 of December 7, 1933, the Marine Corps reorganized its expeditionary units into the Fleet Marine Force. The new title covered the missions of both base defense and amphibious assault. Although these forces were originally quite small, when General Russell became the Major General Commandant the following year, the development of the Fleet Marine Force was the Marine Corps' highest priority, and landing operations were the "first order of business."²⁵

As early as 1931, the Marine Corps Schools had started work on writing doctrine for landing operations. As was seen with the Marine Corps Schools' attempts to publish small wars doctrine, the staff, overburdened with its teaching and course work, had little time for the writing of manuals. General Russell, again while the assistant to the Major General Commandant, had a different solution, close the Marine Corps Schools to concentrate the efforts of the staff and students on the development of amphibious doctrine.²⁶

On November 14, 1933, the Marine Corps Schools suspended the 1933-34 classes to prepare a manual on landing operations. Brigadier General James C. Breckinridge, who had become the Commandant of the Marine Corps Schools in April 1932, was the intellectual leader of the small wars advocates and had little interest in the subject. The real driving force behind the project was his assistant, Colonel Ellis B.

Miller. Seven months later, the Marine Corps Schools turned out a single, comprehensive volume on the conduct of amphibious operations, the Tentative Manual for Landing Operations, 1934.²⁷

Although the leadership of the Marine Corps now saw that the future of the Marine Corps was in landing operations, General Breckinridge still saw a place for small wars. The Major General Commandant directed on October 28, 1933, that the preparation of a manual on landing operations was the priority for the Marine Corps Schools. General Breckinridge, however, saw the suspending of classes as an opportunity to complete the many projects for which there never had been time. On January 22, 1934, just two months after the suspending of classes, General Breckinridge requested from the Major General Commandant that after the completion of the manual for landing operations, the Marine Corps Schools remain closed so the staff could "devote their time to preparation of 1934-1935 work." Breckinridge was confident that upon the completion of the manual for landing operations, the staff would have time to "prepare the data, conferences, lectures, problems, small war and landing operations textbooks essential to the academic year 1934-1935," with the landing operations textbook being "an extension and an enlargement of the manual."²⁸

Breckinridge did not see the creation of the Fleet Marine Force or the priority on landing operations incompatible with the mission of fighting small wars. He believed that the Fleet Marine Force was not exclusively for use in amphibious operations, but also had a place in small wars. He wrote the Major General Commandant that the Marine Corps' mission was "supporting the fleet in a major war, as well as support a part of the fleet in emergencies not involving a declaration of war." Marines must be capable, he wrote, of "supporting the Fleet in Landing Operations or Small Wars."²⁹

Breckinridge believed there was a great deal to teach Marine officers. To instruct many of the new tasks, the Marine Corps Schools must put together much detailed instruction. The Marine Corps Schools were doing this for landing operations, but "the subject of Small Wars has been barely investigated in the past, and we have a vast amount of work to do under this subject."³⁰

As the Marine Corps Schools prepared to reconvene classes in the spring of 1934, the curriculum included instruction in both landing operations and small wars. Although landing operations dominated Marine Corps thought and the Marine Corps Schools' instruction, small wars still had a place. Breckinridge's assistant, Colonel Miller, wrote to the Major General Commandant that "we have built a course for this year on Landing Operations and Small Wars, the two major missions of the Marine Corps." Breckinridge later reported to the Major General Commandant that "the subject of Small Wars has received only cursory attention at the Marine Corps Schools, but this year a comprehensive course in this subject has been included in the curriculum, in order that marine officers be thoroughly instructed in this most important phase of our peace time [sic] duties."³¹

There was room, as Miller had written, for both landing operations and small wars in the curriculum for the 1934-35 school year. For the Company Officers School, instruction consisted of 172 hours of Landing Operations, 94 hours of Small Wars, and 71 hours of Spanish, out of the total 1,056 hours of instruction. For the second year class, instruction in landing operations received a much greater share of the class time. The majority of the instruction used problems, or practical exercises, with 541 hours on landing operations to the 140 hours for small wars. This is again out of 1,056 hours of total instruction.³²

The next step in the development of small wars doctrine was the writing of a Marine Corps Schools text. As General Breckinridge and the Marine Corps Schools staff had desired, the completion of the manual for landing operations gave the Marine Corps Schools the opportunity to turn to other projects. The Director of the Division of Operations and Training at Headquarters Marine Corps, in a June 23, 1934, memorandum, placed at the top of the list of projects at the Marine Corps Schools that "a manual on small wars should be prepared as soon as possible." To complete this task, the Marine Corps Schools should receive "an unusual effort . . . to provide qualified officers for the Staff." This included certain Marines with small wars experience who were "particularly well qualified for work on the Small Wars Manual."³³

The task of writing a manual for small wars fell upon the Small Wars Section at the Marine Corps Schools. The Chief of the Small Wars Section was Major Henry L. Larsen, and his instructors included Major Arnold W. Jacobsen, fresh from a tour in Haiti, and Captain Victor F. Bleasdale. Majors Larsen and Jacobsen were "designated to consult with the Adjutant and Inspector and the Headquarters Historical Officer," to use the Marine Corps files on Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua to "examine, analyze, digest and place in presentable form" the past experiences in small wars for the "preparation of a manual on Small Wars."³⁴

The result of this effort was the publication by the Marine Corps Schools of Small Wars Operations, 1935 Revision. The book was marked "Restricted" and contained the warning on the title page: "Not to pass out of the custody of members of the U.S. Naval or Military Service." In its 900 pages of text, Small Wars Operations was a comprehensive study of small wars for use as a text within the Marine Corps Schools.³⁵

Small War Operations borrowed heavily from its predecessors, but also had much new material. The book consisted of 32 chapters, although Chapter VIII, Operations Orders and Instructions, was not printed. These chapters provided in-depth coverage of a wide variety of subjects. The text showed the influences of the studies of Harrington and Utley, both in the content and the use of examples. Written in greater detail, however, than previous writings, most chapters included appendices with case studies and examples. There were the standard examples from Callwell and the United States Army Indian campaigns, but also included were examples from the French in Indo-China, the Peninsular War, and Marine operations, including the embarkation for Cuba. An example of the level of detail is an appendix that included individual meal menus for patrols out in the field.³⁶

The major doctrinal change was in the phases of a small war. Unlike previous writings, Small Wars Operations divided a small war into five phases:

- Phase 1. Initial demonstration or landing and action of vanguard.
- Phase 2. The arrival of reenforcements [sic] and general military operations in the field.
- Phase 3. Assumption of control of executive agencies, and cooperation with the legislative and judicial agencies.
- Phase 4. Routine police functions.
- Phase 5. Withdrawal from the Theater of Operations.³⁷

Small Wars Operations was an in-depth study into small wars. It compiled nearly all of the research done to date on small wars.

In 1938, the Marine Corps Schools published Small Wars Operations, 1938 Revision, which offered little change to the 1935 revision. The changes consisted of the revision of three chapters. The majority of the book remained intact, with the title page and chapter pages for the unchanged chapters still bearing the title "Small Wars Operations, 1935 Revision." The changes were minimal accounting for a net loss of 28 pages. The table of contents remained the same, not

reflecting that the title of one of the new chapters was different from the one it replaced.³⁸

By the mid-1930s, the instruction at the Marine Corps Schools reflected the primacy of landing operations within the Marine Corps. Although the 1937-38 academic year included 45 hours of small wars instruction, by 1938, the small wars advocates had lost their influence. It had become apparent that the United States was heading for a war with Japan and that the war would require an amphibious capability. The majority of Marines, especially those at the Marine Corps Schools, concentrated their efforts of the completion of the doctrine for amphibious operations.³⁹

The Marine Corps did not task the Marine Corps Schools with the next update of small wars doctrine. Instead, in April 1939, Major General Commandant Thomas Holcomb assigned a four-man board to revise Small Wars Operations. The board consisted of Colonel William H. Rupertus and Majors Merritt A. Edson, Vernon M. Guymon, and Ernest E. Linsert, all assigned in the Washington, DC area. Although the reason that General Holcomb did not assign the task to the Marine Corps Schools is unknown, several factors possibly contributed to the decision. There was, at this time, no small wars instruction occurring at the Marine Corps Schools. The completing of the doctrine for landing operations received all the efforts. The Major General Commandant may not have wished to distract the Marine Corps Schools from that important project. He, however, did want to complete the doctrine cycle and capture the lessons learned during the previous four decades of fighting small wars. The Major General Commandant also had a habit of using ad hoc boards, rather than the normal staff procedures.⁴⁰

The members of the board possessed varied small wars experience. The senior man, Colonel Rupertus, was the Commanding

Officer of the Marine Barracks in Washington. As a major, twenty years earlier, he had served in Haiti as an Inspector in the Gendarmerie d'Haiti and the Chief of Police in Port-au-Prince. The three majors were all assigned to Headquarters Marine Corps. Major Edson was the Inspector of Target Practice, where he oversaw the Marine Corps competitive shooting program. He had already earned a reputation for his tactical expertise, through his exploits leading the Coco Patrol and his tour as a tactics instructor as covered above. With the publication in 1936 and 1937, of his three-part Marine Corps Gazette article "The Coco Patrol," and his membership on the Marine Corps rifle team, Edson had gained further renown within the Marine Corps. That General Holcomb had also been a competitive shooter, did not hurt Edson either. Major Guymon, an aviator assigned to the War Plans Section, had gained his small wars experience flying in support of Edson's Coco Patrol. Major Linsert, the Secretary to the Marine Corps Equipment Board, had been the 2nd Brigade intelligence officer in Nicaragua in 1932.⁴¹

It is most probable that the driving force on the project was Edson. Of the group, he possessed the preponderance of the small wars tactical expertise, being the only one who had ground combat experience in small wars, and had the time to devote to the project. His regular duties in the Target Practice office were not very demanding, leaving him time to work on a number of other projects and inspection teams. For the other members of the board, 1940 was a busy year. Besides his duties at the Marine Barracks, Rupertus spent that winter as an umpire for the annual Fleet Landing Exercises. Linsert was busy as well, as the Marine Corps Equipment Board was hurriedly developing equipment for amphibious operations in anticipation of a war with Japan. Linsert was involved with one of the most important innovations in amphibious

warfare, the Higgins boat, which became the ramp-bow landing craft used in World War II.⁴²

With orders from the Major General Commandant to complete their work before the end of 1940, the board set to work. Starting with Small Wars Operations, the board reorganized the manual, throwing out extraneous material and errors. In this way, the board refined the work of countless Marines over a twenty year period into a single concise manual. In June, the project was complete.⁴³

The result was the Small Wars Manual, a concisely written book that is both a primer on small wars and a how-to-fight manual. Each topic receives a broad summary that explains the background to the political, economic, and social influences. The manual then covers the tactical aspects of the topic in detail, with the manual providing planning considerations and plenty of tactics, techniques, and procedures.

The Small Wars Manual is a slimmed down version of Small Wars Operations, consisting of half the number of pages. The text that remains came mainly from Small Wars Operations, but reorganized from thirty-two chapters to fifteen. Missing, however, is much of the detail, most of the examples, and all the appendices. Of the few examples that do remain, there are two quotations from Callwell's Small Wars and an example of the impact of river conditions on operations from the Coco River in Nicaragua.⁴⁴

With the publication of the Small Wars Manual, the Marine Corps completed a twenty year process to develop doctrine for the conduct of small wars. This process, beginning in the 1920s, compiled the contributions of countless Marines. Through the 1920s and 1930s, the Marine Corps Schools continually refined the doctrine through articles in the Marine Corps Gazette and instruction and text at the Marine Corps

Schools. The development of small wars doctrine was influenced by the conflict between the advocates of small wars and those of advance base operations. Although advance base operations, by then evolved into amphibious operations, emerged as its primary mission, the Marine Corps completed the development of small wars doctrine. The Small Wars Manual, as the end product of this process, was a definitive compilation of the lessons Marines had learned during four decades of fighting the nation's small wars.

ENDNOTES

¹Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, USMC (Retired), interview by author, tape recording, San Diego, California, 27 December 1995; General Merrill B. Twining, USMC (Retired), interview by author, tape recording, Rancho Santa Fe, California, 27 December 1995.

²Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps, rev. and exp. ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 323; Jeter A. Isley and Philip A. Crowl, The U.S. Marines and Amphibious Warfare: Its Theory, and Its Practice in the Pacific (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1951), 24; Anthony A. Francis, "History of the Marine Corps Schools" (Manuscript, Marine Corps Schools, Marine Barracks, Quantico, VA, 1945), 30-31.

³Millett, 277.

⁴Twining. General Twining characterized General Breckinridge's behavior toward Major General Commandant Russell as "insubordinate."

⁵Ronald Schaffer, "The 1940 Small Wars Manual and the Lessons of History" Military Affairs 36 (April 1972): 49; Twining. General Twining "surmises" that small wars instruction and doctrine were allowed to continue as an appeasement to the advocates of small wars.

⁶Lieutenant Colonel P. N. Pierce, "The Unsolved Mystery of Pete Ellis," Marine Corps Gazette 46, no. 2 (February 1962): 35-37; Lynn Montross, "The Mystery of Pete Ellis," Marine Corps Gazette 38, no. 7 (July 1954): 31-32; Dirk A. Ballendorf, "Earl Hancock Ellis: A Final Assessment," Marine Corps Gazette 74, no. 11 (November 1990): 80; Victor H. Krulak, First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984), 76.

⁷Major E. H. Ellis, "Bush Brigades," Marine Corps Gazette 6, no. 1 (March 1921): 3, 8-9. The carrying of cash by patrols is a technique that was recommended throughout small wars doctrine, continuing up to the Small Wars Manual.

⁸Ibid., 1, 11, 15.

⁹"Harrington, Samuel M. BGEN USMC (RET)" Folder, Research Section, History and Museum Division, Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington; Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth J. Clifford, Progress and Purpose: A Developmental History of the United States Marine Corps, 1900-1970 (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1973), 37. Clifford dates the writing of the treatise as 1922. This date, however, is too late since the Marine Corps Gazette published the first part in the December 1921.

¹⁰Ibid.; Major Samuel M. Harrington, "The Strategy and Tactics of Small Wars," Marine Corps Gazette 6, no. 4 (December 1921): 478, 483-84, 486-88. The article is all that remains of the study since the treatise has been lost.

¹¹Ibid., 474-75.

¹²Ibid., 477.

¹³Ibid., 481.

¹⁴Schaffer, 46, 51.

¹⁵Jon T. Hoffman, Once A Legend: "Red Mike" Edson of the Edson Raiders (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1994), 98-99; Brigadier General Dion Williams, "The Education of a Marine Officer," Marine Corps Gazette 18, no. 2 (August 1933): 23.

¹⁶School Memorandum, Marine Corps Schools, 3 June 1931, Historical Amphibious File 43, Archives Branch, Marine Corps Research Center, Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA.

¹⁷"Utley, Harold H. LTCOL USMC DEC" Folder, Research Section, History and Museum Division, Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington; Millett, 251.

¹⁸Major Edwin N. McClellan, "The Saga of the Coco," Marine Corps Gazette 15, no. 3 (November 1930): 79.

¹⁹Hoffman, 98.

²⁰"Utley Papers," Box IV, Personal Papers Section, History and Museum Division, Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington; Hoffman, 98-99.

²¹"The Tactics and Techniques of Small Wars," Utley Papers, Box V. The Utley Papers, Box V contains the manuscript, although Part IV is missing.

²²Major Harold H. Utley, "An Introduction to the Tactics of Small Wars," Marine Corps Gazette 18, no. 3 (November 1933): 44-46; Major Harold H. Utley, "An Introduction to the Tactics of Small Wars," Marine Corps Gazette 16, no. 1 (May 1931): 50; Schaffer, 51; Utley Papers, Box IV.

²³Major Harold H. Utley, "An Introduction to the Tactics of Small Wars," Marine Corps Gazette 16, no. 1 (May 1931): 50, 53.

²⁴Utley Folder; Schaffer, 46; Hoffman, 99.

²⁵Millett, 330.

²⁶Krulak, First To Fight, 80-81.

²⁷Francis, 48; Clifford, 43; Krulak, First To Fight, 80-81.

²⁸Twining; The Commandant, Marine Corps Schools to The Major General Commandant, 14 November 1933, National Archives, Record Group 127, Box 60. Washington; [Marine Corps Schools] Memorandum, 16 November 1933, National Archives, Record Group 127, Box 60, Washington; The Commandant, Marine Corps Schools to The Major General Commandant, 22 January 1934, National Archives, Record Group 127, Box 60, Washington. The underline in the quote from General Breckinridge's 22 January 1934 letter is in the original.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹Colonel E. B. Miller Memorandum for General Russell, 12 May 1934, National Archives, Record Group 127, Box 60, Washington; The Commandant, Marine Corps Schools to The Major General Commandant, 20 September 1934, National Archives, Record Group 127, Box 60, Washington.

³²Major Charles J. Miller, "Marine Corps Schools, 1934-1935," Marine Corps Gazette 19, no. 2 (August 1934): 59; The Director, Division of Operations and Training to The Major General Commandant, 5 June 1934, National Archives, Record Group 127, Box 60, Washington. The Director, Division of Operations and Training, Headquarters Marine Corps reported the information a little differently to the Major General Commandant. In a June 5, 1934, memorandum, the total hours of instruction was reported as 1,045 hours and 1,046 hours for the first and second year courses, respectively. Of that, 116 hours in the first year, and 71 hours in the second were in areas of study that were designated as problems or "studies in Small Wars." This included each class conducting a project problem, "a continuous problem . . . extending over a considerable period," in small wars.

³³The Director, Division of Operations and Training to The Assistant to The Major General Commandant, 23 June 1934, National Archives, Record Group 127, Box 60, Washington.

³⁴[Marine Corps Schools] Schools Special Order Number 53, 6 September 1934, National Archives, Record Group 127, Box 60, Washington; The Commandant, Marine Corps Schools to The Major General Commandant, 1 October 1934, National Archives, Record Group 127, Box 60, Washington; The Commandant, Marine Corps Schools to The Major General Commandant, 20 September 1934.

³⁵Marine Corps Schools, Small Wars Operations, 1935 Revision (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Schools, Marine Barracks, 1935), title page; Krulak, First To Fight, 191. Although the tone of the correspondence from the Marine Corps Schools gives the impression that there was no previous text, the title 1935 revision would lead one to believe that there was an earlier text to have been revised. General Krulak writes that the first publication was titled Small Wars Manual, 1930, which is the only reference to an edition or revision before 1935.

³⁶Small Wars Operations, 1935 Revision, table of contents, chap. II, p. 12-15.

³⁷Ibid., chap. I, p.16.

³⁸Marine Corps Schools, Small Wars Operations, 1938 Revision (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Schools, Marine Barracks, 1938). Two of the revised chapters were Chapters XVII "Signal Communication" and XXV "Aviation," which retained their original titles. Chapter XX, entitled "The Defense, Attack, and Occupation of Towns," was replaced with the correspondence course "Defense of Small Towns." There was no chapter title page, as with the other chapters, but the cover page for the correspondence course.

³⁹Schaffer, 49; Twining. As an instructor at Marine Corps Schools beginning in 1939, General Twining recalls that small wars was a "dead issue [being] completely ignored."

⁴⁰Captain Jon T. Hoffman, "The Coco River Patrol and The Small Wars Manual" (Thesis, The Ohio State University, 1989), 96; Hoffman, Once A Legend, 122; Twining.

⁴¹Hoffman, Once A Legend, 100-109, 120-22; Krulak interview.

⁴²Hoffman, Once A Legend, 122-23; Krulak, First To Fight, 92; Krulak interview.

⁴³Hoffman, Once A Legend, 122-23. Edson's copy of Small Wars Operations in the Edson Papers at the Library of Congress is the 1935 revision. The table of contents of this copy contains pencil marks that renumber the chapters and sections into the same scheme as that of the Small Wars Manual. It can be assumed that these are Edson's marks reorganizing the manual.

⁴⁴U.S. Marine Corps, NAVMC 2890, Small Wars Manual (Reprint of 1940 Edition) (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 1987), chap. III, p. 13, chap. X, pp. 2-3.

CHAPTER 4
AN ANALYSIS OF THE SMALL WARS MANUAL

The Small Wars Manual was the compilation of the Marine Corps' experience in thirty-six years of fighting the nation's small wars. These experiences were compiled and refined over a twenty year period. With the publication of the Small Wars Manual, the Marine Corps had developed a mature doctrine for the fighting of small wars.

This chapter will provide a summary of the Small Wars Manual and then, based upon that summary, provide three criteria for the analysis of the Small Wars Manual and a small war. For each, the criteria will be defined, placed in the context of the Marine Corps small wars experience, and elaborated on from the Small Wars Manual.

The Small Wars Manual begins with the explanation that "small wars are operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our Nation." Further, an expedition "which does not involve a major effort in regular warfare against a first-rate power may be termed a small war."¹

What the United States considers a small war, however, the native belligerents probably will consider a national war. A United State force will most likely encounter guerrilla warfare and possibly levee en masse. The enemy will retreat into the mountains and jungles of his homeland, using the terrain he knows to his favor.²

A small war, however, is more than just a military problem. The roots of the strife may be economic, political, or social, and be long running. The solution to these problems is normally some political adjustment, with military measures necessary to support "peaceful corrective measures." The restoration of peace sets the conditions to make the changes necessary.³

The Small Wars Manual divides a small war into the same five phases as did Small Wars Operations. These phases are: the initial landing or demonstration and the actions of the vanguard; the arrival of reinforcements and operations in the field; the assumption of control of executive agencies, and cooperation with the legislative and judicial agencies; the conduct of routine police functions; and then the withdrawal of the United States force.⁴

During the first phase, the force "dribbles" in, as the United States wishes to use minimum troops and minimum force. During this phase, "small numbers of troops may be sent ashore to assume the initiative, as a demonstration to indicate a determination to control the situation, and to prepare the way for any troops to follow." The vanguard may seize a critical area, but afterward will be restricted to an active defense due to its limited numbers. The commander sets tight rules of engagement during this phase.⁵

The second phase is the most important, as the force conducts operations against the enemy, forms a constabulary, and disarms the inhabitants. To conduct operations against the enemy, the force divides the area of operations and assigns forces to each. These forces then move into the country, seize and hold the most important city, and then send out patrols. During the initial phases, a conventional force usually opposes the United States force. Although the goal is crushing the enemy, some will usually escape to remote parts of the country and

begin a guerrilla war. It is then necessary to "seek out hostile groups, attack them energetically, and then pursue them to the limit." Patrols "combat the native guerrilla at his own game on his own ground."⁶

The United States force will move into the interior in a mobile column, which is an all arms, self-supporting detachment. This mobile column will disperse large groups of the hostile force and then establish advanced bases and fortified posts inland. Once in the interior, the United States force uses a number of methods, often in combination, to pacify the area. In the occupation of an area, the force disperses into as many small towns and localities as possible, while still maintaining adequate security. Patrols deny the enemy terrain and freedom of movement, while operating for limited time before returning to a base. Roving patrols are self-sustaining and can operate for an indefinite period. Roving patrols relentlessly pursue the guerrilla groups until their disorganization is almost complete. A zone of refuge is a protected zone near a garrison, where peaceful inhabitants move, leaving those outside the zone liable to arrests. In a cordon, the United States force encircles an "infested area" and closes in while restoring order to that area. The cordon may remain stationary while patrols operate within the area. A cordon is rare because it requires a large force. In a blockhouse system, there is a line of defended localities. It is similar to a cordon, except that it is defensive, while the cordon is offensive. A final method is the flying column, "a detachment, usually of all arms, operating at a distance from, and independent of, a main body or supporting troops." This formation is "lightly equipped to insure mobility and sufficiently strong to exempt it from being tied to a base of supplies through a fixed line of communications."⁷

The United States force, besides dismounted patrolling, employs aviation, conducts riverine operations, uses pack animals, conducts mounted detachments, and protects convoys. The primary mission of combat aviation in small wars "is the direct support of the ground forces." Often the United States force will find that "water routes are a primary means of transportation and communication, especially if there are few and inadequate railroads, roads, or trails." This poor transportation infrastructure in "the probable theaters of small-wars operations present transportation and tactical problems which usually require the use of animals for their successful solution." The United States force can "employ animals, at least for transportation of supplies, and, generally, to some extent, for mounted work." A convoy escort protects a convoy "to insure the uninterrupted march and safe arrival of the convoy it is detailed to protect."⁸

Normally, the United States force will initially assume the police functions, since the government forces have lost control of the country. For the country to reassume the police functions "the United States Government will usually insist upon the establishment of an efficient and well-trained armed native force, free from political influence and distatorial [sic] control." To accomplish this, the United States will have the chief executive or the legislature of the country disband all armed forces, including police. Defense and police functions are then combined in one armed service, termed the constabulary. Initially, the officers of the constabulary will come from the officers and noncommissioned officers of the United States force. Native officers, once trained, will replace the Americans. The enlisted personnel of the constabulary are native volunteers. The political affiliation of recruits is always a factor, and it may be necessary to enlist "recruits of different political beliefs in

proportion to the voting strength of the principal political parties." It also "may be deemed advisable to refuse enlistment to members of former military forces of the country." Depending on the local situation, the constabulary will take over military and police functions, as well as some civil duties. By participating in civil affairs, the constabulary secures the friendship of the citizens.⁹

In conjunction with the operations in the field and the forming of the constabulary, the United States force is also disarming the country. The majority of the male population has armed itself since the unrest and lawlessness have lead them to believe the government cannot protect them or their property. The disarming of the inhabitants is "the most vital step in the restoration of tranquillity." Often, the United States force must disarm opposing factions as well, and this disarmament must be conducted with impartiality. With the country disarmed, the United States force, and the constabulary, must be able to provide security and guarantee safety for not only those disarmed, but also those whom the disarmed had been protecting.¹⁰

To disarm the inhabitants, the authorities will issue a disarming order that tells specifically what weapons are to be confiscated, and, for those retained, when weapons may be carried. "The peasants in the outlying districts . . . are armed with shotguns for hunting, as well as for self-protection." Likewise, "a feature of the disarming of the inhabitants which is a source of difficulty and misunderstanding is the question of retaining their machetes, cutachas, knives, and stilettos," which may have working, as well as fighting, uses. The disarming order must be specific enough "to insure the collection of these dangerous weapons, and to avoid depriving the peasants of their implements which mean their very livelihood."¹¹

If the second phase fails to accomplish the goals of the small war, then it may be necessary to resort to complete United States control of the executive agencies of the government. This can be through the establishment of a United States military government or the declaration of martial law. During this phase, the United States force will conduct more patrolling and attempt to intercept supplies. The goal is "to break the resistance to law and order by a combination of effort of physical and moral means." The United States force will do the majority of the patrolling, but the constabulary will begin to assume more responsibility so "these native agencies may assume their proper responsibility for restoring law and order in their own country as an agency of their government." The return of law and order to the country marks the end of the third phase.¹²

In the fourth phase, the native agencies gradually assume the police functions and judicial authority. The constabulary, now capable of maintaining order, assumes all police functions, and the United States force withdraws to central locations to act as a reserve, for use in "grave emergencies."¹³

Normally, in the fourth phase the United States will monitor elections, "perhaps the most effective peaceful means of exerting an impartial influence upon the turbulent affairs of sovereign states." An Electoral Mission represents the United States. It normally consists of officers and enlisted of the United States force, and "certain qualified civilian assistants." The Electoral Mission supervises the National Board of Elections, which is a committee of citizens of the country that directs and controls the election procedure. The military and police must protect the voters, so they feel safe taking part in the election.¹⁴

In the last phase, with a government elected and order restored, or the native agencies capable of controlling the country without other support, the United States force withdraws.¹⁵

The Small Wars Manual is a comprehensive study in small wars, providing guidance, planning considerations, tactics, techniques, and procedures at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

Throughout the Small Wars Manual, however, three themes stand out; the end state¹⁶ of the small war is a nation that is lawful and orderly; that to attain that end state requires a phased intervention; and that the military contribution to the intervention is in support of the diplomatic effort.

The end state called for in the Small Wars Manual is a lawful and orderly society. The Marine experience from fighting small wars was that the United States intervened in the affairs of other nations to maintain regional stability, specifically within the western hemisphere. The biggest threat to United States interests in the region was the intervention of European powers, which could use the instability and lawlessness of a nation as a pretext for intervention. With such an intervention, a European power could gain a foothold in the hemisphere. To preclude this, the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine stated the right of the United States to help the nations of the hemisphere eliminate the conditions that made them ripe for European intervention. To maintain the stability of these nations, the United States would end the lawlessness, disorder, and inequity that tended to spark discontent and rebellion. The United States further maintained that it would do so by force if necessary.

The attainment of a lawful and orderly society was both pragmatic and altruistic. In several instances, the Small Wars Manual idealistically describes this end state, such as the example below:

The purpose should always be to restore normal government or give the people a better government than they had before, and to establish peace, order, and security on as permanent a basis as practicable. Gradually there must be instilled in the inhabitants' minds the leading ideas of civilization, the security and sanctity of life and property, and individual liberty. In so doing, one should endeavor to make self-sufficient native agencies responsible for these matters. With all this accomplished, one should be able to leave the country with the lasting friendship and respect of the native population.¹⁷

The mission of the United States force is the attainment of the end state. The Small Wars Manual does recognize, however, that changes in national foreign policy "may lead to an abrupt termination of small wars operations." Normally, however, the force will be withdrawn only once the mission is accomplished.¹⁸

The second theme of the Small Wars Manual is that an intervention is sequentially phased to attain the end state. This sequential phasing means that each incremental step, or phase, requires the attainment of a condition for moving to the next phase. This condition is the objective for that phase. The phases are distinct, although some elements may occur during more than one phase.

The Marine Corps small wars experience in interventions had followed a general pattern. Landing parties from Navy ships made the initial landings, and then were quickly reinforced with larger formations. The Marines would subdue the lawlessness by disarming the population and establishing a constabulary. If necessary, and it usually was, the United States would empower a government or establish a military one. As the constabulary became capable, it would slowly assume more responsibility, until the intervening force is withdrawn.

The Small Wars Manual divides a small war into five phases. These phases, it will be remembered, are:

- Phase 1. Initial demonstration or landing and action of vanguard.
- Phase 2. The arrival of reinforcements [sic] and general military operations in the field.
- Phase 3. Assumption of control of executive agencies, and cooperation with the legislative and judicial agencies.
- Phase 4. Routine police functions.
- Phase 5. Withdrawal from the Theater of Operations.¹⁹

More accurately, however, the Small Wars Manual model consists of four phases. What the Small Wars Manual designates as Phase 3, the establishment of a military government or declaration of martial law if order is not restored, is more accurately a sub-phase of Phase 2, since both phases seek to attain the same objective.

For this study then, the Small Wars Manual model is a four-phased intervention. For each phase, the objective is a pre-condition for the next phase. Phase A²⁰ consists of the initial entry. The objective of this phase is the attainment of a lodgment. In Phase B, the force conducts operations in the field, with the objective being that the lawlessness is subdued. If more thorough measures are required, then the force enters a sub-phase of Phase B, the establishment of a military government or the declaration of martial law. This sub-phase has the same objective as Phase B; that lawlessness is subdued. In Phase C, the functions of government are returned to the native agencies, with the intervening force providing the reserve. The objective of this phase is to have order restored or the native agencies capable of handling the situation without support. In the final phase, Phase D, the United States force is withdrawn, with the objective being the attainment of the end state and total withdrawal from the nation.

Within Phase B of the intervention, the tasks of disarming the population and establishing a constabulary are conducted. Although disarming is begun in Phase B, it will be continuous. Likewise, the development and training of the constabulary will continue throughout the remainder of the intervention.

The disarming of the population is crucial to the return of law and order to the society. The members of the population have armed themselves because they do not feel that the government forces will provide safety for them. As long as the population is armed, elements

of the population will be able to continue the lawlessness. By disarming all elements of the society, while providing for their security, the people will feel safe in the conduct of everyday activities that are essential to an orderly society.

The key to the return of law and order to the country is the establishment of a legitimate security force, after the disbanding of all the standing armed forces, both military and police. The Marine small wars experience was that the army was the source of power of the ruling party. The mission of the armed forces was to keep the ruling party in power, rather than the security of the populace. In the army's place, the Marines established a constabulary. This constabulary was free of political influence, meaning it answered to the people, rather than the ruling party. The ultimate goal of the new constabulary was to make the people feel safe, so they could return to the normal intercourse of society.

The third theme that runs through the Small Wars Manual is that the military action is subordinate to and in support of the diplomatic efforts of the United States. The Marine small wars experience had been that the problems that initiated the intervention were deeper than just the military. Intervention was usually the last resort after all other diplomatic efforts had been attempted. The political efforts continued, however, after the commitment of the military force. The use of the military was a further stage of diplomatic action.

The definition of a small war, quoted from the Small Wars Manual at the beginning of this chapter, includes that diplomatic pressure is combined with the military effort. Traditionally, however, it was the other way around; the military effort was combined with, but subordinate to, the ongoing diplomatic effort. The Small Wars Manual points out that unlike in a conventional war, in a small war, diplomacy

is still active. "In small wars, diplomacy has not ceased to function and the State Department exercises a constant and controlling influence over the military operations." The military, therefore, is "limited to certain lines of action as to the strategy and even as to the tactics of the campaign."²¹

Diplomacy is the key to attaining the end state. Extensive military actions that fail to consider the diplomatic end state are doomed to failure. The military action must be tied to the "political strategy of the campaign."²²

The Small Wars Manual provides a formula for success in small wars that was based on the experiences of Marines during the thirty-six years of the small wars era. The Small Wars Manual provides valuable lessons and planning considerations for the conduct of a small war. Of importance today, however, is the plan the Small Wars Manual lays out for the conduct of a small war. To evaluate the manual and a small war, the Small Wars Manual is dominated by three thematic criteria, the end state, the conduct of a phased intervention, and the military support of the diplomatic effort.

ENDNOTES

¹U.S. Marine Corps, NAVMC 2890, Small Wars Manual (Reprint of 1940 Edition) (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 1987), chap. I, pp. 1-2.

²Ibid., chap. I, pp. 14-15.

³Ibid., chap. I, pp. 15-16.

⁴Ibid., chap. I, p. 5.

⁵Ibid., chap. I, pp. 5-6.

⁶Ibid., chap. I, p. 6, chap. VI, p. 1, chap. V, p. 6.

⁷Ibid., chap. V, pp. 6, 9, 17-19.

⁸Ibid., chap. IX, p. 17, chap. X, p. 1, chap. VII, p. 1, chap. VIII, p. 1.

⁹Ibid., chap. XII, pp. 2-3, 7-8, 14; Ronald Schaffer, "The 1940 Small Wars Manual and the Lessons of History" Military Affairs 36 (April 1972): 47.

¹⁰Small Wars Manual, chap. XI, pp. 1-2.

¹¹Ibid., chap. XI, pp. 4-5.

¹²Ibid., chap. I, pp. 6-7.

¹³Ibid., chap. I, p. 7.

¹⁴Ibid., chap. XIV, pp. 1-4.

¹⁵Ibid., chap. I, p. 8.

¹⁶End state is a contemporary term not used in the Small Wars Manual, which instead used "objective." End state is used in this study as "the set of required conditions that achieve the strategic objectives." U.S. Joint Staff, Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1993), III-2.

¹⁷Small Wars Manual, chap. I, p. 32.

¹⁸Ibid., chap. XV, p. 1.

¹⁹Ibid., chap. I, p. 16.

²⁰Letters have been used to distinguish these phases from those in the Small Wars Manual (Arabic numerals) and those used in Operation Uphold Democracy (Roman numerals).

²¹Small Wars Manual, chap. I, p. 8, 11.

²²Ibid.

CHAPTER 5

OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY

In September 1995, the United States intervened in Haiti for a second time this century. This intervention, code-named Operation Uphold Democracy, had the purpose of restoring the democratically elected president and government. The conditions of this intervention were similar to those of the Marine Corps small wars, including the previous intervention in Haiti from 1915 to 1934. Operation Uphold Democracy provides a pertinent case study that demonstrates the validity of the Small Wars Manual today.

When the United States ended its nineteen year occupation of Haiti on August 15, 1934, it brought to a close the longest intervention by the Marine Corps. The ending of the occupation came two years ahead of schedule; not because that the conditions had been met, rather the growing lack of public support in the United States for the occupation. With the departure of the Marines, the last of the United States occupations came to a close.¹

For Haiti and its people, the effects of the United States occupation had been transitory. The positive effects of the occupation lasted only as long as the occupation. The newly built infrastructure soon crumbled, as did the intangible effects of the United States presence.²

One of the few legacies that did remain was the Garde d'Haiti--the Gendarmerie d'Haiti had been renamed in 1928. The United States goal of an efficient and capable constabulary was realized in the

Garde d'Haïti. The result of a strong constabulary, however, was that the ruling party could use it more effectively. A strong national constabulary did bring stability to the nation since armed revolt was much more difficult, if not impossible. Although the government was more secure, force had not been taken out of politics.³

From 1957 to 1986, the Duvalier family ruled Haiti; first, by the father François Duvalier, and then by the son, Jean-Claude. Ruling through seven United States administrations, the Duvaliers were disliked by each. Their regimes, however, were supported by the United States, due to fears that Haiti would otherwise turn to Castro or economic crises would cause it to go the way of Cuba.⁴

François "Papa Doc" Duvalier, a medical doctor by training, came to power after winning the 1957 election. Despite the election being disputed, he was the more popular candidate. Duvalier, who was a black, promised to pass political and economic power from the minority mulatto élites to the black middle class. The middle class, in theory, would then act in the best interest of the peasant masses. In practice, however, there was no change to the corruption in the system, and the cycle of poverty and illiteracy continued.⁵

After a failed coup attempt in July 1958, Duvalier established the Volontaires de la Sécurité Nationale, or tontons macoutes. This paramilitary organization was a private military force that, by the early 1960s, was twice the size of the army.⁶

François Duvalier died in 1971, and was succeeded by his nineteen year-old son Jean-Claude. Jean-Claude's relations with the United States became strained in 1980, as Haitian "boat people" brought to public attention the plight of Haitians and the poor condition of the nation. By the mid-1980s, high unemployment, poor living conditions, and lack of political freedom lead to a series of popular uprisings that

the tontons macoutes could not put down. Rioting and protests led to a harsh response from the government, which in turn led to further protests. In February 1986, Jean-Claude, with United States assistance, fled Haiti and went into exile in France.⁷

With the departure of Jean-Claude, instability returned to Haitian politics. A National Council of Government was established under Lieutenant General Henri Namphy. There was also a new constitution enacted in March 1987. The following November, the army postponed the scheduled elections. The presidential election was finally held in January 1988, and Leslie Manigat was elected. In June of that year, Namphy led a military coup that overthrew Manigat. Namphy was later overthrown by yet another coup led by Lieutenant General Prosper Avril. Avril's crackdown on opposition leaders resulted in anti-government protests that led to his resignation. Avril was succeeded, in March 1990, by Ertha Pascal-Trouillot, a former Supreme Court Justice.⁸

On December 16, 1990, Haiti held its first fully free elections. Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a leftist Roman Catholic priest, was elected president, and his Lavalas Party also won a plurality in the parliament.⁹

Haiti's attempt at democracy, however, did not last long. President Aristide assumed his office on February 7, 1991. Less than eight months later a military coup unseated President Aristide. The leader of the September 30, 1991, coup was Lieutenant General Raul Cedras, the man that President Aristide had appointed commander of the Haitian military, the Forces Armées d'Haiti. Cedras then took over the government as the head of the junta that included Brigadier General Philippe Bamby, the chief of staff of the army, and Lieutenant Colonel

Michel François, the chief of police. President Aristide fled to Venezuela, and eventually went into exile in the United States.¹⁰

The international response to the coup in Haiti was quick. Three days after the coup, the Organization of American States adopted a resolution that called upon its members to stop economic activities with Haiti. The next day, the United States froze the Haitian government's United States bank accounts and placed a ban on American firms making any payments to the Haitian regime. On October 8, the Organization of American States passed a further resolution that froze Haitian assets and imposed a trade embargo on Haiti. United Nations sanctions followed in June 1992. These sanctions included an oil embargo and a freeze on the Haitian leaders' assets.¹¹

In early April 1992, both the sanctions and the regime created the conditions that caused an exodus of Haitian refugees setting sail for the United States. On May 24, the Bush administration announced that the United States would return to Haiti refugees picked up at sea. This policy, although denounced by presidential candidate Bill Clinton, was later continued by President Clinton.¹²

Although the international response had been quick, the effects were not. Almost two years after the coup, President Aristide and General Cedras met at Governors Island, New York. On July 3, 1993, they signed a ten point agreement that provided for a new prime minister and government, a general amnesty law, the resignation of the military leaders, a United Nations-mandated military and police training mission in Haiti, the return of President Aristide by October 30, 1993, and the lifting of United Nations and Organization of American States sanctions.¹³

The optimism created by the agreement at Governors island did not last long. To begin the implementation of the Governors Island

accord, the USS Harlan County sailed for Haiti carrying members of the Haitian Assistance and Advisory Group on the United Nations-mandated training mission. These two hundred United States and Canadian military personnel were to train the army and police of Haiti. On October 11, 1993, when the ship attempted to dock in Port-au-Prince, a band of Haitian army-backed toughs prevented the docking. Additionally, General Cedras further reneged on the promises made at Governors Island. He refused to resign or permit the return of President Aristide. On October 13, the United Nations re-imposed sanctions that had been suspended by the signing of the Governors Island Agreement.¹⁴

On October 16, 1993, the United Nations Security Council authorized the use of military force, including a naval blockade, to enforce the sanctions. That day also, the United States Atlantic Command activated Joint Task Force-120, which consisted of United States warships assigned the mission of maritime interdiction. The United States ships were joined by those of other nations to help impose the blockade.¹⁵

On May 6, 1994, the United Nations announced a complete economic embargo against Haiti, to be effective May 21. As the United Nations waited for sanctions to work, the impact of the sanctions and the cruelty of the regime resulted in Haitian migrants continued attempts to sail to the United States. On May 16, 1994, the United States Atlantic Command activated Joint Task Force-160 to interdict these Haitian migrants on the high seas. Originally, Joint Task Force-160 returned the Haitians to Haiti, but on July 5, 1994, after being overwhelmed by the thousands of migrants, the United States changed its policy towards the Haitian refugees. From that point on, the thousands of Haitians picked up were detained at the United States

Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba or other "safe havens" in the Caribbean.¹⁶

On July 31, 1994, the United Nations Security Council passed its Resolution 940, which allowed the formation of a Multinational Force that could employ the "application of all necessary means" to restore democracy in Haiti. The resolution called for the return of the legitimately elected president; the restoration of the legitimate authorities of Haiti; the attainment of a stable and secure environment that would permit the implementation of the Governors Island Agreement, which would result in free and fair elections; and the departure of the military leadership of Haiti. Realizing that the resolution authorized a military action against them, the military junta in Haiti declared a state of siege.¹⁷

The United States had been hesitant to act throughout the crises, seeing no vital interests threatened. The only real interest of the United States involved was the large migration of Haitians. The plight of these Haitian migrants, as well as those still in Haiti, was causing domestic political and humanitarian concerns. Regional stability was of concern, but the regional policy of the United States was of greater concern.

From these concerns, rather than any real interests, came United States objectives in Haiti. These were to restore democracy, stop the migrant flow, and enhance the credibility of the United States, the United Nations, and the Organization of American States. Restoring democracy included not only the return of President Aristide, but also the holding of elections and the peaceful transfer of power.¹⁸

On September 17, 1994, President Clinton sent a delegation headed by former President Jimmy Carter to Haiti. The other members of the delegation were Senator Sam Nunn and retired Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell. On the next day, with a planned invasion only hours away, the Carter delegation and the junta reached an agreement, which allowed for the peaceful resolution of the crises.¹⁹

The result of the delegation's negotiations, the Carter-Jonassaint Agreement, paved the way for the peaceful introduction of United States forces into Haiti. Rather than disbanding the Forces Armées d'Haiti, however, the agreement stated, "The Haitian military and police forces will work in close cooperation with the U.S. military mission." This cooperation was to be "conducted with mutual respect."²⁰

While the Carter delegation and the junta leaders were concluding the agreement, military forces were already en route to invade Haiti. With the announcement of the peaceful settlement, the United States recalled some of these forces, most notably those from the 82nd Airborne Division, while others prepared for entry under benign conditions.

The morning after the signing of the Carter-Jonassaint Agreement, Lieutenant General Henry H. Shelton flew ashore from his command ship, the USS Mount Whitney. General Shelton was the Commander of both the Multinational Force and Joint Task Force-180, the United States component of the Multinational Force. Less than one half hour after General Shelton's arrival, the first wave of forces from Joint Task Force-180 landed in Port-au-Prince.²¹

The mission assigned to Joint Task Force-180 was to protect United States citizens and interests, designated Haitians, and third country nationals; create a secure environment for the restoration of the legitimate government of Haiti; conduct operations to preserve civil order in Port-au-Prince and elsewhere, as required; provide technical military assistance to the Government of Haiti; and eventually pass the responsibility for operations to the United Nations peacekeeping force,

the United Nations Mission in Haiti. To accomplish this mission, the operation was divided into six phases:

- Phase I - Predeployment/Crises Action Planning.
- Phase II - Deployment/Initial Security.
- Phase III - Extended Security/Initial Civil-Military Operations.
- Phase IV - Extended Initial Civil-Military Operations.
- Phase V - Handover to United Nations Mission in Haiti/Selective Redeployment.
- Phase VI - United Nations Mission in Haiti Transition/Redeployment.²²

From its mission statement came the defined end state for the Multinational Force. This end state was the establishment of a secure and stable environment for the transition to a United Nations peacekeeping mission. The objective of a secure and stable environment came from the wording of United Nations Security Council Resolution 940. It was the mission of the Multinational Force to establish this environment, and then up to the follow-on United Nations peacekeepers, the United Nations Mission in Haiti, to maintain it.²³

The words stable and secure, however, implied a great deal. Stable and secure were not the same thing. The two words, having different meanings, implied different conditions. Stable, meaning enduring, implied those things that strengthen the long term durability of the nation. It included the acceptance of democratic principles, adherence to human rights standards, proper functioning of the government, and economic, social, and institutional development. Security, on the other hand, meaning free from danger, implied a law abiding citizenry, a professional public security force, and a functional criminal justice system.²⁴

The Multinational Force further defined the conditions that signaled a stable and secure environment. These were a Haiti where violent and criminal acts were below the threshold that interrupted the normal civil and economic life; basic public facilities were initiated or restored; an interim security force was in place, overseen by

international monitors; para-military groups were neutralized; and the sea ports and airports were open to normal traffic and functions.

Toward attaining this end state, measures of success included the reduction in political killings, the government ministries carrying out their duties, the public security forces doing traffic control and genuinely maintaining public order, and a reduction in ordinary crime.²⁵

To accomplish this end state, three key events defined attainment: first, the entry of the Multinational Force, which would establish control over the Haitian territory, second, the return of President Aristide and the establishment of his government, and third, the training and then transfer of security functions to an interim security force. The accomplishment of these events signaled the secure and stable environment required for the transition to the United Nations Mission in Haiti.²⁶

Military forces are more suited to create security than stability. The Multinational Force, for its part, recognized this. The Multinational Force saw that the military forces were capable of providing a secure environment. As to a stable environment, military civil affairs units did possess some capability. It was recognized, however, that attaining this environment was more political in nature and would require the cooperation and participation of many agencies of the United States Government.²⁷

The military contribution to the establishment of a secure environment consisted of two elements, that in the cities and that outside of the cities. Within the cities of Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien, conventional maneuver forces conducted tactical operations, such as patrols, cordon and search, and convoy protection. In the interior of the country, United States Army Special Forces units conducted operations, becoming in many areas the de facto civil

authority, including the functions of police, border patrol, and port monitors.²⁸

An important step in the establishment of a secure environment in the short-term and a stable environment in the long-term was the disarmament of the country. The abundance of weapons within the country was a concern for the security of the Multinational Force, but of even greater concern was the continued Haitian-on-Haitian violence. Political considerations, however, put restrictions on the ability of the Multinational Force to disarm the Forces Armées d'Haiti and the population.

The Multinational Force had wanted to disarm quickly the Haitian security force. The Carter-Jonassaint Agreement, however, had kept the Forces Armées d'Haiti in place, and precluded their being disarmed.²⁹

There were also restraints on the disarming of the population. The Haitian constitution did not outlaw the possession of weapons, and the Multinational Force operated within the laws of Haiti. Therefore, there was no plan for the Multinational Force to go house-to-house to confiscate weapons.³⁰

The Multinational Force used a two-pronged approach to disarm the country. The first was a weapon buy back program and the second was operations to confiscate weapons .³¹

The first method of disarming the populace was the weapons buy back program. In this program cash was paid in exchange for turned-in firearms. Initially, this program was not very successful. The people were hesitant to turn in their weapons due to the media attention that early weapons turn-ins received. Eventually, however, this reluctance wore off. By March 18, 1995, the Multinational Force reported that the weapons buy back program had spent \$2,385,600 to buy 4,124 firearms and

9,176 explosive and riot control grenades. The weapons buy back program also included payments for reporting caches.³²

The second method of disarmament was the confiscation of weapons, usually through raids upon weapons caches, known as Street Sweep operations. After the Haitian legislature outlawed paramilitary groups on October 21, 1994, these raids were the key to disarming the main groups, the Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti and the tontons macoutes. By January 2, 1995, as President Aristide urged armed opposition members to turn in their illegal weapons during his Founding Fathers Day speech, the Multinational Force had collected more than 15,000 weapons from both the weapons buy back and the Street Sweep operations.³³

To attain and maintain a secure environment required a functioning police agency. The plan to empower such an agency was accomplished in three steps: the taking away of the policing functions from the incumbent force; the filling of the void thus created with an interim security force, supervised by international monitors; and then the replacement of the interim security force by a permanent professional police force.³⁴

Before Operation Uphold Democracy, the military police companies of the Forces Armées d'Haiti conducted the policing within Haiti. The 1987 Haitian Constitution had called for the separation of the police and military functions, with the Minister of Justice responsible for the former, and the Minister of Defense the latter. This provision, however, had never been implemented, and the Forces Armées d'Haiti had continued to conduct the policing.³⁵

The Forces Armées d'Haiti was ineffective as a police force. Its members were poorly trained and had little respect from the populace. They conducted reactionary policing, staying in the police

station waiting for people to come forward with complaints or to report crimes.³⁶

The Carter-Jonassaint Agreement left the Forces Armées d'Haiti in place. Despite the presence of the Multinational Force, the Forces Armées d'Haiti was still responsible for the police functions in Haiti. This created an awkward, if not dangerous, situation. Although the Multinational Force and Forces Armées d'Haiti were to cooperate "with mutual respect," tension existed between the two forces. Despite the agreement, the Forces Armées d'Haiti was still the principle armed threat. The Multinational Force, which had been planning an invasion with the Forces Armées d'Haiti as the enemy, continued to see them as such.³⁷

The Haitian population looked to the Multinational Force as their liberators. They were unwilling to accept the continuation of the Forces Armées d'Haiti as the police force, even as an interim police force. When the populace saw the "cooperation" between the Forces Armées d'Haiti and the Multinational Force, they began to question the legitimacy of the Multinational Force. This, however, changed abruptly on September 24, when a United States Marine patrol killed 10 Haitian police in a Cap Haitien shoot-out. The cost to the Americans was only one wounded.³⁸

The results of this firefight were two-fold. First, it hastened the disintegration of the remaining Forces Armées d'Haiti, creating a void in the policing function in Cap Haitien. The members of the Forces Armées d'Haiti departed, both from fear of retribution and due to a lack of professionalism. The second result of the firefight, and probably the more important, was that it gained the Multinational Force credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of the Haitian people.³⁹

After the removal of the Forces Armées d'Haiti from the policing function, the next step was the creation of a security force to fill the void until the creation of a new national police force. This force was titled the Interim Public Security Force.⁴⁰

On January 17, 1995, President Aristide officially formed the Interim Public Security Force and dismissed the remainder of the Forces Armées d'Haiti. The Interim Public Security Force drew its members from two sources, former members of the Forces Armées d'Haiti and volunteers from the refugees detained at the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.⁴¹

The United States Department of State and the Government of Haiti evaluated former members of the Forces Armées d'Haiti for suitability for continued service. This process, termed vetting, disqualified those with past human rights violations or other crimes. Those who had been "vetted positively" joined the Interim Public Security Force. In practice, however, the populace did not accept vetted members who had served in their local area while in the Forces Armées d'Haiti. They would, however, accept those who had served in other areas.⁴²

The second source of volunteers for the Interim Public Security Force was the refugees from Guantanamo Bay. The Government of Haiti considered these volunteers, termed auxiliaries, extremely loyal, due to their having left the country during President Aristide's exile. Since they had no previous law enforcement experience, however, they needed considerable training.⁴³

Concurrent with the fielding of the Interim Public Security Force, was the establishment of the International Police Monitors. The purpose of the International Police Monitors was to ensure that there were no human rights violations by the Interim Public Security Force,

but they also tended to act as role models. The nearly 850 International Police Monitors were law enforcement professionals representing approximately thirty countries. These police officers, in most cases, represented the best the contributing countries had to offer in the way of law enforcement professionals.⁴⁴

The establishment of the International Police Monitors had originally been a Department of State responsibility. Ten days prior to the intervention, however, during an interagency rehearsal, the Department of State said it was unable to handle this responsibility, which was then turned over to the Department of Defense. United States Atlantic Command planners very quickly put together a plan, working with no perceived precedent, and within the restrictions on United States military personnel training indigenous police forces.⁴⁵

On October 2, 1994, Police Director Raymond Kelly and 124 International Police Monitors arrived in Haiti. Police Director Kelly, a former New York City Police Commissioner, was the director, or commander, of the International Police Monitors, which he organized along police lines. The deputy commander of the International Police Monitors was a Marine Corps Reserve colonel, who used his reserve connections to have fourteen reservists with law enforcement backgrounds join the International Police Monitors. These reservists held such positions in civilian life as watch commanders and deputy sheriffs, and included a Haitian-American who spoke Creole.⁴⁶

The International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program of the United States Department of Justice conducted the training for the Interim Public Security Force and the International Police Monitors. The International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program had a standing forty hour program of instruction, but only used part of that instruction for the Interim Public Security

Force. They taught an overview of human rights. The Department of Defense was responsible for teaching other material such as driving and weapons familiarization, and had an Army Judge Advocate General teach law enforcement rules of engagement using those supplied by the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program. This training for the Interim Public Security Force consisted of six days of basic instruction. The International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program also had conducted training for the auxiliaries at the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and for the International Police Monitor in Jamaica.⁴⁷

The International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program later established the National Police Academy. The resulting four-month course trained the members of the new permanent professional police force, the Haitian National Police.⁴⁸

Due to the early collapse of the Forces Armées d'Haiti in Cap Haitien, resulting from the Marine firefight, the first real test of the Interim Public Security Force happened there. The procedure used became known as the Cap Haitien model and was later used in Port-au-Prince.⁴⁹

The Cap Haitien Model called for an incremental approach to the restoration of public security. During the first increment the goals were to gain public support, and to raise and train the force. This was followed by the re-establishment of the criminal justice system and the development of the initial employment tasks and concepts. The next increment was the establishment of a semi-permanent jail facility, and development of the command structure and a concept for sustained operations. In the next increment, the force was equipped and expanded, as were the facilities. Finally, a fully functional Interim Public Security Force was in place.⁵⁰

The key to success of the Interim Public Security Force was the International Police Monitors. To conduct the policing, a member of the Interim Public Security Force was accompanied by an International Police Monitor, an interpreter, and a United States military policeman and escort. The populace regarded the monitors as competent professionals. This respect for the monitors provided the credibility necessary for the Interim Public Security Force to be accepted by the communities they were policing. This proved especially true of the members of the Interim Public Security Force who were vetted former members of the Forces Armées d'Haiti.⁵¹

In practice, the International Police Monitors were the de facto police force. The vetted members of the Forces Armées d'Haiti that joined the Interim Public Security Force had been very comfortable with reactionary policing and were reluctant to go out into the community. The International Police Monitors, however, pushed the Interim Public Security Force out into the community, and once there, prodded as well as supervised them. The result was that the Interim Public Security Force was out in the community making arrests and enforcing the laws.⁵²

The original plan had envisioned the International Police Monitors being stationed throughout the country, but this proved not to be possible. Communications and logistics shortcomings, and the long reaction time for Multinational Force units to come to their aid, made the stationing of International Police Monitors in the interior impractical and unsafe. Therefore, the Interim Public Security Force was only employed in the cities and larger towns, with United States Army Special Forces teams conducting the policing in the rural areas.⁵³

The final step in the establishment of a policing agency was the replacement of the interim security force by a permanent

professional police force. The establishment of the Haitian National Police, however, occurred after the close of Operation Uphold Democracy, and will be covered below in the discussion of the United Nations Mission in Haiti.

The Multinational Force knew that although it played the key role in the establishment of a secure environment, the entire United States government needed to be involved in the establishment of a stable environment. To advise the Government of Haiti, Ministerial Advisor Teams were formed to assist and advise the Ministries of Finance, Justice, Education, and Interior. These teams helped in such functions as the conduct of elections, the reform of the judicial system, and the improvement of literacy, health and human services, and transportation infrastructure.⁵⁴

For the Multinational Force, the contribution to the establishment of a stable environment included those tasks needed to build the nation's infrastructure. The military contribution to these actions was through the civil affairs actions. The Multinational Force set up a Civil-Military Operations Center, to provide command and control, as well as coordinate the efforts of the civil affairs actions. The Civil-Military Operations Center developed city assessment teams formed from the public safety, public health and public facilities teams. These teams went out together to provide a complete civil affairs assessment. The areas assessed included agriculture, drainage, erosion control, fire fighting, garbage removal, human waste removal, landfills, market places, power stations, roads, schools, street cleaning, and water distribution.⁵⁵

The Multinational Force also conducted Military Civic Action, which consisted of projects that emphasized short term benefits to the

populace. These projects included medical care, food distribution, and basic construction.⁵⁶

The civil-military task that had the greatest impact upon the attainment of the end state of a secure and stable environment was the establishment of an effective justice system. Although during the planning the policing function had received the majority of the attention, the Multinational Force quickly discovered that there were other aspects of the justice system that needed reform as well. Reforming the police force would be in vain without an effective justice system to back it up.

The justice challenge, therefore, consisted of three legs, the police, the courts, and the prisons. Policing was covered above. The courts were presided over by judges who were often corrupt, lazy, and incompetent, while the prisons were overcrowded and inadequate. Reform of the judiciary fell to the Ministerial Advisory Team Judicial, which provided support to the Haitian Ministry of Justice. The 17-man team was sponsored by the Department of State, but consisted of Army active duty and reserve personnel.⁵⁷

The prisons were of particular concern. Police Director Kelly of the International Police Monitors quickly saw the importance of the prisons. Although the prison system did not fall within his arena, he sent International Police Monitors to work with the prisons.⁵⁸

On January 3, 1995, the Multinational Force Commander, Major General David Meade declared that a "secure and safe environment" existed in Haiti. Fifteen days later, the United States Secretary of Defense, William Perry, echoed that Haiti was "safe and secure," and the conditions were reached for a turnover to United Nations peacekeepers. On March 31, 1995, Operation Uphold Democracy came to close with the

transfer of the operation from the Multinational Force to the United Nations Mission in Haiti.⁵⁹

The mission for the United Nations Mission in Haiti arose from United Nations Security Council Resolution 940. It included assisting the democratic government of Haiti with: sustaining the secure and stable environment, protecting international personnel and key installations, training the Haitian armed forces, creating a separate police force, and establishing an environment that was conducive to the conduct of free and fair elections.⁶⁰

With the replacement of the Multinational Force by the United Nations Mission in Haiti, the International Police Monitors were replaced by the United Nations Civilian Police. The mission assigned to the Civilian Police was to provide training and guidance to the Interim Public Security Force, monitor all police related activities, assist the Government of Haiti in sustaining the secure and stable environment, instill the principles of community policing, provide presence within police stations to monitor the everyday administration and operations, and to encourage and assist the "Interim Police."⁶¹

On December 6, 1995, a special decree by President Aristide dissolved the Interim Public Security Force and created the Haitian National Police. The Haitian National Police is the long-term future police force, and, as such, is the cornerstone in accomplishing the end state of a secure and stable environment. To man the planned force of five thousand members, the 1,400 members of the Interim Public Security Force were integrated into the Haitian National Police. This action did raise some concerns among Haitians since half of the Interim Public Security Force were vetted former members of the Forces Armées d'Haiti.⁶²

The much awaited presidential election took place in Haiti on December 17, 1995. The Haitian National Police, backed up by the United Nations Mission in Haiti, provided security in the historically volatile areas. Quick reaction forces were ready to react quickly to quell any violence. On February 7, 1996, René Preval was sworn in as Haiti's president in the first transition of power from one freely elected president to another in the nation's history.⁶³

In conditions very similar to those encountered by Marines during the small wars era, the United States-led Multinational Force conducted an intervention in Haiti. The Multinational Force entered Haiti to restore the democratically elected government that had been ousted three years previously in a military coup. The stated end state for the Multinational Force was the establishment of a secure and stable environment, at which time the Multinational Force would turnover to the United Nations Mission in Haiti. To attain this end state, the Multinational Force concentrated on disarming the country and establishing an Interim Public Security Force, to assume the policing function within the country until the establishment of the Haitian National Police.

ENDNOTES

¹Captain Harry Allanson Ellsworth, One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines, 1800-1934 (Washington, DC: U.S. Marine Corps, Historical Section, 1974), 90.

²David Healy, "The U.S. Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934," in Haitian Frustrations: Dilemmas for U.S. Policy, A Report of the CSIS Americas Program, ed. Georges A. Fauriol (Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic & International Studies, 1995), 44.

³Georges A. Fauriol, "Reforming the Security Apparatus," in Haitian Frustrations: Dilemmas for U.S. Policy, A Report of the CSIS Americas Program, ed. Georges A. Fauriol (Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic & International Studies, 1995), 153; Healy, 44.

⁴Georges A. Fauriol, "U.S. Policy and the Ouster of Duvalier," in Haitian Frustrations: Dilemmas for U.S. Policy, A Report of the CSIS Americas Program, ed. Georges A. Fauriol (Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic & International Studies, 1995), 51.

⁵Ibid., 44; Center for Army Lessons Learned, Operation Uphold Democracy: Initial Impressions, vol. I (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1994), xii; Fauriol, "U.S. Policy," 48.

⁶Ibid.; Center for Army Lessons Learned, Initial Impressions, vol. I, xii.

⁷Fauriol, "U.S. Policy," 48, 53, 56; Center for Army Lessons Learned, Initial Impressions, vol. I, xiii.

⁸Fauriol, "U.S. Policy," 58-9; "Haiti--Land of Beauty and Misery," <http://www.cforc.com/haiti/stats.htm> (30 December 1995); Center for Army Lessons Learned, Initial Impressions, Vol. I, xiii.

⁹Johanna McGeary, "Did the Mission Matter?" Time, 147, no. 8 (February 19, 1996); Center for Army Lessons Learned, Initial Impressions, Vol. I, xiii.

¹⁰Ibid.; Georges A. Fauriol, ed. Haitian Frustrations: Dilemmas for U.S. Policy, A Report of the CSIS Americas Program (Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic & International Studies, 1995), 191.

¹¹Ibid., 191-92; Center for Army Lessons Learned, Initial Impressions, vol. I, xiii.

¹²Fauriol, Haitian Frustrations, 191.

¹³Center for Army Lessons Learned, Initial Impressions, vol. I, xiv; Fauriol, Haitian Frustrations, 192.

¹⁴United States Atlantic Command, Operation Uphold Democracy: Joint After Action Report (JAAR) (1995), 6; Center for Army Lessons Learned, Initial Impressions, Vol. I, xv; Fauriol, Haitian Frustrations, 192.

¹⁵United States Atlantic Command, 9; Center for Army Lessons Learned, Initial Impressions, vol. I, xv.

¹⁶Fauriol, Haitian Frustrations, 194; United States Atlantic Command, 2; Center for Army Lessons Learned, Initial Impressions, vol. I, xvi.

¹⁷Fauriol, Haitian Frustrations, 194; "MTG NOTES UNMIH-AT/CJTF-190(J5) OF 7 OCT 1994"; Center for Army Lessons Learned, Initial Impressions, vol. I, xvi.

¹⁸John T. Fishel, "Haiti Ain't No Panama, Jack," in a still untitled book to be published by the World Peace Foundation, 7 (page references are to draft version).

¹⁹Center for Army Lessons Learned, Initial Impressions, vol. I, xvii.

²⁰Fauriol, Haitian Frustrations, 210.

²¹United States Atlantic Command, 12.

²²Ibid., 3; "Planning For Operations in Haiti: Lessons Learned From Operation Uphold Democracy," United States Atlantic Command J5 Special Planning Group briefing slides, 4 December 1995.

²³Fishel, 7.

²⁴"Planning For Operations in Haiti," 13.

²⁵"The 2d Brigade Combat Team," briefing slides; "MTG NOTES UNMIH-AT/CJTF-190(J5); Fishel, 8.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷"Planning For Operations in Haiti," 13.

²⁸Center for Army Lessons Learned, Initial Impressions, vol. I, iii; "Haiti: Unconventional Operations," 3rd Special Forces Group (ABN) briefing slides, 12 December 1994.

²⁹Colonel John Langdon, USMC, Deputy Director, Plans and Policy Division, J5 Directorate, United States Atlantic Command, telephone interview by author, 5 April 1996.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹United States Atlantic Command, 15.

³²Center for Army Lessons Learned, Initial Impressions, vol. I, 104; Center for Army Lessons Learned, Operation Uphold Democracy: Initial Impressions, vol. II (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1995), 146, 149.

³³United States Atlantic Command, 21; "Haiti: Unconventional Operations"; Center for Army Lessons Learned, Initial Impressions, vol. II, ix.

³⁴Lieutenant Colonel Philip L. Idiart, USA, J5 Directorate, United States Atlantic Command, interview by Lieutenant Colonel Walter Ketchick and Dr. Robert Baumann, 6 December 1995, tape recording, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

³⁵Georges A. Fauriol, "Reforming the Security Apparatus," 154, 151.

³⁶Fishel, 17; Idiart.

³⁷Langdon; Colonel Thomas S. Jones, USMC, interview by author, 19 December 1995, Quantico, VA; Fishel, 9.

³⁸Ibid., 16; Center for Army Lessons Learned, Initial Impressions, vol. I, xviii.

³⁹Fauriol, "Reforming the Security Apparatus," 153; Fishel, 17.

⁴⁰Idiart.

⁴¹United States Atlantic Command, 32.

⁴²Idiart; "The 2d Brigade Combat Team."

⁴³Idiart.

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵Ibid.; "The 2d Brigade Combat Team;" U.S. Joint Staff, Joint Pub 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1993), I-11. Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act significantly restricts Department of Defense training of law enforcement personnel.

⁴⁶Center for Army Lessons Learned, Initial Impressions, vol. I, xix; United States Atlantic Command, 15; Idiart.

⁴⁷Ibid.; Center for Army Lessons Learned, Operation Uphold Democracy: Initial Impressions, vol. III (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1995), 123.

⁴⁸Idiart.

⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰"The 2d Brigade Combat Team."

⁵¹Idiart; "The 2d Brigade Combat Team."

⁵²Idiart.

⁵³Ibid.; Fauriol, "Reforming the Security Apparatus," 153.

⁵⁴United States Atlantic Command, 26; "Planning For Operations in Haiti," 13.

⁵⁵Center for Army Lessons Learned, Initial Impressions, vol. I, 195.

⁵⁶Ibid., 204.

⁵⁷"UNMIH Command Brief," briefing slides; "Haiti: Unconventional Operations"; United States Atlantic Command, 26; Center

for Army Lessons Learned, Operation Uphold Democracy: Initial Impressions, vol. III, 152.

⁵⁸Idiart.

⁵⁹United States Atlantic Command, 30, 38; Center for Army Lessons Learned, Initial Impressions, vol. II, x.

⁶⁰"United Nations Mission in Haiti Command Brief."

⁶¹Center for Army Lessons Learned, Initial Impressions, vol. II, 124.

⁶²Ibid.; McGahey; "Haiti's New Police Soon Will Be On Their Own: Are They Up To The Job?" http://www.cforc.com/haiti/ayiti_78.htm; "Electoral Campaigning," http://www.cforc.com/haiti/ayiti_77.htm (7 December 1995).

⁶³Teeple, Jim, "Preval Wins Haiti Vote," http://www.cforc.com/haiti/ayiti_91.htm; "Preval Sworn in as President of Haiti," <http://www-cgi.cnn.com/WORLD/9602/haiti/index.html> (7 February 1996); "United Nations Mission in Haiti Command Brief."

CHAPTER 6

AN ANALYSIS OF OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY

The Small Wars Manual was not a reference used by the planners of Operation Uphold Democracy. The model used by the planners at United States Atlantic Command was based upon the after-action reports and personal experiences from the 1989 Panamanian Invasion. Some of those involved in Operation Uphold Democracy, however, did have previous knowledge of the Small Wars Manual. This knowledge of the Small Wars Manual may have influenced their planning and execution, but there is no way to measure this influence.¹

A Marine with prior experience with the Small Wars Manual is Colonel Thomas S. Jones, the commander of the Marine component of Operation Uphold Democracy, Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force Caribbean. Colonel Jones is a long-time student of the Small Wars Manual, using it throughout the 1980s, including as a source for a 1989 paper on insurgency at the Naval War College. Such experience with the Small Wars Manual was likely to influence his actions.²

Although the Small Wars Manual was not itself used as a reference for Operation Uphold Democracy, the operation can still be examined in the context of the outline plan that is the heart of the Small Wars Manual. This chapter will analyze Operation Uphold Democracy using the three thematic criteria that were introduced in Chapter 4. These are an end state of a lawful and orderly society, a phased intervention to attain this end state, and the primacy of the diplomatic effort. For each of these, the analysis will define the criteria,

describe its application in Operation Uphold Democracy, and then compare this application with that of the Small Wars Manual model. The intent is not to determine if Operation Uphold Democracy fit the Small Wars Manual model, but to determine if the Small Wars Manual model is relevant in Military Operations Other Than War.

The first criterion for this analysis is the determination of an end state. For the Small Wars Manual, this end state was defined as a lawful and orderly society. For Operation Uphold Democracy, the defined end state was a secure and stable environment. In essence, these two end states are synonymous. A lawful and orderly society is the equivalent of a secure and stable environment.

The defining of the end state for Operation Uphold Democracy arose from United Nations Security Council Resolution 940. The resolution had set four objectives in Haiti. Three of these objectives, the return of President Aristide, the return of the legitimate authorities, and the departure of the military leadership of Haiti, were short-term, quantifiable events. The fourth, the attainment of a stable and secure environment that would permit the implementation of the Governors Island Agreement, was a long-term and not so easily measured event. Its attainment, however, would signal true change in Haiti. This objective came to define the end state for the operation. Operation Uphold Democracy was to establish this secure and stable environment, and the United Nations Mission in Haiti was to maintain this environment.

For the Multinational Force, the political leadership had clearly defined the end state. From this defined end state, the Multinational Force determined that its primary contribution was in the establishment of a secure environment. With the end state defined, the Multinational Force remained focused on its attainment, but again more

towards the security than the stability. The mission statements of subordinate units maintained this focus on security.³

The end state was clearly defined, although not easily quantifiable. Therefore, to gauge its effectiveness in attaining the end state, the Multinational Force further defined the conditions that signaled the end state, the key events toward obtaining the end state, and the measures of success toward obtaining the end state.

The second criterion for this analysis is the conduct of a sequentially phased intervention. In the Small Wars Manual model, this is a four-phased intervention that includes the major military tasks of disarming the populace and establishing a constabulary. These tasks are accomplished in the second phase, but may continue into the later stages.

From Chapter 4 of this study, it was determined that these sequential phases, initial entry, general military operations in the field, routine police functions, and withdrawal from the theater of operations, the objectives of which are pre-conditions for the following phase.

For Operation Uphold Democracy, the Multinational Force divided the intervention into six phases:

- Phase I - Predeployment/Crises Action Planning.
- Phase II - Deployment/Initial Security.
- Phase III - Extended Security/Initial Civil-Military Operations.
- Phase IV - Extended Initial Civil-Military Operations.
- Phase V - Handover to United Nations Mission in Haiti/Selective Redeployment.
- Phase VI - United Nations Mission in Haiti Transition/Redeployment.⁴

The six phases of Operation Uphold Democracy do generally correspond with the four of the Small Wars Manual model. With the exception of Phase I, Predeployment/Crises Action Planning, which does not have a corresponding phase, the phases of Operation Uphold Democracy parallel those of the Small Wars Manual model. For each phase, the

Multinational Force set tasks and objectives. These phases, however, were not as distinct as in the Small Wars Manual model. Often tasks begun in one phase, would be continued or enhanced in the next phases.⁵

A difference in the conduct and phasing of Operation Uphold Democracy when compared with those of the small war era is the participation of the United Nations. During the small wars of the first half of this century, an intervention, once assigned to the Marine Corps, remained a Marine mission throughout. Units would rotate in and out, depending on the requirements of the mission, but outward appearances made it appear as a force of Marines.

Within the United Nations mission to intervene in Haiti, the operations of the Multinational Force represents one part of a larger operation. The mission of the Multinational Force was to set the conditions for the introduction of United Nations peacekeepers.

The Small Wars Manual states that the disarmament of the population is crucial to the restoring of a lawful and orderly society. The manual advocates the disarming of the entire population including not only firearms, but also machetes and knives that can be used as weapons.

Likewise, during Operation Uphold Democracy, the Multinational Force recognized the importance of disarming the population, but for political reasons was unable to do so. The Haitian constitution did not outlaw the possession of weapons, and the Multinational Force operated within the laws of Haiti. A further restriction was that the Carter-Jonassaint Agreement which had initially precluded the disarmament of the Forces Armées d'Haiti.

Instead of house-to-house confiscation of weapons, the Multinational Force concentrated on the disarmament of the paramilitary

groups. This was done through the weapons buy back program and the Street Sweep operations.

The weapons buy back program worked through a chit system. The idea of the system was that Haitians could turn weapons into the Multinational Force in their locality. They would receive a chit, that could be redeemed at a certain location. Eventually, Haitians learned to take the weapons to the redemption center since that was where the cash was.⁶

This chit procedure for the purchase of weapons demonstrates a change from the era of the small wars. The Small Wars Manual advises patrol leaders to carry cash for the buying of supplies and information. Today, however, purchasing procedures preclude such loose, unregulated procedures with cash.

There were similarities in the conduct of policing in the Small Wars Manual model and Operation Uphold Democracy. The Small Wars Manual model for the establishment of a constabulary called for first disbanding all armed forces within the country, and then establishing a constabulary that was trained and led by United States officers and non-commissioned officers. During Operation Uphold Democracy, the Carter-Jonassaint Agreement initially precluded the dissolution of the armed forces, and United States law precluded the use of United States military personnel in the constabulary.

The Carter delegation had made this decision to allow the military junta to save face. This political decision, however, had a tremendous impact upon tactical operations. The Multinational Force's perceived cooperation with the Forces Armées d'Haiti resulted in a lack of legitimacy in the eyes of the populace. The Marine firefight in Cap Haitien on September 24, 1994, however, quickly changed the perceptions of the populace. Although in many places the Forces Armées d'Haiti was

ineffective before the firefight, this event signaled their collapse. Although the original plan had been to establish a smaller military, President Aristide eventually did disband the Forces Armées d'Haiti, choosing to build only a police force.

The Multinational Force did not immediately create a constabulary. Instead, to fill the void created by the collapse--rather than disbanding--of the police force, the Multinational Force used the Interim Public Security Force. This security force was later replaced by the Haitian National Police.

The conduct of the policing function had two significant differences from the Small Wars Manual model; the first in the initial responsibility for the policing functions, and the second in the leadership of the force. In the Small Wars Manual model, the intervening force is responsible for the policing functions until the establishment of the constabulary. In Operation Uphold Democracy, this was not practical. The Carter-Jonassaint Agreement left the Forces Armées d'Haiti in place and responsible for the police functions of the nation. There was an advantage to this in that the Multinational Force did not become bogged down in the policing functions. The disadvantage, of course, was that the Forces Armées d'Haiti was still armed and operational.

The Multinational Force also took a slightly different approach to the manning of the force. In the Small Wars Manual model, the constabulary is led by officers and non-commissioned officers of the intervening force. The Multinational Force, however, used the International Police Monitors to oversee the Interim Public Security Force. The difference from the Small Wars Manual model was that the International Police Monitors were not members of the new force. Although they did provide leadership and act as role models, the

International Police Monitors did not technically act as the leadership and were not in the chain of command.

The use of professional law enforcement officers is a significant improvement over the Marines' use of military officers and noncommissioned officers. The monitors possessed a level of experience and professionalism that contributed significantly to the training and performance of the members of the Interim Public Security Force and Haitian National Police.

The use of the monitors was not only due to their proficiency, but also out of necessity. United States law significantly restricts the training of law enforcement personnel by the Department of Defense. The situation, however, is not unique. During the small wars era, the Marines had to contend with the constitutional prohibitions on the United States military serving in the constabulary. The Congress, therefore, had been required to grant, by way of law, authorization for the Marines to join and be paid by foreign constabularies.⁷

The establishment of the Interim Public Security Force by the Multinational Force was a better solution than the Small Wars Manual model. Professional law enforcement officers are the best qualified to conduct the training and leadership of a police force.

The Small Wars Manual model, though, does suggest a further refinement; the use of police professionals to join and lead the constabulary. Rather than being led by United States military personnel, the native country--at least in name--would hire professional law enforcement officers to join the constabulary to lead as well as train the force. These law enforcement officers would be similar to the Marines in the Gendarmerie d'Haiti, the Guardia Nacional Dominicana, and the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua. This would provide the professional leadership within the constabulary, or police force, as in the Small

Wars Manual model, while using professional law enforcement officers as in Operation Uphold Democracy.

The third criterion for this analysis is the primacy of the diplomatic effort over that of the military. The Small Wars Manual stressed that the causes of small wars were a mixture of economic, political, and social factors, and it is these causes that must be addressed. The military supports these efforts by restoring peace, and then maintaining a lawful and orderly society in which economic, political, and social change can take place.

During the small wars, the Marine Corps had a close relationship with the Department of State. Their use in small wars had resulted in Marines being referred to as "State Department Troops." This relationship was so important, that the Small Wars Manual devoted a section, "Relationship with the State Department," to it in Chapter I. This section, as well as the remainder of Chapter I, stressed the concept that the military effort was to support that of the Department of State.⁸

Today, all United States government agencies within a foreign nation operate as a country team. The United States ambassador is the leader of this team and coordinates all United States actions within the country. This concept is more fully developed than during the small wars era. Additionally, the United Nations plays a diplomatic and political role as is seen in Operation Uphold Democracy.

The Multinational Force was well aware of where the military fit into the national and United Nations' objectives in Haiti. This is best demonstrated in a United States Atlantic Command J5 Special Planning Group briefing slide that stated, "Haiti's problems are not military in nature...military stay is inversely proportional to interagency action."⁹ This interagency action consisted of many of the

organizations within the Executive Branch, such as the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice. Throughout, however, there was no question that the Department of State had the lead.

The most significant example of the diplomatic effort being primary was seen in the Carter-Jonassaint Agreement. During the planning for an opposed landing in Haiti, the Multinational Force had considered the Forces Armées d'Haiti the enemy. The Carter delegation, however, saw the political necessity of agreeing to maintain the Forces Armées d'Haiti, and the cooperation between it and the Multinational Force.

Although Operation Uphold Democracy was not planned using the Small Wars Manual model, the model still applies. Operation Uphold Democracy sought an end state that was similar to that of the Small Wars Manual model; it attained this end state using a phased intervention; and, throughout the intervention, the military effort was in support of the diplomatic effort. From this analysis, the framework and themes of the Small Wars Manual were relevant in a current Military Operation Other Than War.

ENDNOTES

¹Colonel John Langdon, USMC, Deputy Director, Plans and Policy Division, J5 Directorate, United States Atlantic Command, telephone interview by author, 5 April 1996.

²Colonel Thomas S. Jones, USMC, interview by author, 19 December 1995, Quantico, VA; Lieutenant Colonel Thomas S. Jones, "Counterinsurgency: Let's Not Cheat At Solitaire" (Paper, U.S. Naval War College, 1989), 30.

³"The 2d Brigade Combat Team," Briefing slides; United States Atlantic Command. Operation Uphold Democracy: Joint After Action Report (JAAR) (1995), 3.

⁴"Planning For Operations in Haiti: Lessons Learned From Operation Uphold Democracy," United States Atlantic Command J5 Special Planning Group briefing slides, 4 December 1995.

⁵Combined Joint Task Force Haiti, "Change 1 to Operation Order, 081600Z September 94," Caribbean Region Collection, Automated Historical Archives System, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1994. The Operation Order for Operation Uphold Democracy is still classified, but is available at Automated Historical Archives System at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

⁶Center for Army Lessons Learned, Operation Uphold Democracy: Initial Impressions, vol. I, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1994), 104-5.

⁷U.S. Joint Staff, Joint Pub 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1993), I-11; Constitution, art I, sec. 9; U.S. Marine Corps, NAVMC 2890, Small Wars Manual (Reprint of 1940 Edition) (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 1987), chap. XII, pp. 6-7. The Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section 9 states, "No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title of any kind whatever from any King, Prince, or foreign State."

⁸Ibid., chap. I, p. 11.

⁹"Planning For Operations in Haiti".

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

This study was undertaken to determine if the Small Wars Manual was still applicable today in Military Operations Other Than War. To make this determination, the study examined the historical background of small wars of the period 1898 through 1934, the subsequent development of small wars doctrine that resulted in the publication of the Small Wars Manual, and the themes of the Small Wars Manual. The study then analyzed a current Military Operations Other Than War, Operation Uphold Democracy, using the themes of the Small Wars Manual to determine if they were still relevant today.

This chapter will review the results of the research into the historical background of the Marine participation in small wars and how the Marine Corps developed doctrine from this experience. From this historical context, this chapter will then examine the applicability of the Small Wars Manual in Military Operations Other Than War and provide a recommendation based on this relevancy. The chapter will also recommend two areas for further study.

During the period from 1898 through 1934, the United States Marine Corps was the force of choice for the conduct of interventions in support of United States foreign policy. In the western hemisphere, United States policy was driven by the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, which stated that the United States would help the nations of the hemisphere eliminate the disorder and economic mismanagement that created instability. This instability, it was believed, could be used

by a European power as a pretext to intervene, thus gaining a foothold in the hemisphere. The United States policy further asserted that the United States would use force, if necessary, to gain this stability.

To "help" these nations, the United States, in the form of the Marine Corps, conducted interventions, and in three cases--Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua--conducted long-term occupations. These interventions, or small wars, became the primary focus for the majority of the Marine Corps. As Marines gained experience in the conduct of small wars, they developed doctrine. Over a twenty year period, the Marine Corps Schools in Quantico studied small wars and further developed small wars doctrine. The Marine Corps published this doctrine in its final form as the Small Wars Manual. The Small Wars Manual, thus, was the product of thirty-six years of Marine Corps practical experience in small wars and twenty years of doctrinal development. It was considered by Marines to be the definitive work on the subject.

The influence of the Small Wars Manual on present doctrine is hard to measure. Some recent Military Operations Other Than War doctrinal publications, including Joint Pub 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense and Joint Test Pub 3-57, Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs Operations, do list the Small Wars Manual as a reference.¹ The Small Wars Manual influence, however, has been much more indirect. Present doctrine may not trace a direct descent, but doctrine writers have certainly been aware of the Small Wars Manual.

This study was undertaken to ask if the Marine Corps Small Wars Manual is applicable to Military Operations Other Than War? The simple answer is yes. This is, however, too simple an answer since the Small Wars Manual is not a simple book. The Small Wars Manual is an in-depth

study of the topic of small wars. It includes background information on the causes of small wars, planning considerations and tactics, techniques, and procedures for the conduct of small wars, and lays out the framework for the conduct of a small war. The applicability of the Small Wars Manual in Military Operations Other Than War will, therefore, be examined through these different aspects of the manual--the Small Wars Manual as a primer, the Small Wars Manual as a how-to-fight manual, and the Small Wars Manual as an outline plan for the conduct of a small war--and explaining their applicability to Military Operations Other Than War.

First, the Small Wars Manual is a primer on small wars. It provides information in the study of the subject. Each topic receives a broad summary that explains the background to the political, economic, and social influences that effect a troubled nation and the force called to intervene there. This material provides valuable background information for the student of small wars.

In Military Operations Other Than War this background study is still relevant. Despite the age of the material, much remains true about the causes of government instability and the causes of rebellion. When the Small Wars Manual was written, the material was based upon the studies of Harold Utley and the other Marine students of small wars. They had conducted historical research using as sources, among others, the United States Army Indian Campaigns and the turn of the century writings of Colonel C. E. Callwell. These studies that led to the publication of the Small Wars Manual were in-depth studies of small wars covering extended periods. Although much has happened since, the Small Wars Manual is a good source of information on small wars between the mid-nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries that is relevant today in Military Operations Other Than War.

Second, the Small Wars Manual is a how-to-fight manual. It provides valuable planning considerations, tactics, techniques, and procedures for the practical work of fighting a small war. The primary topics are infantry patrolling and jungle operations. These topics, primarily at the tactical level, are covered in great detail. The planning considerations, tactics, techniques, and procedures in the Small Wars Manual are still relevant and accurate for present day military operations. Despite changes in weaponry and technology in the intervening half century, little has changed in small unit tactics.

Most of these planning considerations, tactics, techniques, and procedures have been incorporated into present day doctrine. These aspects of the Small Wars Manual do not need to be used to rewrite present doctrine, but present doctrine writers would do well to re-examine the time-proven planning considerations, tactics, techniques, and procedures in the Small Wars Manual.

Some tactics, techniques, and procedures that have fallen into disuse are still as relevant now as in the small wars era. A prime example of this is animal husbandry and the use of pack animals. These subjects, covered in the Small Wars Manual, have all but disappeared from current doctrine. Their relevance, however, was seen in Operation Uphold Democracy, as United States Army Special Forces units found that pack animals provided the only access to some mountainous areas.²

Third, and most relevant today, the Small Wars Manual provides a framework and plan for the conduct of a small war. This plan outlines the end state, the steps to that end state, and how those steps fit into the larger political framework. The end state for a small war is the return of law and order to the nation's society. This society will then be more stable, as the roots of discontent that cause rebellion will be eliminated. To attain this end state, the intervening force conducts

operations phased to accomplish the following successive steps: the initial entry of the force; the elimination of lawlessness by disarming the populace and the establishment of a constabulary; the return of order to the society or the return of functions to native agencies capable of controlling the situation without support; and finally, the withdrawal of the intervening force. Since the end state is a political and strategic objective, the military aspects of the intervention must support the diplomatic effort.

Although political realities have changed over the intervening half century, the basic outline plan for the conduct of interventions remains relevant. The case study of Operation Uphold Democracy in Chapter 5 demonstrated the applicability of the elements of this plan. Each element was either employed or addressed in some way. In some instances the conduct of Operation Uphold Democracy differed from the Small Wars Manual model; notable examples are in the Multinational Force not disarming the entire population and not disbanding the standing armed forces. Each of these, however, was done for political reasons. This, though, is in keeping with the Small Wars Manual model, since the third theme states that the military effort is in support of the diplomatic effort.

This outline plan for a small war, then, is the most important contribution that the Small Wars Manual can make to present Military Operations Other Than War. Although written for Marine interventions, the framework is equally applicable for intervention forces of another service, or joint or combined forces. As with any application of doctrine, this framework must be applied with judgment.

Although the result of this study finds that the Small Wars Manual is applicable today in Military Operations Other Than War, it is time for an updated version of the Small Wars Manual. In 1962, a Marine

writer recommended that the Marine Corps "update and reissue the Small Wars Manual." The Marine Corps did reissue the Small Wars Manual in 1987, but an update is still pending.³

A new version of the Small Wars Manual should be an in-depth study of the topic of small wars. A writer of such a manual would do well to study not just the Small Wars Manual, but also Small Wars Operations, which retained more of the results of the studies done by Marines in the 1920s and 1930s.

There are still areas that invite further study. One is the development of the small wars mission and doctrine, and its rivalry with the development of the amphibious operations mission and doctrine. The other is a contemporary study of small wars, done along the traditions of the Small Wars Manual. This study would be much like those of Harrington and Utley, and could provide the research that could be used in a future version of the Small Wars Manual as recommended above.

Although written over fifty years ago, the Small Wars Manual is still applicable today. It is a primer, a how-to-fight manual, and an outline plan for the conduct of small wars and Military Operations Other Than War.

ENDNOTES

¹U.S. Joint Staff, Joint Pub 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1993), H-5; U.S. Joint Staff, Joint Test Pub 3-57, Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs Operations (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1991), F-5.

²"Haiti: Unconventional Operations," 3rd Special Forces Group (ABN) briefing slides, 12 December 1994. Based on the author's experience in June 1994, the Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, Bridgeport, California continues instruction in the use of pack animals. The results of a search of the U.S. Joint Staff, Joint Electronic Library show only two doctrinal publications, both Marine Corps, Fleet Marine Force Manual 8-1, Special Operations and Fleet Marine Force Manual 8-2 Counterinsurgency Operations, that discuss the use of pack animals.

³Major Michael Spark, "Marines, Guerrillas, and Small Wars," in The Guerrilla - And How to Fight Him, ed. Lieutenant Colonel T. N. Greene (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), 257; U.S. Marine Corps, NAVMC 2890, Small Wars Manual (Reprint of 1940 Edition) (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 1987), Foreword. A Small Wars Manual II is in draft form. This manual is a small pamphlet of Marine lessons learned in recent Military Operations Other Than War.

APPENDIX A

SMALL WARS OPERATIONS

1935 REVISION

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Title
I	General Characteristics of Small Wars
II	The Strategy of Small Wars
III	Psychology in Small Wars
IV	Concentration Section: I. Composition of Forces II. Organization III. Equipment and Supplies IV. Training V. Employment and Preparation of the Commander(s) and Staff(s)
V	Transportation Section: I. Reference Data, Materiel II. Motor Transport III. Railway Transportation IV. Water Transportation V. Air Transportation VI. Animal and Porter Transport
VI	Port of Embarkation
VII	Training Management for Small Wars Section: I. Character and Purpose of Small Wars Training II. Peace-Time Training for Small Wars III. Training During Concentration for a Small Wars IV. Troop Training Aboard Ship V. Training in the Theater of Operations VI. Training Program and Schedules
VIII	Operations Orders and Instructions (Navy) (Not printed)
IX	Debarkation
X	Supply Plans
XI	Neutral Zones and Movement Inland Section: I. Neutral Zones II. Movement Inland
XII	Disarming Population, Collecting, and Custody of Arms
XIII	Armed Native Organizations Section: I. General II. Preliminary Steps in Organizing a Constabulary

- III. Essential Elements to be Considered in Planning for the Creation of a Constabulary
- IV. Training a Constabulary
- V. Auxiliary Agents of the Constabulary
- VI. Status of the Constabulary
- VII. Withdrawal of the Intervening Force
- XIV Relationship--Military, Naval and Civil Authorities
 - Section: I. General
 - II. The State Department's Influence on Relationship in Small Wars
 - III. The Chain of Command in Small Wars--The Navy and the Marine Corps
 - IV. Military-Civil Relationship
- XV Military Territorial Organization and Methods of Pacification
 - Section: I. Military Territorial Organization
 - II. Methods of Pacification
- XVI Principles and Functions of the Marine Staff
 - Section: I. The Staff in Small Wars
 - II. The Chief of Staff
 - III. The First Section
 - IV. The Second Section
 - V. The Third Section
 - VI. The Fourth Section
 - VII. The Special Staff
- XVII Signal Communication
- XVIII Infantry Weapons and Equipment
- XIX Light Artillery in Small Wars
- XX The Defense, Attack, and Occupation of Towns
 - Section: I. Defense
 - II. The Attack and Occupation of Towns
- XXI Animal Transportation and Mounted Detachments
 - Section: I. Introduction
 - II. Care of Animals
 - III. Procurement of Animals
 - IV. Pack and Other Animal Transportation
 - V. Mounted Detachments
 - VI. Hastily Organized Mounted Patrols
- XXII Convoys and Convoy Escorts
- XXIII Organizing the Infantry Patrol
 - Section: I. General
 - II. Personnel
 - III. Transportation, Equipment and Supplies
 - IV. Feeding the Personnel
 - V. Shelter
 - VI. Orders and General Instructions
 - VII. General Preparations
- XXIV The Infantry Patrol in the Field
 - Section: I. Introduction
 - II. Attacking Ambushes
 - III. Prearranged Schemes of Maneuver to Engage Ambushes
 - IV. March Formations
 - V. March Discipline
 - VI. Reconnaissance and Security
 - VII. Laying Ambushes
 - VIII. Attacking houses

- IX. Attacking Small Bivouacs
 - X. Stratagems and Ruses
 - XI. Aids to Scouting
 - XII. Special Operations and Expedients
- XXV Aviation
- Section: I. Introduction
 - II. Technical preparations
 - III. Missions of Observation Aviation
 - IV. Combat Support
 - V. Air Transport
 - VI. General Conduct of Air Operations
 - VII. Communications
- XXVI River Operations
- Section: I. Introduction
 - II. Boats, Desirable Characteristics of
 - III. Armament and Equipment
 - IV. Crews
 - V. Preparations
 - VI. Posts and Boat Stations
 - VII. Occupation of Rivers
 - VIII. Special Operations
- XXVII River Crossings
- XXVIII Chemical Agents
- XXIX Medical
- Section: I. Military Hygiene and Sanitation
 - II. Preparation for the March
 - III. The March
 - IV. First Aid
- XXX Withdrawal from Foreign Territory
- Section: I. Introduction
 - II. The Withdrawal from Active Operations
 - III. The Final Withdrawal
- XXXI Military Government
- Section: I. General
 - II. Establishment and Administration of Military Government
 - III. Applications of Principles to Situations Short of War
- XXXII Supervision of Elections
- Section: I. General
 - II. Personnel for an American Electoral Mission
 - III. Organization and Functioning of an American Electoral Mission
 - IV. Organization and Functioning of the National Board of Elections
 - V. Problems Involved in Conducting Free and Fair elections
 - VI. Registration and Voting
 - VII. Final Reports

APPENDIX B

SMALL WARS MANUAL

TABLE OF CONTENTS

The Small Wars Manual, United States Marine Corps, 1940, is published in 15 chapters as follows:

Chapter I. Introduction.

Section I. General characteristics:	Par.	Page
Small wars defined	1-1	1
Classes of small wars	1-2	2
Some legal aspects of small wars	1-3	3
Function of Headquarters		
Marine Corps	1-4	4
Phases of small wars	1-5	5
Summary	1-6	8

II. Strategy:

The basis of strategy	1-7	11
Nature of the operations	1-8	12
National war	1-9	14

III. Psychology:

Foreword	1-10	17
Characteristics	1-11	19
Fundamental considerations	1-12	19
Revolutionary tendencies	1-13	19
Basic instincts	1-14	23
Attitude and bearing	1-15	27
Conduct of our troops	1-16	27
Summary	1-17	32

IV. Relationship with the State Department:

Importance of cooperation	1-18	33
Principles prescribed by Navy regulations	1-19	33
Contact with State Department representatives	1-20	34

V. The chain of command-Navy and Marine Corps:

Navy regulations	1-21	35
Control of joint operations	1-22	35
The directive	1-23	36
Naval officer commanding ashore	1-24	37
Marine officer commanding ashore	1-25	37
Marine-Constabulary	1-26	39
Direct control by Navy Department	1-27	39

VI. Military-civil relationship:

Importance	1-28	41
Contact with national government officials	1-29	41
Cooperation with law enforcement	1-30	43
Contact with the inhabitants	1-31	44

Chapter II. Organization.

Section I. The estimate of the situation:

General	2-1	1
The mission	2-2	2
Factors to be considered in estimating enemy strength	2-3	2
Relative strength	2-4	6
Enemy courses of action	2-5	6
Own courses of action	2-6	7
The decision	2-7	7
Supporting measures	2-8	7
Campaign and operating plans	2-9	8

II. The staff in small wars:

Command and staff responsibility in small wars	2-10	11
The force commander	2-11	12
Staff procedure	2-12	12
The chief of staff	2-13	15
The first section (Personnel) F-1	2-14	17
The second section (Intelligence) F-2	2-15	19
The third section (Planning and Training) F-3	2-16	32
The fourth section (Supply) F-4	2-17	34
The special staff	2-18	35
The adjutant	2-19	35
The inspector	2-20	36
The law officer	2-21	37
The officer in charge of civil affairs	2-22	37
The chaplain	2-23	38
The paymaster	2-24	38
The provost marshal	2-25	38
The commanding officer of special troops	2-26	39
The artillery officer	2-27	39
The air officer	2-28	39
The communications officer	2-29	39
The engineer officer	2-30	40
The surgeon	2-31	40
The quartermaster	2-32	41
The chemical officer	2-33	41
The tank officer	2-34	41
The munitions officer	2-35	41
The post exchange officer	2-36	41
The amusement and welfare officer	2-37	41

III. Composition of the Force:

General	2-38	43
Infantry	2-39	44
Infantry weapons	2-40	45
Infantry individual equipment	2-41	49
Mounted troops	2-42	50
Engineers	2-43	50
Tanks and armored cars	2-44	50
Transport	2-45	51
Signal troops	2-46	51
Chemical troops	2-47	58
Medical troops	2-48	58

Artillery	2-49	60
Aviation	2-50	64

Chapter III. Logistics

Section I. Introduction.

II. Supply:

Influence of supply on a column	3-2	3
Supply officers	3-3	4
Storage	3-4	4
Distribution	3-5	5
Supply steps	3-6	8
Local purchases	3-7	8
Requisitions	3-8	8
Depots, dumps, and distributing points	3-9	8
Chain of responsibility	3-10	9
Accountability	3-11	9
Public funds	3-12	10
Objective	3-13	11
Supervision of requisitions	3-14	11
Accumulation of stores	3-15	12
General	3-16	12
Importance of supply	3-17	12
III. Transportation:		
General	3-18	15
Railroad transportation	3-19	16
Motor transportation	3-20	16
Tractor-trailer transportation	3-21	16
Transportation pools	3-22	17
Aviation transport	3-23	17
Water transportation	3-24	17
Animal transportation	3-25	17
Important points in packing	3-26	18
Pack mules	3-27	19
Pack horses	3-28	19
Pack bulls	3-29	19
Phillips pack saddle	3-30	20
McClellan saddle	3-31	21
Pack equipment	3-32	22
Native packers	3-33	24
Marines as packers	3-34	25
Bull carts	3-35	26
Trains with combat columns	3-36	30

Chapter IV. Training

Section I. Character and purpose of small wars training:

Relation to other training	4-1	3
Tactical training	4-2	4
Rifle company	4-3	4
Machine gun company	4-4	6
Mortars and 37 mm. guns	4-5	6
Troop schools	4-6	7

II. Training during concentration:

Training objective	4-7	9
Scope of training	4-8	9
Disciplinary training	4-9	9

III. Training en route on board ship:

General	4-10	11
Ship routine	4-11	11

Time available for troop training	4-12	12
Troop schools on board ship	4-13	12
Size of classes	4-14	12
Example of instruction assignments		
rifle company	4-15	13
Subjects covered	4-16	14
Essential training	4-17	14
IV. Training in the theater of operations:		
System of training	4-18	15
Facilities	4-19	15
Subjects covered	4-20	15
Training centers	4-21	15
Troop schools	4-22	16
Organization of training centers and troop schools	4-23	17
V. Training programs and schedules:		
Training instructions	4-24	19
Training programs	4-25	19
Training schedules	4-26	23

Chapter V. Initial operations.

Section I. Neutral zones:

General	5-1	1
Purpose, occasion, and circumstance	5-2	2
Basic orders	5-3	3
Instructions	5-4	3
Zone force commander's order	5-5	3
Proclamation	5-6	4

II. Movement inland:

Point of departure	5-7	5
Mobile columns and flying columns	5-8	5
Strength and composition of columns	5-9	7
Protective measures covering movement	5-10	8
Establishment of advanced bases inland	5-11	9
Movement by rail	5-12	10

III. Military territorial organization

Purpose	5-13	13
Influence of the mission on territorial organization	5-14	13
Assignments of troops to areas	5-15	14
Size and limits of areas	5-16	14

IV. Methods of pacification:

The nature of the problem	5-17	17
Methods of operation	5-18	17
Occupation of an area	5-19	17
Patrols	5-20	18
Roving patrols	5-21	19
Zones of refuge	5-22	19
The cordon system	5-23	19
The blockhouse system	5-24	19
Special methods	5-25	20

Chapter VI. Infantry patrols.

Section I. Small war tactics:

Tactics during initial phases	6-1	1
Tactics during later phases	6-2	1
Influence of terrain	6-3	2

The principle of the offensive	6-4	2
The principles of mass, movement, surprise and security	6-5	2
II. Orders and general instructions:		
Written orders	6-6	5
Verbal orders	6-7	5
General instructions	6-8	7
III. Organizing the infantry patrol:		
Definition	6-9	7
Factors which govern its organization	6-10	8
Size of the patrol	6-11	8
Permanent roving patrols	6-12	9
Selection of units	6-13	9
Elimination of the physically unfit	6-14	10
Patrol and subordinate leaders	6-15	10
The rifle squad	6-16	10
The headquarters section	6-17	11
Attached units	6-18	11
Guides and interpreters	6-19	11
Native transport personnel	6-20	12
Native troops	6-21	12
Prominent native civilians	6-22	12
Transportation	6-23	13
Weapons	6-24	13
Ammunition	6-25	14
Signal equipment	6-26	15
Medical supplies	6-27	15
Miscellaneous equipment	6-28	15
Personal clothing and accessories	6-29	16
General preparations	6-30	17
IV. Feeding the personnel:		
Responsibility of patrol leader	6-31	19
Mess equipment	6-32	19
Weight of rations	6-33	20
The field ration	6-34	21
Butchering on the march	6-35	22
Feeding native personnel	6-36	22
Emergency rations	6-37	22
V. The March:		
General	6-38	23
Hour of starting	6-39	23
Rate of march	6-40	23
Factors influencing march formations	6-41	24
Influence of terrain on march formation	6-42	25
Road spaces	6-43	25
Location of patrol and subordinate leaders in march formation	6-44	26
Location of the combat train	6-45	26
Descriptive march formations	6-46	26
March formations for a reenforced rifle company	6-47	27
March formations for a reenforced rifle platoon	6-48	29
March formation for a rifle platoon	6-49	30
March formation for a rifle squad	6-50	31

March discipline	6-51	31
March outposts	6-52	32
Camp sites	6-53	32
Making camp	6-54	33
Shelter	6-55	33
Bivouac beds	6-56	34
VI. Reconnaissance and security		
Methods of reconnaissance	6-57	37
Reconnoitering by scouts	6-58	37
Careful visual reconnaissance	6-59	38
Hasty visual reconnaissance	6-60	38
Reconnaissance by fire	6-61	38
Reconnaissance by aviation personnel	6-62	39
Airplane reconnaissance by patrol leaders	6-63	39
Intelligence agents	6-64	39
Questioning inhabitants for information	6-65	39
Dogs on reconnaissance	6-66	39
Security on march	6-67	39
Security at rest	6-68	40
VII. Laying ambushes:		
Definition	6-69	41
Selection of position	6-70	41
Usual characteristics of an ambush	6-71	41
Occupying the position	6-72	43
The ambush engagement	6-73	43
Employment of infantry weapons	6-74	44
VIII. Attacking ambushes:		
Mental preparation	6-75	45
Prearranged schemes of maneuver	6-76	45
Spirit of the offensive	6-77	47
Fire and movement	6-78	48
Authority of subordinates to act on own initiative	6-79	48
IX. Attacking houses and small bivouacs:		
Attacking houses	6-80	51
Attacking small bivouacs	6-81	52
Destroying captured bivouacs	6-82	52
X. Stratagems and ruses:		
Rules of land warfare	6-83	53
Clearing the station	6-84	53
Apprehending informers	6-85	53
Spies following a patrol	6-86	53
Guerrilla ruses and stratagems	6-87	54
XI. River crossings:		
Introduction	6-88	55
Availability of means	6-89	55
Swimming	6-90	55
Bridges	6-91	56
Boats	6-92	57
Ferries	6-93	57
Fords	6-94	58
Rafts	6-95	59
Crossings unfordable streams with usual infantry equipment	6-96	59
Crossing horses and mules	6-97	63

XII. Special operations:		
Trail cutting	6-98	67
Night operations	6-99	68
Chapter VII. Mounted Detachments.		
Section I. Introduction:		
Purpose	7-1	1
Use of animals an expedient	7-2	1
Need for training in animal care and employment	7-3	1
Some difficulties in employing animals	7-4	2
II. Care of animals:		
Knowledge of animal management required	7-5	3
Nomenclature	7-6	3
Identification	7-7	3
Duties of officers charged with care of animals	7-8	8
Rules for handling animals	7-9	8
Stables and corrals	7-10	9
Grooming	7-11	9
Forage	7-12	9
Principles of feeding	7-13	10
Watering	7-14	10
Conditioning	7-15	11
Management of animals on the march	7-16	11
First-aid treatment	7-17	14
Communicable diseases	7-18	16
Care of the feet	7-19	17
Veterinary supplies	7-20	17
III. Procurement of animals:		
Necessity for local purchase	7-21	19
Procurement agents	7-22	19
Native dealers	7-23	20
Purchasing from native dealers	7-24	20
Minimum specifications for animals	7-25	20
Height qualifications	7-26	20
Age qualifications	7-27	21
Examination for soundness	7-28	22
Marking of purchased animals	7-29	24
Use of United States bred animals in small wars	7-30	24
IV. Mounted detachments:		
Value of mounted detachments	7-31	25
Basis for organization	7-32	26
A mounted rifle company	7-33	27
Machine gun and howitzer units	7-34	27
Animals for mounted detachments	7-35	28
Spare mounts	7-36	28
Assignment of mounts	7-37	28
Horse equipment	7-38	29
Individual equipment	7-39	29
Arms and ammunition	7-40	30
Pack equipment	7-41	31
Training, general	7-42	31
Training for specialist	7-43	31
Time required for training	7-44	32
Combat training	7-45	32

Tactical uses of mounted detachments	7-46	32
Conduct of mounted patrols	7-47	33
Combat patrols	7-48	34
Ambushes	7-49	35
V. Hastily organized mounted patrols:		
Definition and uses	7-50	37
Discussion	7-51	39
Type of animal to employ	7-52	39
Other details	7-53	39
Chapter VIII. Convoys and convoy escorts.		
Section I. Definitions	8-1	1
Mission	8-2	1
Organization	8-3	1
Convoy types	8-4	2
March of convoys	8-5	3
Disposition of the escort on the march	8-6	4
Defense of a convoy	8-7	5
Attack of a convoy	8-8	6
Security measures at the halt	8-9	6
Chapter IX. Aviation.		
Section I. Introduction:		
General	9-1	1
Special air tactics involved	9-2	1
II. Composition and organization:		
Types	9-3	3
Reconnaissance aircraft	9-4	3
Combat aircraft	9-5	3
Transport aircraft	9-6	3
Organization	9-7	4
Movement to theater	9-8	4
III. Selection and preparation of bases:		
Main airdrome	9-9	5
Auxiliary airdromes	9-10	6
Advance landing fields	9-11	6
Emergency landing fields	9-12	6
Specifications of landing fields	9-13	6
Minimum size of landing fields	9-14	7
IV. General conduct of air operations:		
Control and command	9-15	9
Details of operations	9-16	9
Reports	9-17	10
V. Employment of reconnaissance aviation:		
General considerations	9-18	13
Strategic (distant) reconnaissance	9-19	14
Tactical (close) reconnaissance	9-20	14
The infantry mission	9-21	15
Special combat mission	9-22	16
VI. Combat support:		
General discussion	9-23	17
Fighting aviation	9-24	17
Attack aviation	9-25	18
Bombing aviation	9-26	18
Attacks on troop columns and trains	9-27	18
Support of marching column	9-28	19
Attacks on hostile positions	9-29	20

Attacks on towns	9-30	20
Aviation as a mobile reserve	9-31	20
VII. Air transport:		
General considerations	9-32	21
Troop transportation	9-33	22
Transportation of supplies	9-34	22
Dropping of supplies	9-35	23
Evacuation of sick and wounded	9-36	24
Chapter X. River operations.		
Section I. River operations in general:		
Necessity for river operations	10-1	1
General characteristics of rivers	10-2	2
II. Types and characteristics of boats:		
General	10-3	5
Coastwise communications	10-4	5
Nature of the river	10-5	5
Lower river boats	10-6	6
Middle river boats	10-7	7
Upper river boats	10-8	6
Types of boats available	10-9	6
Method of propulsion	10-10	8
Influence of tactical principles	10-11	9
III. Preparation for river operations:		
Introduction	10-12	11
Organizing the river patrol	10-13	12
Crews	10-14	12
Boat procurement	10-15	13
Armament and equipment	10-16	13
Loading boats	10-17	14
IV. Occupation of a river:		
The mission	10-18	17
Similarity to land operation	10-19	17
The day's march	10-20	18
Rate of movement	10-21	18
Boat formation	10-22	19
Reconnaissance and security	10-23	20
Initial contact with the enemy	10-24	21
A typical ambush	10-25	21
The attack	10-26	22
Garrisoning the river	10-27	22
Defensive measures	10-28	23
Passage of obstacles	10-29	23
Night operations	10-30	23
Supporting forces	10-31	24
Chapter XI. Disarmament of population.		
Section I. General		
Estimate and plans	11-1	1
Laws, decrees, orders and instructions	11-2	3
Manner of collecting arms	11-3	5
Collecting agencies	11-4	6
Custody of arms	11-5	7
Disposition	11-6	9
Permits	11-7	11
Control of sources of supply	11-8	12
Measures following disarmament	11-9	13
	11-10	14

Chapter XII. Armed native organizations.

Section I. General:

Local armed forces	12-1	1
United States intervention	12-2	1
Restoration of authority to Local government	12-3	2
Formation of a constabulary	12-4	2
II. Organization of a constabulary:		
Planning agency	12-5	5
Approval of plans	12-6	5
Local creative law	12-7	6
United States creative laws	12-8	6
Composition	12-9	7
Duties and powers	12-10	8
Size of force	12-11	8
Administrative organization	12-12	9
Supply and equipment	12-13	9
Records and reports	12-14	12
Finances	12-15	13
Recruiting	12-16	14
Housing and shelter	12-17	14
Military courts	12-18	15
III. Operations and training:		
Recruits	12-19	17
Unit training	12-20	18
Officers	12-21	18
Field operations	12-22	18
Troop leading	12-23	19
IV. Auxiliary forces:		
Urban and rural agents	12-24	21
Special agents	12-25	21
Auxiliary units	12-26	22
V. Civil and Military relationship:		
Relation to civil power	12-27	23
Relation to United States forces	12-28	24

Chapter XIII. Military government

Section I. General:

General	13-1	1
Definitions	13-2	1
Authority for exercise of military government	13-3	2
Functions of military government in general	13-4	2
By whom exercised	13-5	3
How proclaimed	13-6	3
II. Establishment and administration of military government:		
Importance of organization	13-7	5
Plans	13-8	5
The proclamation	13-9	8
Supplemental regulations	13-10	9
Digest of information	13-11	11
Attitude toward local officials and inhabitants	13-12	13
Law-enforcement agencies and public services	13-13	14
Exceptional military courts	13-14	15

Control of civil and military administration	13-15	15
Public utilities	13-16	16
Trade relationship	13-17	17
Mines and quarries	13-18	17
Public revenues	13-19	17
Requisitions and contributions	13-20	17
Public and private property	13-21	18
Employment of inhabitants	13-22	18
Police and elections	13-23	19
III. Applications of principles to situations short of war:		
General considerations	13-24	21
What laws apply	13-25	21
Chapter XIV. Supervision of elections.		
Section I. General:		
Introduction	14-1	1
Request for supervision	14-2	2
Definitions	14-3	2
Responsibilities of electoral mission	14-4	3
Intimidation of voters	14-5	4
Military and police measures	14-6	4
Unethical practices	14-7	6
II. Personnel:		
Chairman	14-8	11
Electoral mission staff	14-9	11
Commissioned officers	14-10	12
Enlisted personnel	14-11	12
Civilian personnel	14-12	13
Instruction of personnel	14-13	13
Replacements	14-14	13
Pay and allowances	14-15	14
III. Electoral mission:		
Chairman	14-16	17
Vice Chairman	14-17	20
Executive officer	14-18	20
Secretary	14-19	21
Inspector	14-20	21
Intelligence and press relations officer	14-21	21
Law officer	14-22	22
Communications officer	14-23	23
Disbursing and supply officer	14-24	24
Medical officer	14-25	25
Aides	14-26	25
Departmental board personnel	14-27	25
Cantonal board personnel	14-28	26
IV. National board of elections:		
Members and staff	14-29	29
Duties	14-30	30
Secretary	14-31	30
Complaints, appeals, and petitions	14-32	30
Assembly	14-33	32
V. Registration and voting:		
Registration	14-34	33
Voting	14-35	33
Final reports	14-36	35

Chapter XV. Withdrawal.

Section I. Introduction:

General	15-1	1
Factors to be considered	15-2	1
Phases of withdrawal	15-3	1

II. Withdrawal from active military

operations:

Concentration	15-4	3
Rights retained	15-5	3
Procedure	15-6	4

III. Final withdrawal:

General	15-7	5
Plans and orders	15-8	6
Executive staff duties	15-9	6
First section	15-10	7
Second section	15-11	8
Third section	15-12	8
Fourth section	15-13	8
Special staff duties	15-14	9
Air officer	15-15	9
Engineer officer	15-16	9
Communications officer	15-17	10
Surgeon	15-18	10
Quartermaster	15-19	10

APPENDIX C
BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

Sources used for this study are broken into three broad areas, the involvement of the United States Marine Corps in the small wars, the development by the Marine Corps of small wars doctrine, and the case study of Operation Uphold Democracy.

For the chapter on the background and conduct of the interventions, or small wars, there are a number of secondary sources available. To provide the political and diplomatic backgrounds to the interventions of the first half of the twentieth century, there are Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States, Dana G. Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900-1921, and Lester D. Langley, The Banana Wars: United States Intervention in the Caribbean, 1898-1934. Bemis provides an overview and background of United States foreign policy. Munro, a former United States diplomat with extensive service in the region, provides an in-depth study of the United States diplomatic actions within the western hemisphere during the first two decades of this century. Langley covers the diplomatic and military involvement of the United States in the Caribbean during the time of the interventions. This work concentrates on the interventions in Cuba, Hispaniola, Mexico, and Nicaragua.

The background of the Marine Corps during this period is provided by a number of books, mainly those that are general histories of the Marine Corps. The earliest of value is Captain Harry Allanson Ellsworth, One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines,

1800-1934, originally published in 1934 by the Historical Section of the Marine Corps. Captain Ellsworth was the head of the Historical Section and a veteran of two tours in Haiti. The book covers all Marine landings and interventions up to the time of its writing. Another official Marine Corps history of that period is Lieutenant Colonel Clyde H. Metcalf, A History of the United States Marine Corps, published in 1939. Of the contemporary histories, probably the most authoritative is Allan Millett's Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps. Dr. Millett gives extensive coverage to the use of the Marine Corps in interventions and small wars. Although not a Marine Corps history, as such, Victor H. Krulak, First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps is an anecdotal history of the Marine Corps. The work sets the tone and provides background on the Marine Corps during this era. Although General Krulak concentrates on the development of amphibious warfare, the conflict with the advocates of expeditionary duty for fighting small wars is covered. For a view not written by a Marine, there is Hans Schmidt, Maverick Marine: General Smedley D. Butler and the Contradictions of American Military History. This biography of one of the most famous of the Marine bush fighters explores the "schism" within the Marine Corps between the small war fighters and the advanced base intellectuals. One additional book of interest is America's Small Wars: Lessons for the Future by John M. Collins, senior specialist in national defense at the Library of Congress. Written at the request of the U. S. Congress, the book is a primer on low intensity conflict and includes sixty case summaries dating from 1899 to 1990.

The chapter on the development of small wars doctrine and the writing of the Small Wars Manual relied upon interviews and other primary sources, as well as a few published sources. Interviews of General Merrill B. Twining, USMC (Retired) and Lieutenant General Victor

H. Krulak, USMC (Retired) proved invaluable in setting the tone for the environment within in the Marine Corps during the period, describing how doctrine, and specifically small wars doctrine, was developed and the impact of the conflict between the advocates of small wars duty and those of advanced base operations, or amphibious warfare. General Twining, who was commissioned in the Marine Corps in 1923, provided insight into many of the personalities of the era, putting the correspondence between Generals Russell and Breckinridge into proper context.

The majority of the correspondence between the Major General Commandant and the Commandant of the Marine Corps Schools is found in National Archives, Record Group 127, Box 60, in Washington, DC. Also of value are the Historical Amphibious Files at the Archives Branch, Marine Corps Research Center, Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA. These files, although concentrating on the development of amphibious doctrine, provide material about most aspects of the Marine Corps Schools and the Quantico Marine Base. The History and Museum Division, Marine Corps Historical Center at the Washington Navy Yard contains much original material. The research section maintains folders on past Marines, including Samuel M. Harrington and Harold Utley, while the personal papers sections includes the Utley Papers, which provide background on the study of small wars conducted by Utley in the 1930s. For the writing of the Small Wars Manual, there is Jon T. Hoffman, Once A Legend: "Red Mike" Edson of the Edson Raiders. This work, provided the starting point for the search for how the Small Wars Manual came to be written.

The Merritt A. Edson Papers in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress consists of over 19,000 items donated by the Edson family. For this study, the most important item was a copy of Small

Wars Operations, 1935 Revision. As discussed in the body of this study, this copy includes pencil marks in the Table of Contents that reorganize and renumber the chapters from the thirty chapters of the 1935 revision into the fifteen chapters found in the Small Wars Manual. Also included in the collection are logs and journals from General Edson's career, including those from the Coco River patrol.

The Library at the History and Museum Division, Marine Corps Historical Center at the Washington Navy Yard contains a copy of Small Wars Operations, 1938 Revision. With the Marine Corps Research Center, Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA unable to locate its copy of either revision, the Edson and Marine Corps Historical Center copies appear to be the only two public copies of Small Wars Operations. There are undoubtedly, as a number of copies hidden away in the footlockers of old Marines. General Krulak believes he still possesses his.¹

For the chapters on the case study of Operation Uphold Democracy much of the material used was gained from the "Haiti Project," the writing of the Army history of Operation Uphold Democracy. Much of this is primary source material in the form of briefing slides and charts. Many of the documents from Operation Uphold Democracy, including operations orders, situation reports, and interviews have been stored electronically in the Caribbean Region Collection of the Automated Historical Archives System at Fort Leavenworth, KS. The United States Atlantic Command, Operation Uphold Democracy: Joint After Action Report (JAAR) and Center for Army Lessons Learned, Operation Uphold Democracy: Initial Impressions, in three volumes, provide the chronology and lessons learned from the operation. Also of value are the interviews of Colonel John Langdon, USMC and Lieutenant Colonel Philip L. Idiart, USA, both of the J5 Directorate, United States Atlantic Command. Of the published sources, Robert D. Heinl, Jr. and

Nancy Heinl, Written in Blood: The Study of the Haitian People, 1491-1971 provides a history of Haiti and its problems, and Georges A. Fauriol, ed. Haitian Frustrations: Dilemmas for U.S. Policy, A Report of the CSIS Americas Program provides background on Haitian history and the crises that precipitated the need for the United States intervention.

ENDNOTES

¹Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, USMC (Retired), interview by author, tape recording, San Diego, California, 27 December 1995.

APPENDIX D

GLOSSARY

Auxiliaries. Term used for the volunteers for the Haitian security force who were refugees at the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

Carter-Jonassaint Agreement. Agreement reached on September 18, 1994, between former United States President Jimmy Carter and Emile Jonassaint, the Provisional President of Haiti, which led to the peaceful intervention of the Multinational Force and the return of President Aristide.

Constabulary. An armed service that conducts both national defense and policing functions.

Élite. Self-named mulatto upper class of Haiti; they generally live in the suburbs of Port-au-Prince, speak French, and are Catholic.¹

End State. "The set of required conditions that achieve the strategic objectives."²

Forces Armées d'Haiti. Haitian military until disbanded on January 17, 1995, by President Aristide. Despite the 1987 Haitian Constitution restrictions, it conducted both the national defense and policing functions prior to Operation Uphold Democracy.

Garde d'Haiti. The Gendarmerie d'Haiti after 1928. See Gendarmerie d'Haiti.

Gendarmerie d'Haiti. Constabulary established in Haiti in 1916 by the United States Marine Corps.

Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua. Constabulary established in Nicaragua in 1925 by the United States.

Guardia Nacional Dominicana. Constabulary established in the Dominican Republic in 1917 by the United States Marine Corps.

Interim Public Security Force. Temporary security force established by the Multinational Force until the establishment of the Haitian National Police.

International Police Monitors. Organization of professional law enforcement officers whose purpose was to ensure that there were no human rights violations by the new security force established during and after Operation Uphold Democracy.

Interposition. The use of military force by a nation to protect its nationals in another country during temporary crises.

Intervention. The use of military force by a nation to alter the political behavior and institutions of another country.

Military Operations Other Than War. "Encompasses the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war." It includes the activities of noncombatant evacuation operations, arms control, support to domestic civil authorities, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, security assistance, nation assistance, support to counterdrug operations, combating terrorism, peacekeeping operations, peace enforcement, show of force, support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, and attacks and raids.³

Small Wars. "Operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as our determined by the foreign policy of our Nation."⁴

Tontons macoutes. See Volontaires de la Sécurité Nationale.

Vet. A thorough examination. The term was used during Operation Uphold Democracy for the process of examining members of the Forces Armées d'Haiti to disqualify those with past human rights violations or other crimes from further service in the security force of Haiti.

Volontaires de la Sécurité Nationale. Paramilitary organization formed by François Duvalier after a failed coup attempt in July 1958. It was a private military force that, by the early 1960s, was twice the size of the army. At the time of Operation Uphold Democracy, it was anti-Aristide.

ENDNOTES

¹Dana G. Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900-1921 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964; reprint, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980), 328.

²U.S. Joint Staff, Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1993), III-2.

³U.S. Joint Staff, Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1995), I-1; U.S. Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1993), 13-4 to 13-8. The definition quoted is the approved joint definition. FM 100-5 defines Operations Other Than war as "military activities during peacetime and conflict that do not necessarily involve armed clashes between two organized forces." U.S. Army, FM 100-5, Operations, Glossary-6.

⁴U.S. Marine Corps, NAVMC 2890, Small Wars Manual (Reprint of 1940 Edition) (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 1987), chap. I, p. 1.

SOURCES CONSULTED

Books

- Bemis, Samuel Flagg. A Diplomatic History of the United States. 4th ed. New York: Holt, 1955.
- Callwell, Colonel C. E. Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice. 3rd ed. London: Harrison and Sons, 1906.
- Clifford, Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth J. Progress and Purpose: A Developmental History of the United States Marine Corps, 1900-1970. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1973.
- Collins, John M. America's Small Wars: Lessons for the Future. Washington, DC: Brassey's (US), Inc., 1991.
- Ellsworth, Captain Harry Allanson. One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines, 1800-1934. Washington, DC: U.S. Marine Corps, Historical Section, 1974.
- Fauriol, Georges A., ed. Haitian Frustrations: Dilemmas for U.S. Policy, A Report of the CSIS Americas Program. Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic & International Studies, 1995.
- Fishel, John T. "Haiti Ain't No Panama, Jack," in a still untitled book to be published by the World Peace Foundation.
- Greene, Lieutenant Colonel T. N., ed. The Guerrilla--And How to Fight Him. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962.
- Haines, Gerald K., and J. Samuel Walker, ed. American Foreign Relations: A Historical Review. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981.
- Healy, David. "The U.S. Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934." In Haitian Frustrations: Dilemmas for U.S. Policy, A Report of the CSIS Americas Program, ed. Georges A. Fauriol, 36-45. Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic & International Studies, 1995.
- Heinl, Jr., Colonel Robert D. Soldiers of the Sea: The United States Marine Corps, 1775-1962. 2d ed. With a Foreword by B. H. Liddell Hart. With a Foreword to Second Edition by General Alfred M. Gray, USMC Commandant. Baltimore, MD: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1991.
- Heinl, Jr. Robert D., and Nancy Heinl. Written in Blood: The Study of the Haitian People, 1491-1971. Houghton Mifflin, 1978.
- Heneker, Lieutenant Colonel W. C. G. Bush Warfare. London: Hugh Rees, Limited, 1907.

Hoffman, Jon T. Once A Legend: "Red Mike" Edson of the Edson Raiders.
Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1994.

Isley, Jeter A., and Philip A. Crowl. The U.S. Marines and Amphibious Warfare: Its Theory, and Its Practice in the Pacific. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1951.

Johnstone, Major John H., compiler. An Annotated Bibliography of the United States Marine Corps in Guerilla-Type Actions. Washington, DC: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1962.

Knox, Dudley W. A History of the United States Navy. New York: Putnam, 1936.

Krulak, Victor H. First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984.

Langley, Lester D. The Banana Wars: United States Intervention in the Caribbean, 1898-1934. Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1985; reprint, Chicago, IL: The Dorsey Press, 1988.

Metcalf, Lieutenant Colonel Clyde H. A History of the United States Marine Corps. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1939.

Millett, Allan R. Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps. Rev. and exp. ed. New York: The Free Press, 1991.

Millett, Richard, and W. Marvin Will, eds. The Restless Caribbean: Changing Patterns of International Relations. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979.

Montague, Ludwell L. Haiti and the United States, 1714-1938. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1940.

Munro, Dana G. Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900-1921. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964; reprint, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980.

Schmidt, Hans. Maverick Marine: General Smedley D. Butler and the Contradictions of American Military History. Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1987.

Spark, Major Michael. "Marines, Guerrillas, and Small Wars." In The Guerrilla - And How to Fight Him, ed. Lieutenant Colonel T. N. Greene. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962.

Wiarda, Howard J., and Harvey F. Kline, eds. Latin American Politics and Development. 3rd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990.

Periodicals and Articles

Arnold, S. L., and David T. Stahl. "A Power Projection Army in Operations Other Than War." Parameters 20, no. 3 (Winter 1993-4): 26.

Ballendorf, Dirk A. "Earl Hancock Ellis: A Final Assessment." Marine Corps Gazette 74, no. 11 (November 1990): 78-87.

- Ballendorf, Dirk A. "Earl Hancock Ellis: The Man and His Mission." United States Naval Institute Proceedings, 109 no. 11 (November 1983): 53-60.
- Carlson, Captain Evan F. "The Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua." Marine Corps Gazette 21, no. 3 (August 1937): 7-20.
- Edson, Captain Merritt A. "The Coco Patrol." Marine Corps Gazette 20, no. 3 (August 1936): 18-23, 38-48; no. 4 (November 1936): 40-41, 60-72; 21, no. 1 (February 1937): 35-43, 57-63.
- Ellis, Major E. H. "Bush Brigades." Marine Corps Gazette 6, no. 1 (March 1921): 1-15.
- Hanneken, Major Herman H. "A Discussion of the Voluntario Troops in Nicaragua." Marine Corps Gazette 26, no. 4 (November 1942): 120, 247-266.
- Harrington, Major Samuel M. "The Strategy and Tactics of Small Wars." Marine Corps Gazette 6, no. 4 (December 1921): 474-491; 7, no. 1 (March 1922): 83-92.
- Heinl, Colonel Robert D. "Small Wars -- Vanishing Art?" Marine Corps Gazette 34, no. 4 (April 1950): 23-25.
- Jacobson, Lieutenant Colonel Arnold. "Do We Need Artillery in Small Wars?" Marine Corps Gazette 19, no. 3 (August 1935): 28-9.
- Jandora, John W. "Threat Parameters for Operations Other Than War." Parameters XXV, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 53-67.
- McClellan, Major Edwin N. "The Saga of the Coco." Marine Corps Gazette 15, no. 3 (November 1930): 14-17, 71-79.
- McGeary, Johanna. "Did the Mission Matter?" Time 147, no. 8 (19 February 1996).
- Miller, Major Charles J. "Marine Corps Schools, 1934-1935." Marine Corps Gazette 19, no. 2 (August 1934): 57-60.
- Montross, Lynn. "The Mystery of Pete Ellis." Marine Corps Gazette 38, no. 7 (July 1954): 30-3.
- Moore, Major R. Scott. "Small War Lessons Learned." Marine Corps Gazette 77, no. 2 (February 1993): 32-36.
- Pierce, Lieutenant Colonel P. N. "The Unsolved Mystery of Pete Ellis." Marine Corps Gazette 46, no. 2 (February 1962): 34-40.
- Powell, Colin L. "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead." Foreign Affairs 71, no. 5 (Winter 1992/93): 32-45.
- Schaffer, Ronald. "The 1940 Small Wars Manual and the Lessons of History." Military Affairs 36 (April 1972): 46-51.
- Simmons, Edwin H. "The Marines and Crises Control." United States Naval Institute Proceedings 91, no. 11 (November 1965): 26-35.

Utley, Major Harold H. "An Introduction to the Tactics of Small Wars." Marine Corps Gazette 16, no. 1 (May 1931): 50-53; 18, no. 2 (August 1933): 44-48; no. 3 (November 1933): 43-47.

Weltsch, Major Michael D. "Nationbuilding and the Marine Corps." Marine Corps Gazette 77, no. 2 (February 1993): 30-32.

Williams, Brigadier General Dion. "The Education of a Marine Officer." Marine Corps Gazette. 18, no. 2 (August 1933): 17-28.

Zinni, Lieutenant General Anthony. "It's Not Nice and Neat." United States Naval Institute Proceedings, 121, no. 8 (August 1995): 26-30.

Government Documents

Center for Army Lessons Learned. Operation Uphold Democracy: Initial Impressions. Vol. I. Fort Leavenworth, KS: U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1994.

Center for Army Lessons Learned. Operation Uphold Democracy: Initial Impressions. Vol. II. Fort Leavenworth, KS: U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1994.

Center for Army Lessons Learned. Operation Uphold Democracy: Initial Impressions. Vol. III. Fort Leavenworth, KS: U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1995.

Combined Joint Task Force Haiti. Change 1 to Operation Order, 081600Z September 94. Caribbean Region Collection, Automated Historical Archives System, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Joint Chiefs of Staff. National Military Strategy of the United States of America. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995.

Marine Corps Schools. Small Wars Operations. 1935 Revision. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Schools, Marine Barracks, 1935.

Marine Corps Schools. Small Wars Operations. 1938 Revision. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Schools, Marine Barracks, 1938.

United States Atlantic Command. Operation Uphold Democracy: Joint After Action Report (JAAR). 1995.

U.S. Army. FM 100-5, Operations. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1993.

U.S. Joint Staff. Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1993.

U.S. Joint Staff. Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1995.

U.S. Joint Staff. Joint Pub 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1993.

U.S. Joint Staff. Joint Test Pub 3-57, Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs Operations. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1991.

U.S. Marine Corps. NAVMC 2890, Small Wars Manual (Reprint of 1940 Edition). Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 1987.

U.S. Army and Air Force. FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, Low Intensity Conflict. Washington, DC: Departments of the Army and Air Force, 1990.

Unpublished Materials

Combined Joint Task Force Haiti. "Change 1 to Operation Order, 081600Z September 94." Caribbean Region Collection, Automated Historical Archives System, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Francis, Anthony A. "History of the Marine Corps Schools." Manuscript, Marine Corps Schools, Marine Barracks, Quantico, VA, 1945.

Gonzalez, Major Emilio T. "Intervention and Occupation in Haiti: A Case Study in Irregular Warfare." Paper, U.S. Naval War College, 1994.

"Harrington, Samuel M. BGEM USMC (RET)" Folder, Research Section, History and Museum Division, Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington.

Hoffman, Captain Jon T. "The Coco River Patrol and The Small Wars Manual." Thesis, The Ohio State University, 1989.

Jones, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas S. "Counterinsurgency: Let's Not Cheat At Solitaire." Paper, U.S. Naval War College, 1989.

Macak, Major Richard J., Jr. "Yesterdays Doctrine For Today's Contingencies: The Small Wars Manual and The Security Assistance Force in Low Intensity Conflict." Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1988.

Marsh, Lieutenant Colonel Vicki T. "The Small Wars Manual: Prologue to Current Operations." Paper, U.S. Naval War College, 1992.

Streng, Major Peter J. "Lessons From the Marine Intervention in Haiti, 1915-1934." Master of Military Art and Science Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1995.

"Utley, Harold H. LTCOL USMC DEC" Folder, Research Section, History and Museum Division, Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington.

Utley, Major Harold H. "The Tactics and Techniques of Small Wars." Manuscript, Harold H. Utley Papers, Box V, Personal Papers Section, History and Museum Division, Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington.

Other Sources

Interviews

Hittle, Brigadier General James D., USMC (Retired). Interview by author, 19 December 1995, Washington, DC. Tape Recording.

Idiart, Lieutenant Colonel Philip L., USA, J5 Directorate, United States Atlantic Command. Interview by Lieutenant Colonel Walter Ketchick and Dr. Robert Baumann, 6 December 1995. Tape recording. Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Jones, Colonel Thomas S., USMC. Interview by author, 19 December 1995, Quantico, VA.

Langdon, Colonel John, USMC. Deputy Director, Plans and Policy Division, J5 Directorate, United States Atlantic Command. Telephone interview by author, 5 April 1996.

Krulak, Lieutenant General Victor H., USMC (Retired). Interview by author, 27 December 1995, San Diego, CA. Tape Recording.

Shelton, Lieutenant General Henry H., USA. Commander, Joint Task Force 180. Interview by Steve E. Dietrich, 22 October 1994. Transcript, Caribbean Region Collection, Automated Historical Archives System, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Twining, General Merrill B., USMC (Retired). Interview by author, 27 December 1995, Rancho Santa Fe, CA. Tape Recording.

Letters

Colonel E. B. Miller Memorandum for General Russell, 12 May 1934, National Archives, Record Group 127, Box 60, Washington.

[Marine Corps Schools] Schools Special Order Number 53, 6 September 1934, National Archives, Record Group 127, Box 60, Washington.

[Marine Corps Schools] Memorandum, 16 November 1933, National Archives, Record Group 127, Box 60, Washington.

School Memorandum, Marine Corps Schools, 3 June 1931, Historical Amphibious File 43, Archives Branch, Marine Corps Research Center, Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA.

The Commandant, Marine Corps Schools to The Major General Commandant, 14 November 1933, National Archives, Record Group 127, Box 60. Washington.

The Commandant, Marine Corps Schools to The Major General Commandant, 22 January 1934, National Archives, Record Group 127, Box 60, Washington.

The Commandant, Marine Corps Schools to The Major General Commandant, 20 September 1934, National Archives, Record Group 127, Box 60, Washington.

The Commandant, Marine Corps Schools to The Major General Commandant, 1 October 1934, National Archives, Record Group 127, Box 60, Washington.

The Director, Division of Operations and Training to The Major General Commandant, 5 June 1934, National Archives, Record Group 127, Box 60, Washington.

The Director, Division of Operations and Training to The Assistant to The Major General Commandant, 23 June 1934, National Archives, Record Group 127, Box 60, Washington.

World Wide Web

"Electoral Campaigning." http://www.cforc.com/haiti/ayiti_77.htm (7 December 1995).

"Haiti--Land of Beauty and Misery." <http://www.cforc.com/haiti/stats.htm> (30 December 1995).

"Haiti's New Police Soon Will Be On Their Own: Are They Up To The Job?"
http://www.cforc.com/haiti/ayiti_78.htm.

"Preval Sworn in as President of Haiti."
<http://www-cgi.cnn.com/WORLD/9602/haiti/index.html> (7 February 1996).

Teeple, Jim. "Preval Wins Haiti Vote."
http://www.cforc.com/haiti/ayiti_91.htm.

Briefings

"UNMIH Command Brief." Briefing slides.

"The 2d Brigade Combat Team." Briefing slides.

"MTG NOTES UNMIH-AT/CJTF-190(J5) OF 7 OCT 1994."

"Haiti: Unconventional Operations." 3rd Special Forces Group (ABN) briefing slides, 12 December 1994.

"Planning For Operations in Haiti: Lessons Learned From Operation Uphold Democracy." United States Atlantic Command J5 Special Planning Group briefing slides, 4 December 1995.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Combined Arms Research Library
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
1 Reynolds Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352
2. Defense Technical Information Center
Cameron Station
Alexandria, VA 22314
3. Marine Corps Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University
Quantico, VA 22134
4. U.S. Marine Corps Historical Center
Building 58
Washington Navy Yard
Washington, DC 20374-5040
5. Dr. Jerold E. Brown
Combat Studies Institute
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
1 Reynolds Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352
6. Dr. John T. Fishel
Department of Joint and Combined Operations
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
1 Reynolds Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352
7. LtCol. Ron R. McFarland, USMC
Department of Joint and Combined Operations
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
1 Reynolds Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

1. Certification Date: 7 June 1996
2. Thesis Author: Major Richard C. McMonagle, USMC
3. Thesis Title: The Small Wars Manual and Military Operations Other Than War

4. Thesis Committee Members
Signatures:

David E. Braun
A.J. McMonagle
J.C. F. Lee

5. Distribution Statement: Approved for public release;
distribution is unlimited.

6. MMAS Thesis Author's Signature:

Richard C. McMonagle